



March 5, 2021

Nurturing and Transforming Spaces for Young Filipinos to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism in the Philippines

Caroliza Tulod-Peteros Candy Cañez Diez Lucia Latoc-Tangi

Kristiyano-Islam (KRIS) Peace Library



Content

■ Chapter 1: Introduction	1
■ Background of the Study	1
■ Research Problem and Objectives	15
■ Significance of the Research	16
■ Chapter 2 : Review of Related Literature	17
■ Literature Review	17
■ Analytical Framework	58
■ Context Analysis and Needs Assessment	59



Content

■ Chapter 3 : Methodology	61
■ Research Methods	61
■ Key Informants	63
■ Limitation of Research/ Study	64
■ Chapter 4 : Research Findings	65
■ Survey Results and Discussion	65
■ Findings from Quantitative Survey	73
■ Key Informant Interviews	90
■ Chapter 5 : Analysis	170
■ Chapter 6 : Conclusion and Recommendations	185



LIST OF ACRONYMS

- ASG _____ Abu Sayyaf Group
- BARMM _____ Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
- NPA _____ New People's Army
- CPP _____ Communist Party of the Philippines
- NCR _____ National Capital Region
- NDF _____ National Democratic Front
- MILF _____ Moro Islamic Liberation Front
- MNLF _____ Moro National Liberation Front
- PVE _____ Prevention of Violent Extremism
- VE _____ Violent Extremism

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

The face of violence in the country has been evolving and new labels have emerged to describe the nature and perpetrators of violence. At the height of the struggles for autonomy by the Moro people especially in the Southern part of Mindanao, the terms “rebels,” “Islamic separatists,” and “insurgents” (Counter-extremism project, n.d.) were used to describe the members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) as well as with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). On the other hand, the Communist Party of the Philippines-National Democratic Front through its armed force, the New People’s Army (CPP-NDF-NPA) which has been waging a protracted war against the government since the 1970s are labeled as “nationalist rebels” (Counter-extremism project, n.d.). Leaders and or spokespersons of these groups who came out in the media were adults, many in their senior years, and male.

The stereotype image of “rebel” leaders changed in early 2000 with the emergence of Khadaffy Janjalani as leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Sulu. Janjalani was only in his 20’s then when he represented a new face of perpetrators of violence in the country. The ASG is a breakaway faction of the MNLF and is considered as the most violent Islamic separatist group in the Philippines because of the high-profile assassinations and bombings carried out by members (Stanford University, 2018).

Around this time, the terms “rebels,” “insurgents,” and “terrorists” were used inter-changeably to describe groups that waged violent actions. In recent years, a faction of ASG has been reported to pledge allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Levant (ISIS/L), which is notorious for recruiting young people among its many violent tactics. The phrase “violent extremism” also emerged, considered as more inclusive than the term terrorism (Glazzard & Zeuther, 2016).

Indeed, the cycle of violence in the country, rooted from centuries of colonization that resulted to structural inequalities, marginalization, historical injustices, and human rights violations especially committed among Muslims and indigenous peoples in Mindanao takes on different faces and forms.


The Philippine government has been waging military campaigns to counter these groups with the goal of securing peace and security.




The 2020 Global Terrorism Index report showed that the country ranked 10th among 163 countries most affected by terrorism, with a score of 7.099 (Vision of Humanity.org.). It is the only Southeast Asian country to land in the top ten list.

On the other hand, the human rights situation in the country is deteriorating. CIVICUS Monitor Asia-Pacific in its December 2020 report “downgraded the Philippines' status from "obstructed" to "repressed"—the second-lowest level on a scale of civic space. According to Josef Benedict, Civic Space Research Officer, there is “systematic intimidation, attacks and vilification of civil society and activists, an increased crackdown on press freedoms and a pervasive culture of impunity take root (Cabico, 2020). Since the assumption to office of the Duterte administration in 2016, a war on drugs has been waged resulting to an estimated 27,000 extrajudicial killings (Human Rights Watch) of suspected drug users and peddlers, whose victims come mostly from poor communities.

Further, 22 mayors included in an unverified drug list of local officials supposedly involved in the drug trade made public by the president have been killed as of December 2020 (Manahan, 2020). A research on populism and the drug war found that outsider mayors, to get the attention and support of the president, supported the drug war. The study noted that “the traditional patronage network was replaced with loyalty in exchange for the killings” (Aspinwall, 2020). Lawyers, judges, and prosecutors are not spared, too. As of November 2020, 53 lawyers, 8 judges, and 10 prosecutors have been killed since July 2016 (Buan, 2022). Killings of human rights defenders, environmentalists, and farmers asserting their rights to land are on the rise, too.



Moreover, press freedom is continually attacked, with journalists harassed, intimidated, or even killed. ABS-CBN, the biggest television network, was shutdown in July 2020 when the Duterte controlled Congress denied renewing its franchise. The president accused the network of bias during the 2016 electoral campaign and perceived it as allied with the station of being biased for not airing his political ad in 2016. The network's coverage of the drug war angered the president, too. (Regencia, 2020). Red tagging of critics, from celebrities to ordinary citizens are alarming especially with the enactment of an Anti-terrorism law approved in July 2020 which expanded the definition of terrorism and giving authority to an Anti-Terrorism Council composed of presidential appointees to designate persons as terrorists (Buan, 2020).



Given the above situation, peace in the country remains fragile. The Philippines ranked 129 among 163 countries in the 2020 Global Peace Index (Vision of Humanity.org). Within Asia Pacific, the Philippines ranked 18th, making it the second lowest peaceful country, with North Korea (rank 19) on the bottom list) of the 19 countries in the region. The Global Peace Index (GPI) measures the presence or absence of war, the absence of violence or the fear of violence across three domains: Safety and Security, Ongoing Conflict, and Militarization.

Project sites

This research covers four areas in Mindanao - the cities of Marawi, Davao, and Zamboanga, and the municipality of Jolo, in the province of Sulu, and the National Capital Region, composed of 16 cities and one municipality.

The City of Marawi, Province of Lanao del Sur

Marawi City is a landlocked component city of Lanao del Sur and is located 3,500 miles above sea level (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2013). It has a land area of 87.55 square kilometers or 33.80 square miles representing 0.65% of the total area of Lanao del Sur (PhilAtlas, n.d.). The people of Marawi are majority Maranaos (meaning lake dwellers) as they live around Lake Lanao. Based on the 2015 census, it had a population of 201,785 (PhilAtlas, n.d.), where 51.5 percent were males and 48.5 percent were females (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2019). The province of Lanao del Sur where Marawi City belongs, is classified in 2015 as the poorest province in the country with a poverty rate of 74.3%, a sharp increase from only 44% in 2006 (Gavilan, 2016).

Historically, the people of Marawi, through their Maranao warriors, fiercely resisted the Spanish military forces who attempted to colonize them in 1640 (Custodio, 2019). It was only on March 10, 1895 when the Spanish forces succeeded and conquered the Fort of Marawi (Custodio, 2019). In 1906, the Americans came over and organized it into a village. Being predominantly Muslims by faith, it was declared an Islamic City by its City Council in 1980 (Custodio, 2019).

A research by De Vera, Indoyon, and Barbin (2016) on political stability and business confidence described Marawi as “the cheating capital” of the then Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao when it comes to electoral contests. Politicians compete for control of electoral positions through vote buying and violence. An earlier study by Stratchan in 2015 and Lara (2016, also cited in De Vera, et al, 2016) described a state of lawlessness in the province of Lanao del Sur, making it a potent ground for shadow economies to thrive such as illegal drugs, arms trade, kidnapping for ransom, and informal land markets.

On May 23, 2017, an Islamic State-inspired Maute Group attacked different parts of Marawi City and occupied the city, particularly the commercial and city center. The fighting resulted in the displacement of thousands of people - more than 290,000 individuals according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) on June 9, 2017. The government declared Marawi “liberated” in October 2017 and a comprehensive rehabilitation program was underway. Of its 96 barangays, 24 are most affected, and around 100,000 of the displaced, half of the city’s population, are still living in temporary shelters (UN OCHA, 2017).

The impact of the war, compounded by the inability of the government to meet its promise to rehabilitate the city, is fueling deep seated discontent. Anti-government sentiment and extremist recruitment even in temporary shelters are reportedly ongoing. The recruitment incentive is too tempting for the impoverished young to refuse: sign-up bonus could be between 20,000 to 50,000 pesos (\$390 to \$1,000) plus a monthly allowance. Young students in local universities are also recruited using the narrative of injustice inflicted on the Maranaos (Regencia, 2019).

The recruits were described in a study to be a diverse mix of college students who were quite knowledgeable about computers from “university campuses in Mindanao, including through Muslim student organizations and their alumni at Catholic institutions as well as at state universities and polytechnic institutes¹” (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2017, p.10; cited in The Asia Foundation & Rappler, 2018).

Marawi is also the home of the main campus of the Mindanao State University.

The Municipality of Jolo, Province of Sulu

The Municipality of Jolo is the capital of the province of Sulu, an archipelago that stretches 170 miles (270 km) southwest from Basilan and ends near the eastern shores of Sabah, Malaysia (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017). The Sulu sea along with Indonesian and Celebes seas is the center of the world’s tropical marine biodiversity.

On the other hand, the Sulu sea, historically, is also a hot spot for piracy and armed robbery. Jolo is the center of trade and commerce in the province and has a pier and airport. Its pier can accommodate small to large vessels, even a naval craft. Its people buy and sell their produce i.e. rice, sugar, cooking oil, etc. in Sabah, Malaysia’s northwest state (International Alert, 2015) as this is nearer than going to the mainland city of Zamboanga which would take them eight hours on a regular boat at less than three hundred pesos (and 3.5 hours by fast craft for a fare of P800-900 pesos).

¹ Information is based on an IPAC interview in October 2016 with a senior military officer in Cotabato. Originally published by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict in 2017, and reported by Natashya Gutierrez in the Rappler article, “How pro-ISIS fighters recruited Filipino youth for Marawi Siege” in 2017. This interview was also quoted by the Asia Foundation & Rappler in their 2018 research study, “Understanding Violent Extremism: Messaging and recruitment Strategies on Social Media in the Philippines.”

Majority of the people in Jolo and the province of Sulu are Tausugs, from the words “tau” and “sūg” (or suluk in Malay) meaning "people of the current," in reference to their homeland in the Sulu archipelago (Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.). The Tausugs are regarded as experienced sailors and are known for their colorful vintas (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017). They are also known for their bravery and described as superb warriors. Also, there are Samal people, those who once lived on boats but settled inland; and those of Chinese descent. It is an island with many extinct volcanoes and the principal economic activity of the people is fishing. It also has thick forests.

The people of Jolo and Sulu in general went through a cycle of violence – repression and resistance, dating back to the Spanish conquest. It is the birthplace of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a Tausug-led armed group who waged war for the recognition of the Bangsamoro state, with many young Moros as members. Violent incidents such as the 1974 burning of the town where reportedly, 20,000 people died (MNLF account) as a result of air, land, and sea bombardment by the military against the newly-formed MNLF (Saada, 2017; Saguisag, 2019).

A study by The Asia Foundation (2019) concluded that the continuing cycle of poverty and violent conflict served as fertile ground for the formation of other armed groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), listed in the UN Security website as a group formed in 1990 by Abdurajak Janjalani, a former member of the MNLF and engaged in criminal and terrorist activities including kidnap for ransom, bombings, extortion, and murders. The group is described to be associated with Al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah, and one study stated that it aims to establish an Iranian-style Islamic state in the southern Philippines (Banlaoi, 2009).

Isnlon Hapilon, a leader of an ASG faction, reportedly pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014 and “united ragtag rebels from the jungle, university-educated ideologues and even former Catholics with the particular zeal of the converted” (Beech & Gutierrez, 2019). Other cases such as the bombing of the Jolo Cathedral during a Sunday mass in January 2019 was claimed by ISIS (Gotinga, 2019; BBC News, 2019).

The Mindanao State University-Jolo campus and Notre Dame University are two of the known schools in the area.

The historical context of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur and Jolo, Sulu, being inhabited by a Muslim majority who resisted colonization and conversion is very important in understanding the vulnerability of its youth to violent extremism.

Zamboanga City

Zamboanga City is a highly urbanized city in the Zamboanga Peninsula with a population of 862,000 (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2016) distributed among its 98 coastal and upland barangays based on the 2015 census. The age group with the highest population in Zamboanga City is 15 to 19, with 94,716 individuals (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2016). The dominant people of Zamboanga are called Zamboangeno-Chavacano. They speak Chavacano, a Spanish-based creole language. Other ethnic groups are Tausug (16.4%), Bisaya/Binisaya (12.3%), and the rest are Cebuano, Sama (Samal) Abaknon, Yakan, Tagalog, Hiligaynon/Ilonggo, and others (25.8%) (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2002). There are also Bajaos who live onboard their sailboats and in stilt-raised homes during the storms (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018). In terms of religion, 64.82% of the documented individuals are Catholics, while 16.62% are Muslims in Zamboanga Peninsula (PSA, 2017).

The city has a port that serves vessels plying to and from Basilan and Sulu, Manila and other destinations in the country as well as oceangoing vessels. It also has an international airport.

Zamboanga was founded by the Spanish forces in 1635 and it still has remnants of the Spanish architecture. In 1700, the Fort Pilar and the shrine of Our Lady of the Pillar were built by the Spanish forces supposedly for the protection of Christians from Moro pirates (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2018; Barrios-Fabian, 2004). Now, the city is labeled “Asia’s Latin City” due to Hispanic influences in its culture and religion and its Chavacano language (Rood, 2013). Economically, the city also prides itself as site of many Sardines factory, thus earning it the Sardines capital of the country (Salvador, 2014).

In the recent past, key incidents showed an observable strong anti-Muslim sentiment in the city. Public officials voted against its inclusion in the previous Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, a result of the peace agreement signed in September 1996 (Rood, 2013) between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). During the formation of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), an interim body created under the said signed peace agreement, local Christians stand united against it. They had fears of Muslim domination once the Council is established. They did not trust Misuari, too, who was appointed by then President Ramos to head the SPCPD (Gloria, 2013). When the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain was to be signed between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 2008, the city, led by its officials, also registered its strong opposition and campaigned hard against it. These officials held a “victory celebration” when the Supreme Court junked the MOA-AD (GMA News, 2008). The city also registered its opposition to the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, and did not want to be included in the Bangsamoro territory (Elemia, 2018).

The city has both private and state colleges and universities. Some of these are the Western Mindanao State University, Zamboanga State College of Marine Science and Technology, and Ateneo de Zamboanga.

Davao City

Davao City is a highly urbanized city within the province of Davao del Sur. It has a population of 1,632,991 based on the 2015 census². It is a big city with 244, 000 hectares, thus considered the largest city in the world (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2017). The city was rebuilt after World War 2 with Spanish, American, and Moorish influences (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2013). It has rich agricultural lands that produce bananas, coffee, pomelo, durian, mangosteen, abaca, coconut, rice and corn and lies at the mouth of the Davao River near the Davao Gulf. It also has two busy ports servicing inter-island and overseas vessels. It is now the country's second most important city being the home of current Philippine president, Rodrigo Duterte.

The original inhabitants of Davao are indigenous peoples from five tribes - Bagobo-Klata, Ata, Obu-Manuvu, Matigsalug, and Bagobo-Tagabawa and six 6 Moro tribes - (Sama, Maranao, Kagan, Iranun, Maguindanaon, and Taosug). Majority of the population in Davao now are Visayan migrants (Dejeto, 2018).

During the martial law period³, Davao City was a hotbed of insurgency and earned the label as "killing fields" with many cases of extrajudicial killings (then called salvaging) attributed to both the CPP-NPA-NDF and the military.

² Male 825,100 and Female 807,891 based on PSA data.

³ On September 23, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law in the Philippines. This marked the beginning of a 14-year period of one-man rule which would effectively last until Marcos was exiled from the country on February 24, 1986.

In 1984, a vigilante group “Alsa Masa” was established in Agdao, a depressed barangay and a stronghold of the NPA. Many cases of human rights violations attributed to Alsa Masa killings were reported in Agdao against suspected members of the CPP-NPA-NDF that earned it the monicker “Nicaragdao,” in reference to a similar situation in Nicaragua (Bueza, 2016). In later years, vigilante killings were directed against suspected drug users and peddlers. Then mayor and now president of the republic, Rodrigo Duterte was mayor of the city after martial law and he vowed to “restore law and order in the city” (Peel, 2017). As the city progressed, and the crime rates dropped, extrajudicial killings attributed to the “Davao Death Squads” were on the rise. Human rights groups accused the mayor of responsibility for the killings. Atrocities committed by the so called “Davao Death Squads” form part of the case lodged against Duterte at the International Criminal Court (Ellis-Pettersen, 2018).

Aside from communist insurgents, drugs and petty criminal activities, Davao City has been the target of activities of other armed groups, described by authorities as “Muslim terror groups” or Islamic militants. There was the March 4, 2003, bombing of the old international airport allegedly by the Jemaah Islamiyah and the explosion at its transport terminal on February 14, 2005 claimed by the Abu Sayyaf (Ressa, 2016); and the bombing of a night market last September 3, 2016 allegedly by the Maute Group, then described as “a small Islamist group that sought to attract the attention of the Islamic State” (Villamor, 2017).

Davao City is an important gateway to other Southeast Asian countries through the Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East Asean Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA). With the current administration's pivot to China policy, the Chinese government considers the city as 'pilot city' for its increased cooperation with Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA)⁴ economic sub-region (BIMP-EAGA, n.d.).

Davao also has many state and private universities, such as the Mindanao University, University of the Philippines-Mindanao, and Ateneo de Davao. A significant number of medical students from South Asia are also studying in the city's medical schools.

National Capital Region (NCR)

The National Capital Region or Metro Manila is composed of 16 highly urbanized cities and one municipality. These cities are Manila, Mandaluyong, Marikina, Pasig, Quezon City, San Juan, Caloocan, Malabon, Navotas, Valenzuela, Las Pinas, Makati, Muntinlupa, Paranaque, Pasay, Taguig, and the municipality of Taguig. Based on the 2015 census, it has a total population of 12,877,253, with Quezon City as the most populous with 2.94 million with 1,706 barangays (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2016).

⁴ BIMP-EAGA was founded in 1994 in Davao. Its focus areas include the entire sultanate of Brunei Darussalam; the provinces of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, West Papua and Papua in Indonesia; the states of Sabah and Sarawak and the federal territory of Labuan in Malaysia; and Mindanao and the province of Palawan in the Philippines.

As the country's center of trade, commerce, industry, education; the seat of power of government, Metro Manila attracts migrants from rural and sub-urban populations who seek a better future. There are many informal settlement communities in Metro Manila and the highest concentration is in Quezon City. In urban poor communities of Metro Manila, the right to housing has been the struggle of informal settlers for decades. In these communities, various ethnic groups from the provinces including indigenous peoples and Moro are affected by this issue. Many of them have been wounded, imprisoned, some even killed in the course of their struggle even during the martial law period. Recently, under the Duterte presidency, informal communities in Metro Manila have been targeted by the government's war on drugs. Human rights groups have documented thousands of victims but their cries for justice remained elusive.

Metro Manila experienced some violent attacks attributed by the government to the ASG in 2004. These were the bombing of Superferry 14 in Manila Bay, reportedly by a faction led by Khadaffy Janjalani (Reuters in Manila, 2004). An attempt to conduct a series of bombings the following month was foiled with the arrest of an ASG cell. In 2005, an Abu Sayyaf leader, Abu Solaiman, claimed responsibility for the bombing of a bus in Makati City. It was meant as "Valentine's gift" to the government of then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo for its supposed atrocities committed against Muslims everywhere (The Associated Press, 2005). A similar incident happened in 2011 but no group claimed responsibility.

Two of the five sites selected – Jolo, and Marawi City share a common history of colonization and fierce resistance from colonizing forces. These two areas have been and continues to be vulnerable to violent extremism owing to their connection with Moro liberation movements whose factions later on deviated from their idealisms of freedom and recognition of the Bangsamoro identity and became part of the international expansion of ISIS.

1.2 Research Problems and Objectives

The road to peace and social cohesion can be long and difficult. This research focuses on providing a comprehensive and practical understanding of the problem of youth involvement and recruitment in violent extremism and to suggest ways on how to reach, engage, mobilize the youth, and nurture spaces to build networks in preventing violent extremism. Five cities in the Philippines – National Capital Region (NCR), Davao City, Zamboanga City, Marawi City and Jolo City - are identified for this research.

This research aims to achieve the following objectives:

- 1 To find out what forms of violent extremism exist in the five target cities in the Philippines;
- 2 To establish how young people in urban areas define and understand violent extremism as opposed to the definition of the EU and civil society;
- 3 To identify the push and pull factors, including the role of institutions such as family, peers, schools, media, especially social media, that drive urban youth towards violent extremism in the target cities;
- 4 To analyze the impact of violent extremism on youth's economic opportunities, education, and community dynamics;
- 5 To examine how gender affects the youth involvement and recruitment in violent extremism;
- 6 To draw lessons from local activities and contexts on how to reach, engage and mobilize the youth for preventing violent extremism; and
- 7 To create a training module that will help create and sustain youth networks for building a youth movement for the prevention of violent extremism.

1.3 Significance of the Research

Youth involvement in violent extremism is a social phenomenon in many parts of the world, including the Philippines. By identifying the factors that drive young people to join extremist groups, this research can suggest appropriate forms of intervention in order to prevent violent extremism.

This research is also expected to provide a comprehensive understanding of youth involvement in violent extremism and can serve as a guide to stakeholders and policy makers in introducing an inclusive approach to prevent violent extremism.

Chapter 2: Review of Related Literature

2.1 Literature Review

The peace and conflict context of a country such as the Philippines needs a study that reflects the diverse ethno-linguistic, and religious faiths that create the socio-political and cultural landscape influencing extremism and violence.

Across the range of literature available, there are gray areas in defining what constitutes radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism - which are integral components in studying critical areas for intervention and engagement in key cities. Among its various objectives, this study will also seek to identify existing definitions available in both the global and local discourses on violent extremism.

This review seeks to study existing research to explore the phenomenon of violent extremism including the factors that determine extremism and the immediate landscape in which violent extremism occurs. This section discusses key literature written in recent years including studies of respondents in post-conflict settings where individuals were radicalized and joined armed groups.

Violent extremism and the Philippine landscape: Depth and Scale

The country witnessed the historical use of arms by non-state actors in varying contexts and period. To provide clarity and understanding on the extent of violent extremism in the Philippines, the nature of the armed groups can be categorized as follows:

1 Armed insurgent and secessionist groups

The country witnessed the historical use of arms by non-state actors in varying contexts and period. To provide clarity and understanding on the extent of violent extremism in the Philippines, the nature of the armed groups can be categorized as follows:

Communist Party of the Philippines - New People's Army (CPP-NPA)

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) started the revolutionary struggle in 1968 (Stanford University, 2018). 51 years since the group waged the armed struggle, the CPP continues its operations - launching both urban and rural operations by its armed unit - the New People's Army (NPA) (Stanford University, 2018).

The CPP-NPA have since attempted to overthrow the Philippine government system, and while the numbers have dwindled over the years, the groups remains active and have launched reported attacks. Since the CPP-NPA leadership called for an end to the ceasefire last May 2020, attacks were launched in various areas - among the recent ones include the encounter in Paquibato District, Davao City during the distribution of the Social Amelioration Package for families affected by COVID-19 (Palicte, 2020). Other attacks occurred during the various stages of the quarantine e.g. encounter last August in Ilocos Sur, etc. (Cimatu, 2020).



Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

The Moro National Liberation Struggle has its roots in the marginalization of the Muslim population in the population as manifested in the structural discrimination, historical revisionism and direct attacks against the community - with the Jabidah massacre recognized as one of the key provocation for the struggle to liberate Mindanao (Stanford University, 2019). An Islamic separatist group formed to create an independent Islamic state, it operates in the Southern provinces of the Philippines. It was formed in 1972 and at present contains numerous factions (Stanford University, 2019).



Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

The group separated from the MNLF in 1997 and was formally identified with the name MILF in 1984. With an initially same purpose, the splinter group led by Hashim Salamat attempted to wrest control over MNLF under Nur Misuari (Stanford University, 2019). Ending with the failure of the take-over, Salamat proceeded with creating the MILF. Due to the consistent peace negotiations with the group, a peace agreement was finally agreed on and in 2014, both the Philippine government and the MILF leadership decided on a set of agreements including the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) (Stanford University, 2019). The group is no longer an active armed group at present and has started its decommissioning process (Stanford University, 2019).


2 Terrorist Groups

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

The ASG remains active at present and considered among the “most dangerous militant group in the Philippines” (Stanford University, 2019). Formed in 1991, ASG was initially as an Islamic separatist organization led by Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani. It also separated from the MNLF and proceeded to conduct its high-profile operations through bombings, kidnappings, attacks, among others (Stanford University, 2019). Reportedly influenced by Al Qaeda, the group was also linked to the Marawi Siege (Stanford University, 2019).

Maute Group

Led by the Maute brothers - Omar and Abdullah, the group attacked and occupied Marawi in a siege that lasted for 5 months (Hwang, 2019). The brothers were also notably well-connected and wealthy (Hwang, 2019). Both have previously studied in the Middle East. The reasons were quite unclear on how the brothers became radicalized and what triggered the shift to violent extremism (Hwang, 2019). Omar later on married an Indonesia woman but his extreme Wahabi views led to his expulsion from his wife’s family Islamic boarding school.



Among the reported strategies for recruitment and indoctrination by the Maute brothers include teaching Qur'an to children, later on providing paramilitary training from 2013-2015 in Butig. Later on, the brothers expanded their influence and brought together different clans i.e. Maranao, Tausug, and Maguindanao to form a coalition of pro-Islamic State groups (Hwang, 2019). Other groups such as Isnlon Hapilon's⁵ break-away group from the ASG, a cell from Cotabato, and a group called Ansharul Khalifa Philippines (AKP) in Sultan Kudarat (Hwang, 2019). The Maute brothers escalated their operations in 2016 which led to the Marawi attack and siege of the city (Hwang, 2019). Following the Philippine Military's take-over of Marawi, the brothers were killed in separate encounters⁶ (ABS-CBN News, 2017).

⁵ Considered as the leader of ISIS in Southeast Asia and was on the US' list of "Most Wanted Terrorists." He was killed by the Philippine military in an armed encounter in 2017 together with Omar Maute. Source: BBC News at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41632434>

⁶Abdullah Maute was killed in September 2017. A month later, Omar Maute was shot dead with Isnlon Hapilon in October 2017. Source: ABS-CBN News at <https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/09/05/17/abdullah-maute-is-dead-says-military>

3 Traditional and political clan violence “rido”

The concept of rido is rooted in the culture of families and clans. A more common idea of rido is a clan feud and the way it uses violence to retaliate against conflicting families and groups (The Asia Foundation, 2013). Rido is also described as “a state of recurring hostilities between families and kinship groups characterized by a series of retaliatory acts of violence carried out to avenge a perceived affront or injustice.” (Torres, 2014, p.4).

Documented cases of Rido from the 1930s to 2005 indicated 1,266 cases of rido with more than 5,500 people dead and thousands displaced (Torres, 2014, p.8). The provinces with the highest rido cases include, “Lanao del Sur (377), Maguindanao (218), Lanao del Norte (164), and Sulu(145)” (Torres, 2014, p.8).

Relevant concept, theories and measurements of violent extremism

Defining key terms on the topic of violent extremism illustrates the relative parameters in which this phenomenon has been articulated. To provide clarity in this literature review, a few key terms will be expounded based on its available expressions in research studies including references among regional and international bodies.

The definition of violent extremism itself creates contentions and leads to different perspectives and stand points. As noted by previous studies and international bodies, there is a present lack of a standard definition of violent extremism.

Among the existing definitions of violent extremism includes definitions within the international and domestic settings. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (2017) refers to violent extremism as “beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goal” (UNESCO, 2017). In addition to this, UNESCO emphasizes that terrorism and other similar acts of violence are included in this definition of violent extremism (UNESCO, 2017).

Meanwhile, the concept of radicalization pertains to:

A process that involves an individual or group committed to a set of beliefs that support acts of extreme violence or terrorism, often aimed at bringing about a social change, which can be manifested in one’s behavior and attitudes (Rahimullah et al, 2013; Schmid, 2013; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009 in Institute for Autonomy and Governance, 2017, p.16).

Extremism, meanwhile, connotes the use of extreme violence. The following is one explicit definition of the term:

A strong will to power by a social movement based on a rigid ideology, which restricts individual freedom in the name of collective goals and is willing to realise their goals by any means, including extreme violence and mass murder (Schmid, 2013 in Institute for Autonomy and Governance, 2017, p.17).

Another term that is discussed interchangeably at times with extremism is the word, terrorism. Similar to the two terms, Terrorism lacks adequate parameters, hence the following description is often used:

Terrorism entails intentional criminal acts that are committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, seriously destabilising or destroying fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation (European Commission (EC), 2006; European Union (EU), 2002; Rahimullah et al., 2013 in Institute for Autonomy and Governance, 2017, p.17).

The term Terrorism also has its local expression in the Philippines - stated in the Republic Act No. 11479, otherwise known as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020.

Section 4 defines Terrorism as an act:

Committed by any person who, within or outside the Philippines, regardless of the stage of execution: a) Engages in acts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person, or endangers a person's life; b) Engages in acts intended to cause extensive or destruction to a government or public facility, public place or private property. damage death or serious bodily injury to any person, or endangers a person's life; c) Engages in acts intended to cause extensive interference with, damage or destruction to critical infrastructure; d) Develops, manufactures, possesses, acquires, transports, supplies or uses weapons, explosives or of biological, nuclear, radiological or chemical weapons; and e) Release of dangerous substances or causing fire, floods and explosions. (Congress of the Philippines, 2020, p.5).

Violent Extremism: Perspectives and Local Narratives

Discussing the definitions of radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism, requires a careful study of the contextual landscape of a particular country and communities affected. Definitions recognized by international actors and subsequently adopted in a domestic setting, may not be accepted by the communities especially those who experienced armed conflict.

Such is the sentiment expressed in a workshop forum hosted by Equal Access International in January 2020. A number of participants reflected on violent extremism and shared their insight that this is a foreign concept. Some participants expressed that once the narrative refers to the armed struggle as a violent extremist activity, it immediately reduces the significance and legitimate basis of insurgencies. Meanwhile, others shared their dissatisfaction because the term is closely linked with security strategies used for military offensives against armed groups (Equal Access International, 2020).

Among local community perspectives, a few studies report of definitions of violent extremism based on the views of local respondents. An example of this is the case of the Maguindanaon respondents invited in the study by The Asia Foundation (2020). They referred to radicalization as, “a negative way of luring young orphans to destructive paths,” and “twists teachings in extreme ways and destroys unity in the revolutionary community” (The Asia Foundation, 2020, p. 78).

4 Theoretical Perspectives on Radicalization and Violent Extremism

Throughout the literature review, several theories and measurements will also be introduced. In reference to these concepts, the relevant literatures will also refer to the ideas posited in these theories and measurements. This sub-section will refer to several relevant theories and emerging thoughts.

Socialization Theory

This particular theory describes the extent of influence of diverse factors within an individual's social interactions. In this study, the different Socialization Theories can be referred to when reviewing the drivers of radicalization and recruitment especially among the youth.

One such theory is the Group Socialization one that highlights the influence of peer groups in a person's life particularly in influencing his/her personality or behavior in contrast to the influence of parental figures in an individual's life (Libretext, 2020).

Expanding this thought, the Group Socialization Theory also describes the relationship of the individual to its group and the possibility of this relationship changing with time. Both the individual and the group itself can alternately be a source and/or recipient of influence⁷ (Levine, Moreland, & Ryan, 1998). While this concept applies to certain types of groups, this theory in itself describes three psychological process that occur within the dynamics of his/her interaction with the said group – evaluation, commitment and role transition (Levine, Moreland, & Ryan, 1998).


⁷ This part describes "temporal change & reciprocal influence."

Evaluation refers to the process wherein the individual and group both assess the “rewardingness of their relationship” (Levine, Moreland, & Ryan, 1998). In this process the group explores the extent of the individual’s contribution to its goals, while the individual reviews how the group actually contributes to meeting his/her needs (Levine, Moreland, & Ryan, 1998). Meanwhile, another process involves commitment – which can be described as the process of expressing one’s commitment. This affects the acceptance of the group, how it responds to the individual’s feelings and needs, and its response to retaining the individual (Levine, Moreland, & Ryan, 1998). Role transition, on the other hand, happens when there are changes in the relationship and expectations of the two parties that require another role and another set of commitments (Levine, Moreland, & Ryan, 1998).

In describing this theory and process, radicalization and recruitment could also contain these elements that influence an individual to join and commit to the group’s objectives.

Agnew’s Revised General Strain Theory

In identifying the factors that affect the drivers of extremism and radicalization, several theories express the pretext of violent extremism. Among these theories include the General Strain Theory by Robert Agnew (Carey, 2016; Nivette et al., 2017). A revision of previous strain theories, Agnew’s revised strain theory is highly recognized among modern criminology (Carey, 2016) as it established an individual’s coping mechanism as the determining factor that drives a person to criminal behavior (Carey, 2016). Agnew asserted that individuals experience different strains that can lead to negative emotions (Agnew, 1992, as cited in Carey, 2016, p.3), and that delinquent tendencies and behavior are a result of pressure (Agnew, 1992).



Agnew's revised strain theory provided a strong emphasis that social class might not be a strong determinant for criminal behavior as previous theorists proposed. Instead, his theory asserted that various strains cut across social class. The coping mechanisms to deal with negative experiences determine criminal tendencies of a person. And this applies to all social classes and not only to the poor (Agnew, 1992, as cited in Carey, 2016, p. 5).

He further expounded this theory to assert that a collective strain is experienced in the context of extremist violence. In such conditions, the collective strains are higher in magnitude, highly unjust and are a result of "more powerful political, social or religious groups" (Agnew, 2010, p.136 as cited in Nivette et al., 2017, p.759).

Agnew's expanded theory provides a framework in which this research study can be supported.



Integrative Complexity

Another concept that will be used for reference is Integrative Complexity. In a policy brief entitled, "Integrative Complexity Interventions to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism," authors Christina Nemir and Sara Savage (2019) introduced the concept of Integrative Complexity (IC) as a measurement for determining the levels of radicalization and shift to violent extremism of individuals (Nemir & Savage, 2019).


Peter Suedfeld and his colleagues developed the concept of IC and has been used to evaluate the shifts of cognitive complexity of individuals engaged in intergroup conflict and analyze its consequences. To further illustrate, a lower IC connotes the tendency for binary and categorical thinking. In a lower IC, the individual or groups in question are unable to consider and integrate various perspectives. A higher IC, meanwhile, shows the capacity of individuals and groups to recognize and integrate various views on a topic (Nemir & Savage, 2019).

Suedfeld's research established how the complexity of thought is shown in one's behavior (Nemir & Savage, 2019). A lower IC can include the inability to recognize the views or values of others as a valid thought. This thinking can lead to intensified conflict. In contrast, a higher IC translates to individuals or groups being more open for mutual understanding. With Higher IC, there is a likelihood of more peaceful resolutions to conflict (Nemir, & Savage, 2019). This measurement remains relevant and can be referred to in designing appropriate strategies to support the prevention of violent extremism.


Emerging Perspectives

While the discourse on radicalization and violent extremism remain dynamic, there are a few emerging views on how radicalization, recruitment and violent extremism occur within the individual, his/her community, and organizations.

One such narrative discusses identity politics as an important consideration - from both an individual and group setting. Identity politics can be expressed in many forms. One involves the idea that an individual is motivated to join violent extremist movements to correct or avenge an injustice committed against a group that he/she identifies with. In this concept, the presence of the "other" is quite dominant (Harper, 2018).





Another manifestation of identity politics happen between an individual and the state, wherein there is a belief that the inequalities experienced by a marginalized group were committed deliberately against them (Harper, 2018). There is also an evident elite interest that takes precedence over the rest of the people's welfare, which is exacerbated by the presence of corruption, nepotism, disenfranchisement, among others (Harper, 2018). This situation describes a state wherein the youth's aspirations and frustrations "collide," which can cause the urge to seek relevance and status in other ways (Harper, 2018). This particular context is exploited by violent extremist groups in their approach to youth recruitment (Harper, 2018).



Other dynamics that can affect individuals is the nature of repression by the state – as seen in the limitations of civic freedoms, various forms of repression and very few options for "rule-based recourse" (Harper, 2018).

Exploring Identity Politics further, there are incidences wherein the motivation for joining groups do not reflect any forms of injustice as previously assumed, but relies on purely individualistic needs – such as financial incentives, rewards in both material and non-material form i.e. jobs, thrill, self-cleansing, "social significance, wealth or marriage" (Harper, 2018, p.15).

Aside from focusing on the individual processes of radicalization and recruitment, it is similarly important to draw attention to "enablers" and how their presence links the individual to a violent extremist group. Enablers can take the form of peer influence, structure, & networks as well as the desire for group belongingness, security, and protection (Harper, 2018).



It is critical to review thoughts and analysis on why incidences of radicalization and violent extremism happen. However, it is similarly important to realize that these phenomena are still evolving. As emphasized by Randy Borum (2011), no single pathway or theory can sufficiently apply to all individuals & groups radicalized and involved in violent extremism. As Walter Laqueur further explained in the context of terrorism, many of these individuals' character "has changed over time and from country to country" and this can also apply to the process of radicalization (Laqueur in Borum, 2011, p.15). This asserts that theories are still emerging and responding to the dynamic process of both radicalization and violent extremism.

5 Drivers of Radicalization, Violent Extremism: Reflections from the Ground

Following the previous expressions of relevant theories and measurements, this section will proceed to identify the dynamics of violent extremism in various research studies and reports.

The context and the effects of the violent extremism perpetrated by the Maute-ISIS group were known to the respondents of the research on the “Moro Youth Perception on Violent Extremism vis-à-vis Drivers of Radicalization and the Influence of Socializing Agents” written by Reemar Alonsagay (n.d.).

The study asserted that the respondents believe the conflict was caused by both political and religious motivations. Interestingly, they expressed disagreements on the violent means utilized by the Maute-ISIS group to achieve their objectives. The clear foundations of peace found in the Islamic faith were found to be one of the basis for this contradictions (Alonsagay, n.d.)

According to the study, the respondents became aware of the context and accessed information from multiple sources. An in-depth look at the socializing agents influencing their views, a number of them provided a positive influence on the respondent’s views about violent extremism. The media, family, peers, religious institution and leaders, school and social milieu influenced the attitude and beliefs of the respondents (Alonsagay, n.d.)

The study also showed that the respondents have a clear notion that the “push” factors leading individuals to violent extremism were caused by, “political, socioeconomic, cultural, religion, and personal conditions” (Alonsagay, n.d.).


The perception found in this study is also supported by a research conducted by the International Republican Institute (2019) entitled, “Violent Extremism in the Philippines: Endemic Conflict, Volatile Politics and the Struggle for Identity.” The research focused on young male respondents in Mindanao and sought to explore how governance deficiencies as well as other social dynamics resulted to vulnerabilities that affected the radicalization and violent extremism of the young men in Mindanao (International Republican Institute, 2019).

The study also provided an in-depth understanding of the views about violent extremism - including the levels of vulnerabilities caused by several push factors. These factors include the different experiences of marginalization experienced by the Muslim community, state of violence and accessibility to justice (International Republican Institute, 2019).


Lacking effective means for individuals to report grievances and seek justice has an effect in the level of trust on the state and its judiciary. In this circumstance, the individual might resign to the situation and choose extra-legal means of taking back power and control through violent extremism.

Discrimination against the Muslim faith as well as political disenfranchisement were perceived to be among the push factors for driving individuals to violence and radicalization. An individual’s level of socio-economic standing can also affect the shift to violent extremism since it ensures financial incentives in exchange for the participation of individuals in the cause (International Republican Institute, 2019).

The period of Martial Law declared in Marawi and Mindanao imposed restrictions on the movements and access to services. This was among the drivers reported to increase the grievances of the people affected (International Republican Institute, 2019).




The key findings of the research also support the narrative of the respondents in Alonsagay's study. The summary of the push factors reflects, "political, socioeconomic, cultural, religion, and personal" (Alonsagay, n.d.). The findings by the International Republican Institute similarly discovered push factors that reflect all of the five factors listed by Alonsagay i.e. political, socioeconomic, cultural, religion and personal conditions.




While these research studies attempted to map out and identify views on violent extremism and the key drivers of radicalization - the push and pull factors, both studies differed on their research methods and the scope of the study. The limitations in the respondent size, geographical focus and gender perspective expressed both gaps and opportunities for further research investigation on the drivers of extremism.

In another literature, a research study contracted by DAI sought not only to identify but also test the assumptions on the drivers of violent extremism in Mindanao. Researchers Kevin Casey and David Pottebaum (2018) in the study entitled, "Youth and Violent Extremism in Mindanao, Philippines: A Mixed-Methods Design for Testing Assumptions about Drivers of Extremism," sought to verify assumptions and identify the importance of the drivers of extremism.



The research study was set in the Central, Southern and Western Mindanao. With local universities as partners, the research team chose a mixed method approach and previously selected 18 assumed drivers of extremism based on different sources. For the quantitative approach, the team used a stratified sampling method for their youth survey. In total, there were 2,342 students who participated - all of them ranged from 15 - 29 years, with 45% Male and 55% Female. In terms of the breakdown of respondents based on their religion, 55% of the participants are from the Islamic religion, Christianity had 42% respondents and other religions documented at 3%. A case study method was also used to gather further information from select groups in the areas (Casey and Pottebaum, 2018).



The implementation of the research method yielded results. The study was able to refute some of the commonly held assumptions about extremism. Based on the data gathered, six factors serve as a stronger predictor for violence and radicalization: “Feelings of discrimination and marginalization of one’s community, belief that Islam is under attack, support for revenge, lack of efficacy, the culture of guns, and a sense of personal social isolation and insecurity” (Casey & Pottebaum, 2018, p.11-12).

In addition, the research determined that, “Increased optimism about employment prospects, feelings of security and lower levels of social isolation correlated with more support for violence and extreme ideologies (Casey & Pottebaum, 2018, p.11).” This finding is notably the opposite of some assumptions that these factors can lead to less support for violent & extremist ideas.



The research further discovered that individuals who express a strong social connection to one's community as well as the awareness on marginalization and discrimination levels in the community are likely to support violent means to defend the community against the perceived outsiders (Casey & Pottebaum, 2018).

These findings confirmed a few of the previously cited results by the International Republican Institute. The group identified marginalization of the Islamic community, and discrimination against the Muslim faith as two of the push factors that affect radicalization (International Republican Institute, 2019). The DAI research study complemented these findings.

Contrary to assumptions of extremism, the research findings was not able to support known and expected drivers of conflict such as "corruption, human rights abuses, lack of trust in the government, poverty or unemployment" (Casey & Pottebaum, 2018, p.12).

This finding showed that anxieties over unemployment and poverty in itself are not a strong driving factor in violence and radicalization. In several of the case studies presented, the researchers noted that poverty is a critical factor in associated regions of the New People's Army (NPA). This is also where the messages of economic liberation and financial support are frequently used by the NPAs. It is crucial to note that poverty in itself is a factor that creates vulnerability but not necessarily radicalization to support extremist ideologies (Casey & Pottebaum, 2018).

These findings resonate with the General Strain Theory that identifies coping mechanisms as the key determinant in resorting to criminal actions (Carey, 2016)



Considering the gender dimension of the research study, the researchers also expressed that there is no predictive power that links men and women's gender differences as a determinant and predictors of extremism and/or leads to support for violence and extremist ideologies. This point emphasize the absence of a strong evidence supporting that men are more vulnerable to recruitment (Casey & Pottebaum, 2018). Both researchers have significantly pointed out that there is a shift happening that affects the roles of women in this issue (Casey & Pottebaum, 2018). The study was able to track that women were the early supporters of ISIS at MSU - Marawi. Another group of young women led the promotion of ISIS and wore the entire niqab, while others have reported women as medics and combatants (Casey & Pottebaum, 2018).

To further examine the General Strain Theory, the findings reported in these three key literatures are consistent with the theory's points that for violent extremism, the strains are higher in magnitude. It is also highly unjust and is a result of more political power, social or religious groups which gradually strains an individual's response and cause the shift toward violent extremism (Agnew, 2010, p.136 as cited in Nivette et al., 2017, p.759).

6 Youth Vulnerabilities and Gray Areas: Radicalization and Recruitment among Youth Groups

Across the literature, studies on violent extremism among youth covered specific age groups with a focused geographical scope within the time frame of the research study. Based on a few studies, a few youth groups were found to be vulnerable to recruitment.


Orphans of War

Among these youth groups include the orphans of war in Mindanao. These are the children of the combatants killed in previous encounters and were left behind dealing with the loss and struggling with their identity in the context of armed conflict.


Defining the term orphans in the context of violent extremism, the study by The Asia Foundation (2020) noted the different categories of orphans based on their background. These categories cover the following:

1. The type of parent lost
2. Age
3. Dwelling
4. Type of incident

With the 77 war orphans surveyed by The Asia Foundation, results showed that orphans' vulnerability lies in their emotional state following the death of their family member (TAF, 2020). Strong emotions, such as the desire to avenge their family members or loved ones, were also used by violent extremist groups to entice and recruit members.



While 55% of the respondents are not inspired to be part of a revolutionary group, the study reported that there are 19% of the orphans who opened up on how their father's death became their motivation for joining the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or Moro National Liberation Front (TAF, 2020).



These orphans expressed their intention to participate in an armed group to assume the role their father held within the organization and to also deal with their grief. Other respondents mentioned social capital as one of the reasons for joining. In addition to this, 16% of the respondents disclosed their thoughts about seeking revenge (TAF, 2020).

For these orphans, there are several entry points for radicalization and recruitment. As previously noted, the orphans' vulnerability are linked to their emotional state following the death of their loved one and the strong desire for vengeance (TAF, 2020).

Some of them are motivated based on their need to emulate their fathers and the need to demand justice for their deaths (TAF, 2020). In the case of orphans unloved, ignored or were left to themselves, VE groups can exploit their state of mind and recruit them (TAF, 2020). If an orphan feels strong emotions over the death of their loved one i.e. anger, hatred, agony, etc. and if these emotions remain unprocessed, this can also serve as the strongest motivation for recruitment of violent extremist groups (TAF, 2020).

Similar to previously cited drivers of violent extremism, these orphans' can also be used based on the extent of their extremist beliefs in the Islamic law (TAF, 2020). Receiving financial and educational incentives can also be appealing especially when they are experiencing the loss of a family member (TAF, 2020). Violent extremist groups might also convince them by highlighting the oppression of the government and promoting "black flag" activities to depict the continuity of the Bangsamoro political struggle (TAF, 2020).


In the case of the orphans of the Abu Sayyaf Group, the youth were able to form sub-cells and have identified themselves as "Lucky-9, Ajang ajang, Anak I'lu, Group Latih and Pulang Araw" (TAF, 2020, p.40). Most of the members in these groups are orphans of fallen ASG combatants. The members of Lucky 9 and Anak I'lu are almost the same and are reported to be the orphans of the ASG members from Patikul, Sulu (TAF, 2020).

Vulnerabilities found in other youth groups

Aside from the orphans of war, violent extremist groups also reached out to out-of-school youth in attempts to radicalize them for recruitment (IAG, 2017).


Violent extremist groups were reported to have similarly recruited youth in the following areas (IAG, 2017):

1. Students in "morits" (Madrasah students) and in secular schools
2. A boarding school type of Madrasah known as a "toril" as well as a center for learning Islam - "darul"



Youth with a particular profile were also noted to be more susceptible to recruitment. The following describes those that are more susceptible (IAG, 2017):

1. Young Muslims with no guidance received from their elders
2. Offsprings of members of violent extremist groups
3. Youth from families supported by violent extremist groups - who are in conflict with other families
4. Drug addicts
5. Youth from isolated barangays
6. Youth knowledgeable in specialized tasks and fields i.e. medical care, engineering.



Similar to previous research findings, the general characteristics of youth being recruited are “the idle, the orphan and the angry” (IAG, 2017). The social media serves as the platform for recruitment, while cash incentives are used to generate interest and appeal (IAG, 2017).


In the case of recruitment within state universities, the report by The Stabilisation Network (2019) documented recruitments in the Mindanao State University. A tutor in the same university recalled how the Maute group recruited her students by enticing them with cash incentives (The Stabilisation Network, 2019).

CPP-NPA recruitment: Context and youth vulnerability


Investigating this phenomenon of recruitment and the use child soldiers within the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People's Army require a thorough scrutiny of records and documentation – including the use of appropriate research methodology. Similar to observations of previous researchers on this subject, both information and respondents on this issue are not readily accessible. Hence, this section will only seek to present, (1) Data collected by different researchers from the year 2000 onwards; (2) Information disclosed by the Philippine military in different media platforms; and (3) Written articles by the international and local Philippine media.

From the strategies of the Communist Party of the Philippines, various reports documented cases of recruitment among youth to serve as a guerilla fighter for the New People's Army (NPA) - the party's armed wing (TSN, 2019).

As historically documented, the ideology of the Communist Party of the Philippines appealed to a broad spectrum of youth from various backgrounds. Tracking the recruitment of the New People's Army, thousands of youths from the cities reportedly joined the cause in the 1970s and 1980s (Santos, Jr., et al., 2010). The profile of recruited youth combatants shifted throughout the years. In 2010, it was the youth from rural areas who are in their late teens and early twenties who comprised most of the NPA ranks (Santos, Jr., et al., 2010, p. 265). Through mass actions and mass organizations, the CPP-NPA-NDFP was able to recruit students (Santos, Jr., et al., 2010, p. 265).



The Philippine military's narrative of the NPA's operations revealed information on the nature of recruitment of child soldiers. Approximately 270-300 children constituted 3% of the NPA's regular fighters before 2000 (Makinano, 2001, p. 83 in Santos, Jr., et al., 2010). Another military report in 2003 provided details of 122 boys and 50 girls (as young as 13) were already part of the NPA forces and served different functions (PHRIC, 2005, pp. xxix–xxx in Santos, Jr., et al, 2010).



Similar to the cases of youth involvement in the Islamic violent extremist groups, the children as well as other family relations of NPA combatants, serve to support the cause by taking the roles of “messengers, runners, and assistants” (Santos, Jr., S et al, 2010 p. 274). These children were exposed early in the ways of the armed group - where they also receive a form of education i.e. literacy, numeracy, politics, etc. Through this consistent build-up and exposure, it is easy to see how the process would enable them as NPA commanders later on. By the time they reach the age of 18, they were already sufficiently primed to serve as combatants (Santos, Jr., et al, 2010 p. 274).

Since this information became public, the CPP-NPA-NDF asserted that the group has applied limitations to recruitment and were receiving only combatants from age 18 above (Santos, Jr., et al, 2010 p. 274), debunking further allegations of using child soldiers in their operations.

In recent incidents, reports that the CPP-NPA-NDF is continuing the use of child soldiers resurfaced following news coverage of the Philippine military’s alleged arrest and other armed encounters with child soldiers tagged as NPA fighters. A few reported incidences of child soldiers arrested or surrendered before the Philippine military revealed disclosures of their recruitment within the CPP-NPA. The following are a few cases reported in different online articles.

Table 2.1. Reported incidences documenting involvement of young CPP-NPA insurgents ⁸

Year	Incidence	Age at the time of the incident	Recruitment Age
May 2015	A child soldier - aged 11 years, surrendered before the military in Davao Oriental. Soon after the incident, the military released a statement claiming that approximately 22% of NPA rebels are actually between the age 6-17 years (Conde, 2016).	11 years	No reported age
February 2016	A child soldier was captured in an encounter in Compostela Valley (Conde, 2016).	14 years	No reported age

⁸ Compiled information from news articles. This data is presented to show the reports of the youth involvement in the CPP operations as mentioned in the news and is not intended to neither confirm nor represent actual numbers of youth involved with the CPP.

Year	Incidence	Age at the time of the incident	Recruitment Age
March 2019	A female CPP-NPA medic surrendered to the 23rd Infantry Battalion in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte (OPAPP, 2020)	17 years	14 year
April 2019	A former BS Architecture student of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines surrendered in Davao City to the Eastern Mindanao Command. She admitted being recruited as a student and through student organizations in the campus (OPAPP, 2020)	No reported age	No reported age

Year	Incidence	Age at the time of the incident	Recruitment Age
July 2019	Pregnant female NPA insurgent surrendered with her fellow combatant and partner (Luczon, 2019).	19 years	15 year
November 2019	NPA insurgent wounded and captured by the Philippine military (OPAPP, 2020)	19 years	No reported age
	NPA insurgent captured (OPAPP, 2020)	23 years	12 years (full time combatant at 16 yeras)
December 2019	NPA rebel killed in an encounter with the Philippine military. He was previously a 6th grade student and was reported missing in February of the same year (CNN Philippines, 2019).	16 years	No reported age

Year	Incidence	Age at the time of the incident	Recruitment Age
February 2020	NPA insurgent was captured in the village of Mt. Malindang, Misamis Occidental (OPAPP, 2020).	14 years	13 years
June 2020	Female NPA insurgent from the Dumagat indigenous people surrendered with others in Quezon province (2nd Infantry Division PAO, 2020).	15 years	No reported age

Following these reports, the Commission on Human Rights condemned this strategy and launched an investigation to ascertain the truth behind the use of child soldiers by the CPP-NPA (CNN Philippines, 2019).

At this juncture, information presented in the media requires careful scrutiny following allegations that the Philippine military is fabricating the narrative of recruitment among children. Human Rights Watch in 2016, investigated several of these cases and concluded that indeed, the Philippine Military fabricated a few incidences and disclosures. In particular, the group reviewed the reports in mid-2011 claiming that three male child soldiers_were arrested in Mindanao followed by another arrest of a 14-year old male combatant in Samar, and discovered that the stories were indeed fabricated (Conde, 2016).

From the previous reported cases, what is known among the recruitment of the CPP-NPA historically are the following:

1. Recruitment of urban and rural youth
2. Youth recruitment within urban settings occur allegedly within universities through student organizations
3. Recruitment of youth among indigenous communities
4. Children of NPA combatants are recruited
5. Recruited youth serve as combatants and non-combatants (auxiliary and support functions and political organizing)

While the studies reviewed for this research did not explicitly result in identifying particular youth groups, it is crucial to note that the respondents within the range of the research studies are youth with various profiles based on the following:

1. Age
2. Geographical locations
3. Nature of involvement with existing violent extremist groups
4. Survivors of armed conflict

A dedicated study on the extent of vulnerability of youth groups for radicalization and recruitment may need to be designed and implemented to further add depth to society's understanding of violent extremism.

6 Gender-based Vulnerabilities in Violent Extremism

As stated in previous studies, armed groups exploit vulnerabilities to radicalize and recruit individuals. Vulnerabilities as experienced by different genders are no exception. This section will review the existing studies documenting situations wherein the gender differences affected the dynamics of radicalization, recruitment and other forms of involvement of the youth.

Gender Identities and Dynamics in the Radicalization and Violent Extremism

In a study entitled, “A Gender Sensitive Approach to Empowering Women for Peaceful Communities,” respondents reflected on the existing gender relations within the family and community that influence the radicalization and tendencies toward violent extremism.


The concepts of femininity and masculinity as seen within the family affect the perception on violent extremism.

The masculine identity of the respondents expressed views that it is the responsibility of men to be a good father, husband and provider, hence, there is the need to provide financial support to his family. These conditions create an appealing option especially if the man is not financially secure. Since violent extremist groups offer financial incentives, men are more drawn to the promised financial earnings.


The study discovered that the relationships of women is linked to their vulnerability for recruitment. Several respondents noted wifely devotion - which describes how women love, support and obey their husbands, are often exploited by violent extremist groups. By appealing to these tendencies of women, violent extremist groups can recruit them through their links to the women's husbands. The women's sense of duty and loyalty to her husband and children becomes the utmost priority as witnessed by the respondents during the Marawi Siege. The particular behavior of following their husbands are closely associated with being perceived as a "good woman" and this inadvertently becomes another avenue for exploitation. Other women are more protective of their husband and children and can engage in killing to protect them.

These instances where feelings are exploited also extends to other young women. Their involvement in violent extremist groups can be influenced by their love for someone involved in these violent extremist groups. Members of these groups were observed to sugar coat their talk with young women. Relationships and eventual marriage can lead to women becoming immediate supporters of violent extremist activities.

Aside from these influences, there are cases of women choosing violent extremism because of their heightened sense of empowerment. A few respondents noted that because of the concept of gender equality, other women may feel emboldened to adapt ways that are conventionally done by men i.e. taking up arms, experience the thrill of adventures and freedom, etc. One male respondent in the study mentioned how some women would see holding guns as a symbol of their empowerment (Johnston et al, 2020, p.41).



In such situations, the intentions for recruitment are clear, with women subsequently taking a more active role in the operations of violent extremist groups. The study cited the case in Marawi wherein the four best snipers of the group were women. The recent Jolo bombing reported that the suicide bombers were wives of former combatants.



Women play other roles in the organization's structure. Some of them have taken an active role in raising funds to support the operations - as seen in the case of the Mother of the Maute brothers. Other women prefer acting as spies - using their built and communication skills to disarm any suspicions and gather information needed. They also serve as couriers and can potentially convince other women to join the group as well.

Such utilization of women in an armed struggle is not exclusively practiced within Islamic violent extremist groups. Female suicide bombers, for instance, have been employed by other armed groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, etc. which predominantly includes Buddhists, Hindus and Catholics.

Violent extremist groups have also used the idea of gender complementarity to encourage recruitment. This notion supports fixed roles of men and women within the family setting and lays down norms that can be appealing to potential recruits.

7 Preventing Violent Extremism: A Collaborative Approach to End the Cycle of Violence

Countering efforts to recruit individuals to violent extremism is perceived to require community and government support, strengthening links to values, beliefs and traditions, technology and an efficient system for documentation, monitoring and reporting.

The assessment by The Stabilisation Network (TSN) entitled, “Violent Extremism in the Philippines: A Country Needs Assessment,” noted how the family, religious leaders are important figures in preventing violent extremism. The youth can be vulnerable for recruitment - hence the family, other people close to them, and religious leaders need to be involved in creating solutions (TSN, 2019).

Consequently, the role of technology and the need for parents to learn and be equipped on the ways violent groups radicalize potential recruits, conduct their outreach and recruitment online are also essential in efforts to prevent radicalization and eventual recruitment. Addressing the gap in this element of radicalization can provide another layer of prevention of recruitment within the family group.

Meanwhile, addressing data gathering approaches to violent incident data collection and analysis are necessary and should be included in efforts to engage with the local community. Specifically, the need for enhancement is intended to identify “local hotspots, drivers, patterns of violent extremism” (TSN, 2019).

The community's response is just as crucial in supporting the youth. By emphasizing traditional values such as the "kasisiyapa" reflecting cooperation and mutual concern from the Maranao culture, the efforts are focused on strengthening their links to the community (TSN, 2019). Similarly, forming a strong and inclusive identity can support the community. In particular, the concept of the Bangsamoro unity can support the strengthening of both the youth's identity and sense of purpose (TSN, 2019).

Engendering Responses to Violent Extremism

Jasmin Nario-Galace (2019) in a publication entitled, "Guidance on Implementing Gender Provisions in the Philippine National Action Plan on P/CVE_," outlined the necessity for integrating gender in the state's national action plan. Nario-Galace emphasized the existing realities among different genders - reporting in detail how the nature of violent extremism affects various genders in different ways.

The guidebook provides an important take off point for this research. It is premised on the view "that acts of terrorism "violate the rights of women and through sexual enslavement, forced marriages, and encroachment on their rights to education." (Nario-Galace, 2019); and also based on the 2013 General Recommendation No. 30 of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on the role of women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations (Nario-Galace, 2019). Further, it also contends that aside from women, special attention needs to be given to the lesbians, gays, bi-sexuals, transgender and inter-sex community since they are targeted by these terrorist and violent extremist groups in their areas of operation (Nario-Galace, 2019).

While existing traditional gender roles may still be present in situations of violent extremism, studies have reported the shifts in these roles. For instance, women are often stereotyped as victims in conflict - whether they are among the internally displaced, experienced economic dislocation or suffered sexual abuse. However, the prevailing context also documents that women have participated in various forms of violent extremism - from recruitment to being a perpetrator themselves. Nario-Galace (2019) emphasized this point and has cited the need to study the gender dynamics and linkages in the state's effort to prevent and counter violent extremism (Nario-Galace, 2019).

This point was also supported by the previous literature, "Youth and Violent Extremism in Mindanao, Philippines: A Mixed-Methods Design for Testing Assumptions about Drivers of Extremism," wherein the key findings on gender-related dynamics of radicalization and recruitment reflect that there is no strong predictive factor that men or women are more vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization (Casey & Pottebaum, 2018). Furthermore, there was an observation that women have taken the initiative in supporting the ISIS at MSU-Marawi and engaged in other similar extremist activities (Casey & Pottebaum, 2018).

In the guideline, Nario-Galace identified key integrations based on different stakeholders that are vulnerable to violent extremism and terrorism. These stakeholders include the community, persons deprived of liberty in jails as well as violent extremism offenders in prisons. Religious leaders as well as the different learning institutions are also included in this list. Social media was noted as a vulnerable area. Overseas Filipino workers and students in religious studies abroad were also noted with a certain level of vulnerability to violent extremism and terrorism (Nario-Galace, 2019).

Aside from gender-specific sections, she also provided insights about radicalization. She listed down 7 factors that drive radicalization: 1) Political injustice and marginalization; 2) Non-delivery or lack of basic services; 3) Poverty (limited access to education); 4) Prolonged and repetitive internal displacement due to armed conflict and natural disaster; 5) Lack of business and livelihood opportunities; 6) Non-observance of the rule of law (proliferation of illegal firearms); 7) Massive incidence of violence (Nario-Galace, 2019). Understanding these factors is critical in addressing vulnerabilities through integrating gender-specific provisions within the Philippine National Action Plan on P/CVE.

Notably, these findings are consistent with Wagner's Strain Theory applied to violent extremism. Wagner (2010) pointed out a collective strain that may lead to the shift toward violent tendencies. These collective strains have a higher magnitude, are highly unjust and are a result of powerful political, social or religious groups.

In Nario-Galace's (2019) findings, these three are evident in her justifications for the creation and integration of a gender-based mainstreaming in the National Action Plan on P/CVE.

Reviewing the list of stakeholders, the guideline introduces key provisions and desired outcomes outlined in the Philippine Government's National Action Plan on P/CVE and proceeds to add guides on how gender sensitivity can be integrated in each provisions. The guides indicated in this document reflect the insights of participants from a series of consultation workshops by the Philippine government as supported by the UN Women. The consultations included various stakeholders - i.e. government agencies, religious and civil society groups. Through these workshops, the participants developed the gender-specific sections of the guideline.

8 Conclusion


While the reviewed literature provides information and analysis on the research subject, there are only a few publications that holistically discussed the topic and covered the research objectives. Certain gaps in gender dynamics in violent extremism were evident along with the constraints in the areas and sample size distribution amongst researchers. These areas provide an opportunity for this research study to explore and contribute to this research investigation.

2.2 Analytical Framework

Drivers of Violent Extremism

Based on the review of literature and the Kofi Anan Foundation Analytical Framework, there are three major factors that can be considered as drivers of violent extremism among the youth sector. Youth involvement in violent extremism is complex and multi-dimensional. This means that young people’s involvement in extremist activities happens for various reasons. The figure below illustrates how different drivers of violent extremism can influence a youth in engaging in violent extremism.

Figure 1.
Drivers of Youth Involvement in Violent Extremism



2.3 Context Analysis and Needs Assessment

The KAF analytical framework was designed to serve as a tool for researchers of partner organizations to come up with a comprehensive report on violent extremism. It aims to provide, 1) Initial context analysis in order for researchers/organizations to have a better understanding of the urban areas to be studied and 2) Documentation and observations and findings for the comparative analysis in order to share and exchange learnings with local, regional and international actors working on youth and PVE.

Under the first level of context analysis and needs assessment, researchers must find out what drives urban youth to violent extremism. The following specific questions must be asked:


- 1 What forms of violent extremism exist in urban areas in each country?
- 2 What are the push and pull factors that drive urban youth towards violent extremism in the selected cities?
- 3 Which youth groups are more susceptible to get attracted to violent extremist narratives? (Approaching through demographic breakdown; e.g. age, gender, ethnicity, economic status and/or religious identity).

Researchers must also conduct youth vulnerabilities mapping. Through review of literature and in-depth interviews with experts and key-informants, the following issues must be addressed:

- 1 Which youth groups do you identify vulnerable to violent extremism and what are the particular vulnerabilities? (Approaching through demographic breakdown; e.g. age, gender, ethnicity, economic status and/or religious identity)
- 2 How does the PVE action (capacity-building and youth-led action) consider and address the diverse vulnerabilities of the youth groups in the selected urban areas?

Figure 2.

KAF Analytical Framework



Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Research Methods

This research utilized both quantitative and qualitative methods. For the quantitative part, a survey on the perception of young people on violent extremism was administered online through the Facebook page of KRIS.

The objectives of the survey are the following:

- 1 To find out young people's knowledge/awareness on the forms of violent extremism in their community/city;
- 2 To determine young people's perception of violent extremism in their community/city;
- 3 To identify the drivers of violent extremism as perceived by the young people in selected cities;
- 4 To learn from young people's initiatives on preventing violent extremism.

Around 500 young people between 15 to 30 years old were targeted for the survey. The survey did not target young people who are directly involved in violent extremism or act as a member of terrorist groups. First, such young people are difficult to find. Second, the security of the research team may be compromised.

The survey questionnaire was designed both in English and Filipino. It was originally intended for young people in the five target areas of research⁹. It was decided to use the Facebook page of KRIS to administer the survey, and extended the invitation to all its contacts, not only from the five target areas. Individual contacts of the researcher were also invited and requested to share the questionnaire to their own sets of networks¹⁰.

⁹ Purposive sampling was the original design in conducting the survey. The researchers intended to directly approach youth organizations from the five target areas and request members to answer the online survey to ensure that the target respondents are met given the limited time and the restricted mobility as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Letters were sent to organizations initially identified. However, it was difficult to secure their support to the survey as these organizations were busy with their own adjustments and transitions to a new mode of working under an extended lockdown starting March of 2020.

¹⁰ The survey was run on the first week of June to end of July at a time when stricter quarantine measures were imposed due to the increasing transmission of the COVID-19 virus. Classes were also suspended at this time while the government, through the education department was proposing its opening to September.

3.2 Key Informants

To validate the result of the survey, key informant interviews were conducted with various stakeholders. The team originally aimed to interview at least one key informant in every research area. In the course of identifying key informants, it was decided to expand the number of respondents to include representatives from the youth and civil society organizations for better appreciation of the situation.

Selection of Key Informant Interview Respondents

They were selected based on their engagement in peace work especially with young people and referrals from contacts of the research team and key informant respondents themselves, especially among young people. The interviews were done via mobile call and were recorded.¹¹

Processing of Raw Data

The interview notes were collated per interview questions while audio files were transcribed. The transcriptions and the collated interview notes served as reference in the counting and categorization of the responses.

¹¹ The researcher simultaneously encoded key responses in a matrix format according to the interview questions while the interview was ongoing. The interview ran for 1.5 hours. Some interviews were completed in succeeding schedules of the respondent. A few exceeded either due to the rich experiences of the respondent or the erratic mobile connectivity that affected the clarity of the interview.

3.3 Limitation of the Research/ Study

The research is limited to a few young individuals and those involved in efforts to prevent violent extremism in the Philippines. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, conducting face-to-face interview with the people in the intended research areas. Online interviews were not an option due to issues of connectivity. Secondary sources including documents, newspapers and online resources were used if key informants are not available.

The original intended timeline of the research was from April 15 to July 15, 2020. However, due to the implementation of the Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ) from March 15 to May 15, the data gathering had to be adjusted. Delays in conducting interviews because of the lockdown was expected. The research team, however, decided to pursue both quantitative and qualitative methods to ensure that the study will be comprehensive and reliable.

Due to mobility restrictions, all interviews were done via audio call and recorded. Prior to the actual call, emails were sent to request for an interview. The email contained a brief introduction of KRIS and the research project and the objective of the interview. There were three situations where the request was declined as they felt they were not the right respondents for the study. Instead, they referred potential respondents that can be interviewed.

Chapter 4: Research Findings

4.1 Survey Results and Discussion

As of July 31, 2020, the survey generated 193 responses (both English and Filipino), representing 38.4% of the target number. The low turnout could be due to the following factors:

- 1 The survey was run in June and July when most of the universities and colleges are closed and opening of classes was still being decided by the authorities.
- 2 Access to social media was limited because most students/young people do not have allowances to buy mobile and or internet load as their respective families prioritized living expenses given the limited sources of income. Restrictions of mobility to contain the spread of COVID-19 virus resulted to job and income losses.
- 3 Lack of stable internet connectivity. For respondents from areas with limited internet connectivity, responding to the questionnaire through Google docs was difficult. If the connection is intermittent, the respondent had to repeat the whole process. Only those who are persistent would be patient and would allocate time and resources to complete the answer.

Even with a low turnout, the results are still valuable to provide a sense of how young people understand violent extremism, its drivers, and their knowledge or engagement of some initiatives to address it.

4.1.1 Respondents

The questionnaire was originally in English and was translated to Filipino. Of the 193 respondents, 185 answered the survey using the English questionnaire. This means, majority of them are more comfortable with the use of the English language.

Profile of Respondents

Sex, age, and educational attainment

Of the 193 respondents, 43 percent are female while 57 percent are male. Table 1 below, shows the breakdown. In terms of age, all of them except for one are within the age range of 15-30 years old. They are highly educated, with 36.27 college graduates, 32.64 percent college graduates, and 10.88 percent post-graduates. The remaining 20.21 percent are high school level. The following table shows the distribution:

Table 4.1
Sex of survey respondents

Sex	Frequency	Percentage
Female	83	43%
Male	110	57%
Total	193	100%

Figure 3.
Sex of survey respondents (Visualized)





Table 4.2.
Educational attainment of survey respondents

Education	Frequency	Percentage
High School	39	20.21%
College Level	63	32.64%
College Graduate	70	36.27%
Post-Graduate	21	10.88%
Total	193	100%

Figure 4.
Educational attainment of survey respondents (Visualized)




In terms of geographical location, 43.01 percent of the respondents listed NCR as their permanent address, 13.99 percent Davao City, 2.59 percent Marawi City, 3.11 percent Zamboanga City, and the rest, from other regions, including one from outside the country. The following table shows the breakdown.

Table 4.3.
Geographical location of survey respondents

Geographical Location	Frequency	Percentage
Davao	27	13.99%
NCR	83	43.01%
Marawi	5	2.59%
Jolo/ Sulu	1	0.52%
Zamboanga City	6	3.11%
Others	71	36.79%
Total	193	100%

Figure 5.
Geographical location of responents (Visualized)




In terms of religion, 77 percent are Christians, 11 percent Islam, 5 percent agnostic, 2 percent Atheist, 5 percent with no religion (or not applicable), and 1 percent Theist. The following table presents the distribution.

Table 4.4.
Religion of survey respondents

Religion	Frequency	Percentage
Agnostic	9	4.70%
Atheist	3	2.00%
Christian	149	77.20%
Islam	22	11.40%
No Religion/ NA	9	4.70%
Theist	1	1.00%
Total	193	100%

Figure 6.
Geographical location of responents (Visualized)



This study utilized the clustering of monthly income classes of a family of five in 2017 by Albert, Santos, and Vizmanos (December 2018)¹² which are:

- 1 Poor, with income of less than PhP 9,520 (less than the official poverty threshold);
- 2 Low income class (but not poor), with income between PhP 9,520 – PhP 19,040;
- 3 Lower middle-income-class with income between PhP 19,040 – PhP 38,080;
- 4 Middle middle-income class with income between PHP 38,080 and PHP 66,640,
- 5 Upper middle-income class with income between PHP 66,640 and PHP 114,240;
- 6 Upper income class (but not rich), with income between PHP 114,240 and PHP 190,400; and
- 7 Rich, with an income of at least PHP 190,400.

Another study pegged the income of PhP23,381 – P46, 761¹³ per month for a family of five members as falling within lower middle-income groups as of 2018.

¹² Albert, J-R, Santos, A-G, and Vizmanos, J-F. December 2018. Defining and profiling the middle class. Policy Notes. Philippine Institute for Development Studies No. 2018-18 (December 2018). Retrieved from <https://pidswebs.pids.gov.ph/CDNPUBLICATIONS/pidspn1818.pdf>. ISSN 2508-0865 (electronic)


¹³Salceda, J. in Zialcita, S. EXPLAINER: Who are the Filipino middle class? Retrieved from https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/4/25/explainer-who-are-the-Filipino-middle-class.html?fbclid=IwAR2RvrThdjvss7l__cKHvNtmMPURVb8k07Siw3cRFKjYPBab67hR4QhtxU#:~:text=Jose%20Ramon%20Albert%20told%20CNN,class%20is%20per%20capita%20income&text=This%20means%20that%20among%20those%20the%20lower%20middle%20income%20group

Of the total respondents, 13 percent of them are poor, with income below PhP 10,000. 17 percent are low income but not poor, while the majority belong to middle income classes. The sub-categories would not apply as the income bracket used in the survey overlaps with the figures in the classification of Albert, Santos, and Vizmanos. There are negligible differences in income of families of male and female respondents. On the other hand, there are slightly higher male respondents coming from lower middle-income brackets. It is significant to note that 9.7 percent of the male respondents fall below the poverty line. The following table provides the details.

Table 4.5.
Respondents’ Gross Family Income

Income	Frequency	Percentage
P40,001 and above	76	39%
P30,001 - P40,000	19	10%
P20,0001 - P30,000	40	21%
P10,001 - P20,000	32	17%
P10,000 and below	26	13%
Total	193	100%

Figure 8.
Respondents' Gross Family Income



4.2 Research Problems and Objectives

Q1. Definition of Violent Extremism

Violent extremism is commonly described by respondents as an extreme ideological belief, anchored on religious or political motivations. This kind of religious belief is not part of conventional religious teaching (or false as one described it) and is imposed on others to advance an agenda. Religious supremacy and political dominance are the most identified as the goal or agenda, while few included economic and social objectives. Those wanting to gain religious supremacy are described as devout.

Some also view the religious belief as misunderstood; misinterpreted; twisted, with the believer as close-minded, defensive, described by one respondent as having “a binary view of social concepts, thus producing biases and negative reactions towards the other extreme end.” One respondent specifically mentioned ISIS ideological perspective as an expression of violent extremism, by using an Islamic identity, thus creating a problem for Muslims who could be “easily judged because of the actions of an organization that uses an Islamic identity.”

Violent extremism is also viewed to condone or justify the use of violence to achieve its intentions.

The second group of responses see violent extremism as a result of an accumulation of the lack of basic needs – healthcare, education, security; differences in social classes; cultural issues; a result of oppression on a marginalized sector. These experiences of “deprivation, oppression, and marginalization are radicalized and turned into a form of resistance to a governing structure.”

4.2 Research Problems and Objectives

A related view regards violent extremism as a means “to highlight grievances; a movement that has principles to change something but was taken too far,” an act of hostility and justice for those who suffered injustices and one cited its occurrence more in rural areas where there is armed conflict, while also recognizing that this happens in urban areas, too.

One respondent elaborated that violent extremism will:

“reinforce divisions among social groups and undermine the social contract between the citizens and their governments; a product of historical, political, economic, and social circumstances, including the impact of regional and global power politics. The push factors are the lack of socio-economic opportunities, marginalization, and discrimination, poor governance, violations of human rights and the Rule of Law; prolonged and unresolved conflicts, and radicalization in prisons.”

Related to the above view, one respondent even provided the following quote as further explanation:

“Former Cotabato Archbishop and Cardinal Orlando Quevedo (in the book *Conflict in Mindanao*, Diaz [2003]) said that violent extremism can be a particularly attractive proposition or alternative to young people, especially the youth who are displaced, impoverished or oppressed and cited Muslim Mindanao as having one of the most staggering differences in social classes recorded in the country, indirectly implying that the youth in Muslim Mindanao is vulnerable to violent extremism.”

The third group of responses view violent extremism as a method employed by powerful people “people in power, politicians, to silence those who are against their agenda; to use law as a weapon to silence and harass their critics; to use power as a privilege to abuse others.”

The fourth group of responses define violent extremism based on its actions such as bombings, kidnap-for-ransom, murder, arson, massacre, suicide attacks, merciless killings; an act of domination, inflicting damage and suffering to innocent people and properties; or the indiscriminate use of violence, where law, ethics, morals, and compassion for fellow human beings are disregarded, thus losing sight of their humanity. Donating money or providing logistical support to groups espousing hate, recruitment of minors to become rebels, and collection of revolutionary taxes from indigenous communities.

A fifth group of responses directly label violent extremism as terrorism that utilizes “the misuse of religion or ideology,” a terroristic act or simply as terrorists.

The sixth group (only two) of respondents distinctly define violent extremism as communism while the other directly identified a block of party list lawmakers.

The effects of violent extremism were also cited in the survey responses such as the destruction of communities, severe damages to civilian life and property—physical, social, mental; destruction of peace and harmony in the community that seeks unity and sovereignty. It also poses a threat to the environment and the economy. A few of them directly consider the acts of violent extremism as a violation of human rights.

Q2. Forms of Radication

The 193 survey respondents were composed of 83 females and 110 males. Based on the table above, both female and male respondents consider bombings of government buildings, malls, churches as the topmost manifestation of violet extremism with 78 female respondents and 110 male respondents. For males, the next two highest manifestations are suicide bombings (105), beheading of captives/prisoners of war and harassmt and intimidation of marginalized/vulnerable sectors (farmers, fisherfolks, urban poor) both choices with 101 responses. The latter two highest choices for males were also shared by female respondents. The lowest manifestation for females is kidnapping (56) while for males, it is the dissemination of publications that promote intolerance and distorted religious beliefs.

There were 12 male respondents who registered their additional comments, to elaborate their choices. One response noted the environmental, historical, or socio-economic injustice and sexual harassmt of women and children, while a female respondent highlighted the force recruitment of children.

Table 4.6
Forms of Radicalism

	Manifestations	Responses	
		Female	Male
2.1	Suicide bombing		
2.2	Bombings of government buildings, malls, churches		
2.3	Beheading of captives/ prisoners of war		
2.4	Kidnapping		
2.5	Raising funds for groups espousing violence against people on the basis of religion or race		
2.6	2.6		
2.7	2.7		

Q2. Forms of Radication

The 193 survey respondents were composed of 83 females and 110 males. Based on the table above, both female and male respondents consider bombings of government buildings, malls, churches as the topmost manifestation of violet extremism with 78 female respondents and 110 male respondents. For males, the next two highest manifestations are suicide bombings (105), beheading of captives/prisoners of war and harassmt and intimidation of marginalized/vulnerable sectors (farmers, fisherfolks, urban poor) both choices with 101 responses. The latter two highest choices for males were also shared by female respondents. The lowest manifestation for females is kidnapping (56) while for males, it is the dissemination of publications that promote intolerance and distorted religious beliefs.

There were 12 male respondents who registered their additional comments, to elaborate their choices. One response noted the environmental, historical, or socio-economic injustice and sexual harassmt of women and children, while a female respondent highlighted the force recruitment of children.

Table 4.6

Forms of Radicalism

	Manifestations	Responses	
		Female	Male
2.1	Suicide bombing	2.1	2.1
2.2	Bombings of government buildings, malls, churches	2.2	2.2
2.3	Beheading of captives/ prisoners of war	2.3	2.3
2.4	Kidnapping	2.4	2.4
2.5	Raising funds for groups espousing violence against people on the basis of religion or race	2.5	2.5
2.6	Dissemination of publications that promote intolerance; distorted religios beliefs	2.6	2.6
2.7	Dissemination of publications that promote intolerance; distorted religios beliefs	2.7	2.7

Q3. Timeline of Experience of Violent Extremist Attack in the Community

Forty percent of the respondents have not experienced a violent extremist attack while 22 percent experienced it more than two years ago. This could be partly due to the fact that in terms of geographical location, majority of the respondents (43.01 percent) are from NCR. On the other hand, twenty-two percent of them experienced it more than two years ago while another eighteen percent experienced it in the last three months.

Table 4.7


Perceived Timeline of Experience of Violent Extremist Attack in the Community

Period	Female	Male	Total	Percentage
More that two years	18	25	43	22%
Last two years	6	12	18	9%
Last twelve months	3	9	12	6%
Last nine months	-	3	3	2%
Last six months	-	4	4	2%
Last three months	17	18	35	18%
Never	39	39	78	40%
Total	83	110	193	100%

Table 4.7

Perceived Timeline of Experience of Violent Extremist Attack in the Community

Q3: When was the last time that a violent extremist attack occurred in your community/city?



Q4. Involvement of young people (ages 15 to 30) violent attacks

Forty-four percent of the respondents affirmed the involvement of young people in violent attacks while forty-one percent are not sure. The remaining sixteen percent do not think that young people are involved. The forty-one percent could possibly correlate with the geographical location of respondents where forty-three percent are from NCR and forty percent have not experienced violent extremism.


Table 4.8

Age of young people perceived to be involved in violent attacks

Responses	Female	Male	Total	Percentage
No	17	13	30	16%
Not sure	30	49	79	41%
Yes	36	48	84	44%
Total	83	110	193	100%

Figure 9

Perceived involvement of young people in violent attacks



Q4. Involvement of young people (ages 15 to 30) violent attacks

Forty-four percent of the respondents affirmed the involvement of young people in violent attacks while forty-one percent are not sure. The remaining sixteen percent do not think that young people are involved. The forty-one percent could possibly correlate with the geographical location of respondents where forty-three percent are from NCR and forty percent have not experienced violent extremism.


Table 4.8

Age of young people perceived to be involved in violent attacks

Responses	Female	Male	Total	Percentage
No	17	13	30	16%
Not sure	30	49	79	41%
Yes	36	48	84	44%
Total	83	110	193	100%

Figure 9

Perceived involvement of young people in violent attacks



The responses in the succeeding questions – 5, 7, & 8 only present the highest level of influence chosen by the respondents.

Q4. Push and pull factors with strongest influence (5) on a young person’s decision to join extremist groups.

The table below shows that distortion and misuse of beliefs, political ideologies and ethnic and cultural differences ranked the highest with a total of 116, followed by the lack of socio-economic opportunities (110), marginalization (108) and identification with collective grievances and narratives of victimization with only a difference of one point (107). The lowest factor is individual background (80) followed by poor governance, violations of human rights and the rule of law (94), and prolonged and unresolved conflicts (89).

Table 4.9
Perceived Push and Pull Factors of Violent Extremism

Push and Pull Factors	Female	Male	Total
Individual backgrounds (existential and spiritual search for identity and purpose, utopian world vision, boredom, adolescent crisis, sense of mission and heroism, a promise of adventure and power, attraction of violence)	38	42	80
Identification with collective grievances and narratives of victimization that provoke powerful emotional reactions which can be manipulated by charismatic leaders	46	61	107
Distortion and misuse of beliefs, political ideologies and ethnic and cultural differences	49	67	116
Lack of socio-economic opportunities (poverty, unemployment, corruption, etc.)	50	60	110


Table 4.9

Perceived Push and Pull Factors of Violent Extremism

Push and Pull Factors	Female	Male	Total
Marginalization, injustices, and discrimination (including experience of exclusion and injustice, stigmatization, and humiliation)	50	58	108
Poor governance, violations of human rights and the rule of law	43	51	94
Prolonged and unresolved conflicts	40	49	89

Figure 10.

Perceptions of push and pull factors' influence among youth



Q6. Other Important Factors

Other important factors highlighted are lack of education that develops critical thinking; environment – family and community; the lack of positive role model; and the prevalence of rido where young children are exposed to guns and killings as a means to resolve conflicts.

The following are the rest of the answers:

Prejudices against Muslims by mainstream Filipinos	Weak and unharmonized peace advocacies approaches of religious sectors	"Boredom" from all the rest of the individual background; Peer pressure
Different family crisis	Police and military threat; Suppression of dissent	Attention seeking behavior; Love for money
Presence of far-left extremist ideologies in school campuses in the guise of socio-civil rights youth organizations	Being blackmailed; Complete allegiance and loyalty in exchange of safety and security of relatives and families	Ignorance with due process, entitled individuals who think they can solve everything through armed conflict
Peer pressure; Subtle peer pressure from extremists	Information transparency and credibility	Lack of compassion and moral integrity
Sense of community from such groups; Religion, certain teachings promote exclusivity for their members	Generalization of media and other online tools that strongly affects their decision making	Intolerance
Lack of education; limited access to quality education, and inequality; Having a sense of critical thinking for the betterment of their growth as themselves	Environment they grew up in including the maternal depression or generational mental disorders that affected decisions pre-birth of the child. Likewise, the people they are surrounded with and basis for imitation; role models; upbringing and love from family and real friends	Prevalence of violence in the society such as rido (family feud) that even a 10 year old boy is already used to handling firearms. Killing or being killed is already installed in their minds at a young age

Q7. Level of Influence in the recruitment of individuals to terrorist groups

Family is the highest influencer in the recruitment of young individuals followed by the religious leaders. Friends, neighbors, or the community follows, and the least influence are school leaders or student activists.

Table 4.10

Level of Influence in the recruitment of individuals to terrorist groups

Recruiters	Female	Male	Total
Family member/ relative	44	41	85
Friends/ nighbors/ community	25	29	54
Religious leaders	26	37	63
School leaders/ student activists	11	34	44

Q8. Level of influence of different media and organization in the recruitment of young people

As shown in the table below, face-to-face interaction is rated to have the strongest influence in the recruitment of young people followed by social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and WhatsApp, and videos and livestreaming.


Table 4.11

Perceived level of influence of media in youth’s recruitment

Media	Female	Male	Total
Physical interaction	35	58	88
Online interaction	-	-	-
Social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and WhatsApp	22	39	61
Online interaction	4	8	12
Multi-media: Videos and livestreaming	19	21	40

Figure 11.

Level of Influence in the recruitment of individuals to terrorist groups



Q9. Actions that would have the strongest effect in reducing the involvement of young people in violent extremism

The provision of education for both male and female youth is ranked to have the strongest effect to reduce the involvement of young people in violent extremism (168). This is followed by the provision of equal economic opportunities for both male and female youth (163); Reforming education that promote peace, gender equality and respect for diversity (159); Increase community and local initiatives to address misunderstanding and discontent (156); Increase access to social services, social assistance programs, housing, and land ownership (153); and provision of psychosocial intervention to individuals and families at risk. Increasing military action and imposing harsher penalties against those involved in violent extremist groups got the lowest scores (39 and 42 respectively).

Q9. Actions that would have the strongest effect in reducing the involvement of young people in violent extremism


These three highest scores correlate with the responses of Q5 as well as the in Q6 where education and the development of critical thinking are key to counter distorted beliefs (scored the strongest) and improve one’s socio-economic opportunities. It is interesting to note that more males (32) chose increasing military action against violent extremist groups over females.

Table 4.12
Perceived actions with the strongest effect in reducing the youth’s involvement in violent extremism

Actions	Female	Male	Total
Reforming education that promote peace, gender equality and respect for diversity	72	87	159
Increase military action against violent and extremist groups	17	32	49
Harsher penalties on those involved in violent extremist groups	16	26	42
Increase community and local initiatives to address misunderstanding and discontent	72	84	156
Provide education for both male and female youth	77	91	168
Provide equal economic opportunities for both male and female youth	73	90	163
Increase access to social services, social assistance programs, housing, and land ownership	73	80	153
Provide psychosocial intervention to individuals and families at risk	70	73	143

Figure 12.

Perceived actions with the strongest effect in reducing the youth’s involvement in violent extremism



Q10. Interest to participate in activities organized by KRIS

Fifty-two percent of the respondents expressed willingness to participate in the activities of KRIS while 48 percent responded in the negative. More male respondents are interested to join activities compared to female respondents.


Table 4.13

Interest in participating in activities by KRIS

Responses	Female	Male	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	39	61	100	52%
No	44	49	93	48%
Total	-	-	-	100%

Figure 13.








Interest in participating in activities by KRIS











4.3 Key Informant Interviews

An in-depth interview with 14 key informants were conducted from July to September. The interviews were done to deepen the understanding on violent extremism and the varied perspectives on the matter from representatives of civil society organizations and students. The following details the profile of respondents according to location, sex, age, religion, and educational attainment.

Table 4.14.
Profile of key informant interviewees

Location	Female	Male	Age	Religion	Educational Attainment
BARMM			33	Christian	Undergrad: Education and Philosophy Master of Arts in Peace and Development Studies Currently studying Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Development Studies Attended special courses on peace, interreligious dialogue, and disarmament
Davao City					
R1			40	Islam	BSE, PE; Masters PE
R2			22	Islam	3rd year, Mechanical Engineering
R3			23	Islam	5th year, ChemicalEngineering
Jolo					
R1			61	Islam	BS Education
R2			45	Islam	BS Computer Engineering
R3			40	Islam	Electronics and Communications Engineering

Location	Female	Male	Age	Religion	Educational Attainment
R4			33	Islam	BS Nursing; Masters, Nursing; completing thesis, Masters in Public Administration
Marawi City					
R1			45	Christian	Master of Divinity
R2			22	Islam	Islamic studies, Major in Islamic Laws
NCR					
R1			40	Christian	International Studies Special courses on peace and women's studies
R2			50	Christian	AB Philosophy and Theology
R3			22	Christian	3rd Year BA Communication Arts
Zamboanga					
			33	Islam	3rd Year BA Communication Arts
		 ¹⁴			

Of the fourteen respondents, six are females and nine are males. Five of them are Christians, while nine are Muslims. Four of them are within the age bracket of 15-30 years old, seven are within the age bracket of 31-45 years old, and two respondents are above 45 years old. All of them completed college education, where five pursued postgraduate studies.

¹⁴ Sulu R4 respondent relocated to Zamboanga City six years ago

4.3.1. Selection of Key Informant Interviews Respondents

They were selected based on their engagement in peace work especially with young people and referrals from contacts of the research team and key informant respondents themselves, especially among young people. The interviews were done via mobile call and were recorded. The researcher simultaneously encoded key responses in matrix format according to the interview questions while the interview was ongoing. While the interview ran for approximately 1.5 hours, some interviews were completed in succeeding schedules of the respondent. A few exceeded either due to the rich experiences of the respondent or the erratic mobile connectivity that affected the clarity of the interview.

4.3.2. Processing of Raw Data

The interview notes were collated per interview questions while audio files were transcribed. The transcriptions and the collated interview notes served as reference in the counting and categorization of the responses.

4.3.3. Findings from the Key Informant Interviews

The data from the key informant interviews were reviewed based on the specific research objectives of the study.

Research Objective 1:

To find out what forms of violent extremism exist in the five target cities in the Philippines

During the interviews, the perceptions of the respondents on violent extremism were noted. Specifically, the forms of violent extremist activities were classified based on the research locations.

Table 4.15.
Perceived forms of violent extremism in the immediate areas of the respondents

Location	Forms of Violent Extremism
Davao City	<div>1. There is a general impression that the city is peaceful.</div> <div>2. Bombings were done by Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).</div> <div>3. Extreme beliefs such as a belief that killing Christians is good. “Sa community po ng parents ko, our former community po dito, I can see kids or even adults na they think that killing Christians is something good... I can hear it from them and I think if hindi sya masolusyonan paglaki ng mga bata, I think it will emerge as a violent extremism.”</div> <div>(In the community of my parents – which is our former community, I can see kids or even adults who think that killing Christians is something good... I can hear it from them and I think if it will not be resolved, once the child grows up, it will emerge as violent extremism.)</div>

Location	Forms of Violent Extremism
Jolo, Sulu	<p>1. Extrajudicial killings “Mga batang napapagkamalan na masamang grupo; napapatay; madalas nangyayari – yearly. Halimbawa Patikul Seven - 7 teenagers nag harvest ng mga tanim tapos binaril sila ng mga military. Ang military ay galing sa encounter at akala nila mga masamang tao ang mga bata. Malapitan silang pinagbaril at may mga pasa. Mga damit nila pambahay lang talaga.</p> <p>Patikul Area is in a conflict zone and forested. Dumaan ang mga bata sa checkpoint at nag submit ng mga documents. Ongoing ang case pero hindi na masyadong na publish sa media.”</p> <p>(There are cases wherein children are mistaken to be part of a group. They are often killed every year – this happens often. For example, the Patikul 7, there were 7 teenagers who are harvesting their crops when the military came and shot them. They came from an encounter and they thought the teenagers were bad people. They were shot in close range and had bruises. Their clothes were just daily household clothes.</p> <p>Patikul is in a conflict zone and forested. The youth just went through a checkpoint and submitted their documents. The case is on-going but it’s not well publicized by the media.)</p> <p>2. Recruitment of young people “Ajang-ajang – grupo ng mga kabataan within sa Patikul area na laging nang hold up, kinukuha ang motor, nanghihingi ng pera. Mga batang pinatay ay na link sa Ajang-ajang, binabase sa hitsura” [R4].</p> <p>(Ajang-ajang is a group of youth within the Patikul area that always conducts “hold-ups” (robbery). They take the motorcycle and asks for money. The youth that were killed were linked to Ajang-ajang and that was based just on the judgment of their looks.)</p>

Location	Forms of Violent Extremism
Jolo, Sulu	<p>“Ajang-ajang is only their funny name because it literally means sweet-heart, a Malay term for SWEETHEART. So during their operations yun din yung kasikatan ng kanta na yon but if you look at the young Abu Sayyaf, most of them are orphans of the head of the Abu Sayyaf, so it is a cycle. Namatay ang tatay na gusto mag Abu Sayyaf, so this young group started with the LUCKY 9, apat lang sila na magkakapatid at magkakaibigan na mga anak ng Abu Sayyaf commanders na namatay so they started and called their group the LUCKY 9. Extortion, highway robbery yung ginagawa nila siguro namataan sila ng iba pa na namatayn din ng ama and they saw it as “oh okay pala ito ah” makakapag revenge na tayo magkakapera pa tayo before they formed the group dumami na ng dumami sila at pinangalanan nilang Anak Ilo which means orphan so nagtipon tipon lahat ng orphans and bumuo ng kanilang grupo, so these are the emerging group of young notorious ABU SAYYAF na walang ideology basta survival, more on how they can find money, sila yung nagpalaganap ng local extortion” [R3].</p> <p>(Ajang ajang is only their funny name because it literally means the Malay term for sweetheart. During their operations this also happened to be the height of the song’s popularity. If you look at the young Abu Sayyaf, most of them are orphans of the head of the Abu Sayyaf – and this shows a cycle. Their father died as Abu Sayyaf and this young group gathered and started LUCKY 9. The group has four members – brothers and friends who are all children of Abu Sayyaf commanders who were killed. They conduct extortion and highway robbery. Some who also lost their fathers might have seen them and assumed that their operations are quite okay and they can take their revenge while earning money. They formed the group to increase their numbers and named the group Anak Ilo which means orphans. In this group they were all orphans and can be considered as the emerging group of young notorious ABU SAYYAF – concerned after their own survival and operating without any ideology. Their lives are intended to find money and impose local extortion activities.)</p>

Location	Forms of Violent Extremism
Jolo, Sulu	<p>The following were also shared by the respondent:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Recruitment of VE groups ■ Beheading ■ Suicide bombing ■ Kidnapping - targeting of non-Muslims <p>“Naging sikat ang Abu Sayyaf dahil sa kidnapping. Ang pagkaintindi ko ang kidnapping nagsimula sa Basilan at dinala dito. Ang mga Abu Sayyaf dito nag receive ng kidnap victim. Nag join ang Basilan at Jolo, kidnapping and drug abuse.”</p> <p>(The Abu Sayyaf became popular because of kidnapping. In my understanding, the kidnapping started in Basilan and was brought here. The Abu Sayyaf here received the kidnap victim. Basilan and Jolo joined in the kidnapping and drug abuse.)</p> <p>There’s a pattern established - A group (not Abu Sayyaf) staged a kidnapping in Zamboanga del Norte and the victim is turned over to the Abu Sayyaf in Sulu who will do the negotiation.</p> <p>In the the narrative of the respondent, Dawlah Islamiyah was said to be the promoted narrative – focusing on creating an exclusive Islamic state and society for Muslims. In this setting, non-Muslims are being killed.</p>
Zamboanga City	<p>1. Bombings</p> <p>“Even in the last 2018 may nahuli na tatlo na supposedly manggugulo sa pier sa Pilar. May nahuli na mga tatlong kabataan, na may dalang granada.”</p> <p>(Even in the last 2018, there were three arrested who would supposedly cause chaos at the pier. There were around 3 youth arrested carrying grenades.)</p> <p>“Early 2000, 2002, mga twin bombings. Armed attacks: Zamboanga siege in 2013. We also recognize na dito din yung money ng mga bayo-lenteng grupo, May mga pang-ilan ilan ding mga sightings na dito din sila bumibili ng mga materyales.”</p> <p>Early 2000-2002, there were twin bombings. There were armed attacks in Zamboanga Siege in 2013. We also recognized that this where the money of the violent groups are. There are a few sightings that this is where they buy materials.</p>

Location	Forms of Violent Extremism
Zamboanga City	<p>2. Recruitment</p> <p>“Late 1990s. Top leadership of Abu Sayyaf were from top schools of the city – e.g. Khadaffy Janjalani was from Unibersidad de Zamboanga o Early 2000, some colleges in the city were sources for recruitment.”</p> <p>(In the the late 1990s, the top leadership of the Abu Sayyaf group were from the top schools in the city eg. Khadaffy Janjalani was from Unibersidad de Zamboanga. Some colleges in the city were sources for recruitment.)</p> <p>“Early 2000, some colleges in the city were sources for recruitment.”</p> <hr/> <p>Directly or indirectly, the city being a commercial center has been affected by activities of violent extremist groups.</p>

Research Objective 2:

To establish how young people in urban areas define and understand violent extremism as opposed to the definition of the EU and civil society.

Violent extremism is defined as an extreme ideological belief using violent actions. Extreme ideology or beliefs of Islam is mostly referred to; However, this is contrary to the teachings of Islam and respondents, especially those who identify their religion as Islam emphasized this - as expressed in the following narratives:

“I always say, na sa Muslim, na there’s no such thing as extremism but excessiveness. Sumusobra sa tinuturo ng Islam. This is the character and values of these individuals who tends to destruct the peace in the whole wide world. No such thing as extremists because ang Muslim, it is a religion of peace. You cannot find it in the Qur’an but excessiveness” [R2, Jolo].

“Hina-hijack nung violent groups yung image ng Islam. (Violent groups hijacked the image of Islam). What they are trying to portray is that they are the good Muslims which for me is... Islam never encourages the violent acts. (Hijacked the image of Islam) [R3, Sulu].”

Interviewees associated violent extremism with violent actions such as destruction of infrastructures and communities, bombings, killing innocent people and kidnapping, including foreigners. These acts, especially for believers in Islam, are contrary to its teachings.

“Allah said if you go to war, you should not kill women, children, and the old ones; not to destroy structures. The siege in Marawi contradicted the teachings of Islam [DC, R2].”

The consequences of these violent acts include destructions of life, property, and community. It also sowed fear and hatred.

One respondent articulated that there is nothing wrong with having the fundamentals of one's faith – referring to someone having an extreme ideology. It is being synonymous with being pious. Some call it being passionate. But, using force to impose these beliefs to others is not acceptable, especially when innocent lives – civilians, properties are destroyed; rights are violated¹⁷.

Respondents have also associated the term with terrorism and terrorist attacks. Terrorism is seen as the result of violent extremism. The Abu Sayyaf and ISIS who claim to be Muslims are the most cited examples. A few cited the New People's Army (NPA) as a terrorist group while some label them as extremists, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front because they used violence.

Perception of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) on violent extremism

Violent extremism is an idea from outside, a foreign concept, and that there is no Philippine definition of this phrase. There are groups who have/had been waging armed struggle in the country rooted in legitimate causes. The case of the struggle of the Bangsamoro people in Mindanao was cited as an example. Had the term Violent Extremist Organization was used when they were still waging arms, they could be labeled as such. Understanding the context, the history and identity of each group's struggle is important. The term violent extremism does not capture the kinds of conflicts happening in many communities where there are indigenous peoples, migrants, and Muslims. One offered the term non-state actors as the more appropriate term.

¹⁷ Based on the interview of the NCR 2 Respondent

“Muslims are categorized as rebels dahil struggle nila for autonomy, self-determination – nagkaroon ng label as against the government; Hindi nakita kung ano ang dahilan ng kanilang struggle; tinuturing silang rebels” [NCR, R2].

(Muslims are categorized as rebels because of their struggle for autonomy & self-determination. They were labeled as against the government. They are treated as rebels and the reason for their struggle was not recognized.)

Another highlighted the evolution of terms, from being described as insurgency to terrorism, radicalism, and jihadism, and now violent extremism. The latter is coming from a security framework and in the country. The use of the term is now being mixed-up.

“VE in the country – halo-halo; insurgency na pinapasok as VE is wrong; it is a legitimate struggle although naging violent sila” [NCR, R1].

(VE in the country – all mixed up. Insurgency as part of VE is wrong.

One expressed a sense of confusion on the term.

“Pero ang violent extremism kung titignan mo, yung NPA at mga MILF, they are doing violence. Hindi lang natin sila napapansin pero they are extremist kasi nagpapasabog sila, kumontra din sa gobyerno, kalaban din ng gobyerno. Kaya ako, hindi ko rin talaga maintindihan kung ano ba talaga yung definition ng foreign country about violent extremism. Could it be its only for Muslims? Is it only for those in Madarasa or Masjid? [Sulu R2].”

(But if you look at violent extremism, the NPA and MILF, they are committing violence. We just don't notice it but they are extremists because they use bombings. They are also against the government - the enemy of the government. Even for myself, I don't understand the definition of other foreign country about violent extremism. Could it be that it's only for Muslims? Is it only for those in Madarasa or Masjid?)

This was observable during the interviews where all respondents took time to think about their answers.

Some hold the view that violent extremism is politically motivated, where the existence of private armies and the shadow economy operating in many parts of BARMM intersect. There were narratives from the ground during the attack of Marawi City in 2017 by the Maute brothers. Many of the fighters were identified as members of the armed security of a politician.

The common understanding among CSOs, especially those who attended a summit on the matter early this year is that violent extremism "should not be centralized to religion; rather it is a process, it starts from the mindset and translates into action and includes issues of structural injustices, inequalities brought about by government."¹⁸

Prejudices, personal experiences and local context play an important part in cultivating violent tendencies in the development of an individual. Narratives resulting from these experiences if not analyzed and processed could fan hatred.

¹⁸ Interview with the head of an international organization who organized the said summit.

“Sa akin, yung sa community kung saan ako nanggaling, may laging kinukwento yun yung panahon ng Ilaga, the Muslim barracudas tapos dudugtong yung Christians ilaga “black shirts.” So itong mga kwento naging buhay yung mga kwento noong panahon ng Martial Law tuloy tuloy yan so naipasa ng naipasa ang kwento, the question lang is “Ano yung kwento na ipasa? Kwento na pinalaganap, sa panahon ng Ilaga vs Black Shirt¹⁹. Naipasa ang kwento sa young generation; Sa panahon ng Martial Law, may militarization; Ito ang mga narratives na hindi na purify [NCR, rR2].”

(For me and the community where I am from, there were a few stories of the time of the Ilaga – the Muslim barracudas, linked to the Christian Ilaga (Black shirts). Each of these stories during the period of Martial Law lived in the tales that were passed on. The question is – what kind of stories were shared? What stories were passed around during the period of Ilaga vs Black Shirt? The stories were told to the young generation. During the period of Martial Law, there was militarization. These are the kind of narratives that are not being purified.)

¹⁹ The Ilaga was a group composed of mostly Ilonggo farmers and Tedurays from Upi who were used during the Marcos period against the Blackshirts Baracudas. It is considered a Christian extremist group. The Blackshirts had Muslims as members. The Ilaga were used by the military to fight the Muslims who were then waging an independence movement. Their existence created division between Muslims and Christians. Source: Rappler at <https://www.rappler.com/voices/imho/manili-massacre-remember>; <http://asianjournalusa.com/the-moro-peoples-conflict-the-ilongos-and-deuterium-by-dinggol-araneta-dp14733-95.htm>; <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilaga>

Perception of the youth on violent extremism

The young people among the respondents share the above description and added spreading violence in social media, including fake news, and bullying. One cited the violence used by state forces against legitimate protests during the pandemic as a form of violent extremism. It is also used to “to meet a certain a goal,” “to build a caliphate.”

“Quranic scriptures and teachings ginagamit to stir the emotions to misguide them...wrong belief in Islam” [Zamboanga City R2].

(Quranic scriptures and teachings are being used to stir the emotions to misguide them... Wrong belief in Islam.)

“Ideology – events that happened in the recent past such as the SAF 44 killings, campaign related to the BBL... were used to recruit/ entice people.”

These acts are contrary to both Islam and Christian teachings.

All but one of them have no direct experience of violent extremism and they based their responses from secondary sources such as news reports in various media. They also expressed difficulty in defining the term, with one commenting that the phrase is intimidating.

For someone who once admired, listened to, and eventually supported the teachings of a Grand Imam who was preaching violent extremist interpretations of Islam, the siege in Marawi was a life-changing experience. He was born, raised, and schooled in the city (except for special Arabic courses outside the province). His home was at the center of the city, now the ground zero or most affected area, post-Marawi siege. His family now lives in a house outside the province.

“Extremism really is hindi talaga yan hindi iyan maka-taong gawain both in constitution both in the humanitarian... specially in our religion, Islam. Napakalaking ipinagbabawal ng Islam ang pag gamit ng extreme or extremist sa extreme na pamamalakad in propagating the religion. so hindi maka-tao, hindi maka-Islam. Sa mga research ko, hindi siya maka-Kristiyano, hindi sa lahat lahat ng religion, they disagree with violent extremism.”

(Extremism really is an inhumane act both in the constitution and in the humanitarian setting specially in our religion, Islam. It is strictly prohibited under Islam to use extreme or extremist approach and leadership in propagating the religion. So it's not humane and not pro-Islam. In my research - it's not pro-Christianity, not in all religions. They disagree with violent extremism.)

He was in Marawi when the attack happened.

“Nandoon ako sa Marawi, it was 3:00 p.m. nangyari yon right after the Muslim prayer. Lyon yong pinaka malaking experience ko in violent extremism where in fact I'm ah hindi ko kinakahiya na nangyare, na before, I really support them, I really support their ideology.”

(I was in Marawi. It was 3:00 p.m. when it happened right after the Muslim prayer. That is my huge experience with violent extremism... Where in fact I am not ashamed of what happened – that before, I really support them. I really support their ideology.)

"I really support their ideology before their attacks in Piagapo, in Butig before they attacked different Islamic countries... Where in fact, they even told me to take an oath. I took an oath to them, that so called bay-ah na oath sa Arabic duon mismo sa grand Mosque..."

(I really support their ideology before their attacks in Piagapo, in Butig – before they attacked different Islamic countries... Where in fact, they even told me to take an oath. I took an oath to them, that so called bay-ah oath in Arabic in the Grand Mosque itself...)

"Duon mismo yung napakalaking Mosque so I was there my colleague are there, those people who believe in Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the reason why I'm familiar ako sa history regarding the ISIS but because of what happened in Piagapo and Butig which was not to follow the supporter or even propagate their ideology kahit hindi tayo nakikipag bakbakan minsan nasali tayo duon sa , I choose not to pursue it nalang not to continue with that on propagating or in sharing their ideology in Islamic propagation kasi nakita naten ay mali pala itong ginagawa ko."

(That is where the biggest Mosque is, so I was there. My colleagues are there, those people who believe in Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The reason why I'm familiar with the history regarding the ISIS... because of what happened in Piagapo and Butig which was not to follow the supporter or even propagate their ideology. Even if we're not part of the encounter, sometimes we become part of it. I choose not to pursue it and not to continue with that on propagating or in sharing their ideology in Islamic propagation since we saw that what we're doing was wrong.)

He also added that students from schools in three partner areas within Lanao del Sur experienced VE due to the presence of ISIS-inspired groups. These areas are considered as “Pagayawan” – resting place of these groups.

The definition of the survey respondents and key informants on violent extremism falls within the range of current definitions by both governmental and intergovernmental institutions such as the UNESCO:

“Refers to beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals.” Acts of terrorism and other politically motivated and sectarian violence is included in this definition. In violent extremism, there is an object of hatred and violence - a perceived enemy.”

However, for young people, spreading hate messages is also a form of violent extremism.

Among civil society, there is also the view that violent extremism is a foreign concept and does not capture the realities of many conflict-affected communities in the rural areas. Especially Mindanao is inhabited by indigenous peoples, settlers, and Muslims. The phrase also delegitimizes the struggles of certain minority groups for self-determination. Understanding the context of the struggles waged by certain groups in the country is important. The term non-state actors appears to be a more acceptable term.

Common among the young people and civil society participants is the view that violent extremism is politically motivated and that poor governance, poverty, and a thriving shadow economy especially in many areas of the Bangsamoro facilitates their existence.

How often do violent extremist attacks happen?

In Marawi, the earliest incident that can be recalled by the respondents happened in 2013 which involved recruitments in Lanao del Sur. The Mamasapano incident where 44 members of the Special Action Force of the Philippine National Police were killed and the campaign for the ratification of the Bangsamoro Basic Law were used to entice people to join the extremist cause. The takeover by the Maute brothers of Butig town in Lanao del Sur in late 2016 was also mentioned.

In Davao City, the 2016 bombing of a night market attributed to the Maute brothers was mentioned by a respondent. One also mentioned that occurrence of VE could be long term, likened to a child being fed with bad ideas, such as in a community where the idea that killing Christians is considered good. The respondents generally feel that the city is peaceful. In Jolo, Sulu, the 2019 bombing of the Jolo Cathedral, the February 2020 kidnapping of a Jolo doctor (Dr. Daniel Moreno), and the August 2020 twin bombings at the town center were cited. One Sulu respondent even mentioned that two years ago, incidences of violent extremist attacks were occurring 2-3 times a day and at times - once a month. There were indiscriminate killings of civilians, one Jolo respondent shared, and these were undertaken by new recruits as a kind of test mission.

In NCR, however, one respondent believed that violent extremism attributed to state forces is happening more frequently because of the protests on many issues and violent dispersals. Another, whose view of violent extremism relates more to prejudices, believed that for young people who have less or no interaction with Muslims, there is less transmission of prejudice.

However, those young people living in predominantly Muslim communities, they experienced frequent prejudices, especially religious in nature, due to in-migration and also when their communities are targeted by police operations every time a VE attack happens in Mindanao. There is also a police perception that there are extremists in their communities who could launch solidarity actions. They feel they can become collateral damage.

It can be gleaned, based on the above answers, that the nature, extent, and frequency of attacks by violent extremist groups vary. Jolo experienced more frequent attacks such as bombings and kidnappings, the most recent was in February and August 2020, respectively. Davao and Marawi experienced bombings in 2016 and 2017. One respondent in Jolo observed that recent bombings usually happen in military installations or when there is a concentration of military personnel such as what happened last August 20, 2020.

Who are the main actors of violent extremism in the area/city?

Across the research sites, respondents mentioned the Maute Brothers, Abu Sayyaff Group, New People's Army, BIFF and ISIS as the main actors of violent extremism. The Anzar Kalifa-Philippines, reportedly present in the Zamboanga-Basilan-Sulu-Tawi-tawi areas was also mentioned. Further, individuals with power, authority, and resources (including politicians) can also be considered as main actors of violent extremism. One even mentioned the Abu Sayyaf of politicians. This view was shared among the youth respondents:

“...corrupt government officials... I think it is part of a war initiative because of their greed... Nasa kanila ang power na pwede mag-control ng mga terrorist; Sila ang nagbibigay ng armas o mga grupo para maghasik ng terrorism sa isang lugar para sa kanilang personal na interes.”

(Corrupt government officials... I think it is part of a war initiative because of their greed... they have the power to control terrorists. They are the ones who give arms to the groups to spread terrorism in one area for their personal interest.)

Other individuals include the teachers in Madrasah schools and Imams like the Grand Imam of Marawi City who was preaching the ideas of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in every sermon and conducted mass oath taking prior to the Marawi siege. Ustaz, especially those foreign missionaries, as well as the Tabligh scholars, and the Blacks, those who are perceived to be Shia Muslims and wearing black clothing were also noted. People without sufficient information or understanding of Islam were also noted as key actors.

Two respondents associated the Philippine security forces (AFP and PNP) as among the main actors of VE. Related to this is the fear of the civilians in the context of Jolo, when there are security forces:

“Natatakot kami sa military; Hindi kami safe; Kasi pag may military baka pasasabugan na. Halimbawa, Jolo-bombing, mga military ang natamaan... May sibilyan, yong nagtitinda sa daan. Sa Indanan, checkpoint din ang pinasabugan.”

(We are afraid of the military; We do not feel safe if the military is around because there could be bomb attacks. For example in Jolo, it is the military who is the target of bomb attacks but the civilian, the street vendors were also hit. In Indanan, a checkpoint was also bombed.)

Another cited the lack of knowledge and understanding of Islam:

“Mga mangmang, walang kaalaman sa Islam; Ignorante na naniniwala at gustong ipakita sa Allah na sila ay purely devoted at willing to die in the name of Islam (Marawi).”

(They are the ignorant. Those who have no knowledge of Islam, those who want to show to Allah that they are purely devoted and willing to die in the name of Islam.)

Lastly, a youth respondent from NCR cited groups involved in fraternities who engage in fraternity wars as actors of violent extremism.

How would you differentiate radicalism from violent extremism?

There is a thin line of difference between radicalism and violent extremism. The common response is that radicalism is the belief in extreme ideas, it could be political or religious. Some respondents think radicalism per se is not negative because it wants to pursue change. It shakes the status quo and explores new ideas and approaches beyond the bounds of traditions to usher in new power relationships and does not necessarily lead to violent extremism.

“It is not the usual way of doing and thinking. For example, in our community work, we do meetings in circle, not classroom type because it means we listen not only to officials but to ordinary folks. This goes against the community norm. There is self-realization (Marawi).”

The struggle for autonomy was also cited as another example.

Respondents among the young people also cited the following examples of radical ideas or action they think as justified:

- 1 Protest actions of students against a university president who allowed the school to be used in the political propaganda of an elected government official; Threats against students who participated in these actions.
- 2 The struggle of the Bangsamoro people for recognition of their rights, likened to the Black lives Matter protest in the US .
- 3 Groups advocating for the rights of women, lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgender people.

All respondents believed that when radical ideas, beliefs or practices are imposed on people and violence is used, then it becomes a violent extremist action. When very strong emotions of anger, of victimization from discrimination, oppression, and other structural issues drive one to commit violence inflicting harm and damage to civilians and properties, instilling fear on people should they refuse to obey the imposed beliefs, then radicalism becomes the root of violent extremism. One respondent described it as “panibugho ng damdamin.”

Research Objective 3:

To identify the push and pull factors, including the role of institutions such as family, peers, schools, media, and social media, that drive urban youth towards violent extremism in the target cities.

Involvement of young people in violent extremism

Estimates of involvement of young people varies in each site. In Marawi City, respondents said there was a higher percentage of involvement of young people prior to the siege. During the period of the interview, estimates ranged from 2.5-5 percent, and higher in the province of Lanao del Sur at 10 percent. The security forces are said to have been monitoring the area for possible recruitment activities. Also, during the siege, medical students from nearby universities were reportedly recruited and participated in the fighting.

In Jolo, it is said that 7-10 percent of young people have been recruited, even as young as 13 years old who knows how to drive a motorcycle. One respondent said that in a group of 150 Abu Sayyaf, for example, 60 percent of them were estimated to be young people. Reference was made to a group of orphans of Abu Sayyaf leaders and members who now constitute the main bulk of those recruited. For the whole of BARMM, where there are other armed groups (the respondent preferred to refer to them as non-state actors), there was reference to a study conducted by the International Labor Organization that said 13-18 years old have been involved.

In Davao City, the respondents referred to wrong messages pertaining to Islam that could have affected children as young as ten years old, that if not corrected, could lead to violent extremism.

One, however, cited videos that circulated via social media showing children carrying arms from groups like the BIFF, Abu Sayyaf, which were prevalent prior to the Marawi siege. The respondent also claimed seeing similar videos where the NPA were using children.

“May mga videos sila na mga kabataan mismo yung nagdadala, kumbaga yung frontliner nila kahit hindi mo tatanungin yung edad nila titignan mo lang sa mga videos na nakikita mo talagang mga underage, ahm not underage but di pa sila talagang obligado dapat humahawak ng ganoon na bagay” (Davao City).

(There are videos that show children carrying arms in the frontlines. The video shows that they are underage and should not be obligated to carry such.)

How were they recruited?

Recruitment of young people in schools such as Madrasah and Toril (boarding schools) are the most cited by the respondents, especially in remote areas where teachers are also preachers that may be foreign missionaries or foreign-schooled. It also happens through after school learning activities, among family, relatives, and through friends, or sometimes in mosques where extremist ideologies were promoted. In some situations, it is after prayer time because there are those who sleepover in mosques. Incentives such as money, scholarships, guns, access to modern gadgets such as smart phones, and drugs were cited. Monetary incentives ranged from P25,000 to P100,00 per month, including a sack of rice for the family such as the case in Sulu.

Recruitment also happens through front organizations of extremist groups and the need for belongingness among the youth is also seen as an opportunity to entice the young people to join. In certain occasions, there are young persons who are forced to join to protect their families “kasi pagkasali ka, may armas, so part ng security status.”

What are the push factors?

The respondents believe the following factors affect the recruitment of the youth in VE groups:

Poverty is the most cited by half of the respondents, followed by lack of access to education; religion (the desire to practice Islam or lack of understanding about Islam); issues related to family and relatives (injustice for family members killed, threats to family, dysfunctional family background). Influence of elders, decision and participation in governance, and weak participation of the youth in communities.

In Jolo, Sulu, all respondents point to poverty as the primary push factor. There are limited earning opportunities for the people. In the town proper of Jolo, the men earn a living mostly as trisikad drivers; Some are small fishers or seaweed growers. The women leave the town to find work as domestic workers or go to Sabah.

“Mga babae,yung iba kaya marami raming umaalis , dito mag domestic diyan o sa Sabah ang punta, sa Saudi, kung saan saan. Ma’am kasi yong iba, hindi rin sila nakapag-aral. Kaya naghahanap buhay nalang, yun mag abroad, pero yung karamihan din dito pati pamilya din nila dinadala na nila duon sa Sabah.”

The women...many of them left to find work as domestics. Some even go to Sabah, to Saudi where there is work. Some of them were not able to go to school. So they try to find work abroad, but mostly in Sabah where they can also bring their families.)

For those who are engaged in coconut farming, the buying price is so low and not enough to sustain their families.

“Tapos yun lang Ma’am imaginin mo isang ano ba yun, yung 100 kilos na kopras, halos man hindi na bilhin so kwan lang talaga mababa na talaga. Yun lang ang kabuhayan ng taga duon tapos, every 3 months pa yun Ma’am. Tapos, inuutang lang nila sa tindahan. Ayun parang hindi pa sila maka bayad ng inutang dahil sa mababa ang ano, yan ang kabuhayan sa bundok.”

(As you can see, Ma’am, the price of 100 kilos of copra, the price is so low. And that is the only source of income of the people and the harvest is only every three months. And they are indebted for their sustenance; They could hardly pay their debts from the sale of their harvest.)

Employment opportunities are also very scarce in Jolo, Sulu. According to one respondent, even if you are a college graduate, the only option is to apply for a government post in the area. And there are very few vacancies.

“Oo, kasi yung Jolo po sobrang liit lang, yung mga offices like the capitol yung province namin, part na siya ng Patikul, yung ibang areas like us, ng MSU, nasa Patikul area na siya, between Patikul and Jolo. Opo, nandun po siya. Siguro nasa 30% lang po yung professionals. Government employees

Marginalized po siya, kung tutuusin marginalized po dito. Yun nga lang talaga nasa, kahit na po siguro yung mga government employed, yung mga teachers tsaka pulis, usually po kasi yan ang mga propesyon... Marami po kasing mga asawa tsaka mga anak, yung kanilang income po ay bine-base sa kanilang pangangailangan. May mga four-day wage earners na lang... Mga nasa 70% low, ano low income. Yung mga nakaka-ano mga patindahan, ang alam ko lang po is mga P1,500 per month. Mga 50 or 60 pesos lang a day.”

(Jolo is a very small place. The offices here like the provincial capitol is already part of Patikul, and other areas like MSU is also in Patikul already, between Patikul and Jolo. Maybe there are only 30% professionals, who are government employees. We are very marginalized here. Even those employed in government like teachers and the police, these are the usual professions here and they have many wives and children, so their income is based on their needs. There are those who are four-day wage earners, about 70% are within the low-income group. What I know is that those from the commercial centers, the shop keepers, they earn P1,500 per month, around P50 or P60 per day only.)


Another factor to get employment in government is connection and other requirements.

“Pag hindi ka kamag anak ng mayor o ano man, hindi ka makapasok government offices; Sa university, dapat upated. Dapat pa pumunta sa Zamboanga para mag review. Kung hindi makapasa, walang trabaho.”


(If you are not a relative of the mayor or other politician, you cannot get a job in government offices. In the university, you need to be updated, so you have to go to Zamboanga City to take a review. If you cannot pass, you don't have work.)

It is important to note that in Jolo, Sulu, centuries of historical injustices inspired the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to fight for the recognition of their homeland and their identity. Many men and women from the island supported this struggle for self-determination. In the course of their struggle, breakaway factions emerged such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) who succeeded in negotiating a peace deal with the government. The extremist Abu Sayyaf also had its roots from this political struggle, but as its original founders died, the succeeding leaders, according to the respondents, were mainly interested in the economic gains of their operations, while others were drawn to ISIS-inspired ideas. And respondents from Jolo, Sulu offer different perspectives on the Abu Sayyaf and its driving factors.

“Kung titignan mo dito sa Sulu, ang Abu Sayyaf ay hindi mo pwedeng tawaging extremism. Alam mo kung bakit? Dahil ang parents ng mga yan is MNLF. So because failure ang usapan ng MNLF at military and there were no justice sa mga parents nila, ancestors nila. So ang sabi nila bakit ako makikipag kaibigan sa gobyerno eh sinungaling si gobyerno? Bakit ako sasama sa MNLF na yan kung ang mga forefathers namin ay hindi nga nila nabigyan ng justice? Look at that, this so called MNLF peace process, it's more of historical injustices eh, injustice doon sa mga namatayan. Iyon ang issue. Actually hindi sila extremist kung titignan mo ma'am. Marami tayo ngayon mga surrenderies noh. Ngayon kasi may program yung military dito, eh minsan may nakakausap tayo na hindi sumusurrender, kasi gusto nila (mumble) gusto nila ma-secure yung justice, para masecure nila na di sila gagalawin ni AFP, PNP.



So ah, we assist them in a way na kino-coordinate natin sila sa mga community centers and LGUs. So, ang mga kwento nila is hindi sila kasing sama kagaya ng sinabi ng iba na mga namumugot ng ulo. That is excessiveness yung pamumugot ng ulo. That is no Islam teaching. We disagree with that part kasi act of violence yon, it's not extremism eh, and they, ah, do it so kailangan sila mabigyan ng pera."



(Here in Sulu, you cannot just call the Abu Sayyaf as extremists. You know why? Their parents were MNLF members. And because of the failure of the peace agreement with the MNLF and the military and there was no justice attained by their parents and even for their ancestors. So they would say, why would I make peace with the government when the government is a liar? Why would I join the MNLF when our forefathers were not given justice? This MNLF peace process, it's more about historical injustices - injustices especially those who lost their kin. That is the issue. We have a lot of surrenderees because of the program of the military. Sometimes we get a chance to talk to those who are not willing to surrender because they want justice to be secured and that they will not be harmed by the AFP and PNP, so we assist them by coordinating them with community centers and the local government units. And their stories are that they are not as notorious as those portrayed that they do beheading. That is excessiveness and not a teaching of Islam. We disagree with that part because it is an act of violence and they do it for money.)

There are also different kinds of Abu Sayyaf, according to respondents from Jolo, Sulu and their existence need to be further understood. There are remnants of ideologically motivated Abu Sayyaf; there are those used by politicians, and there are the orphans whose narratives of injustices and the need for survival motivated them to organize:

“If you look at, may study kasi, actually, there are three kinds of Abu Sayyaf daw. There is still one that is an ideologue, eto yung mga remnants of the Moro National Liberation Front, yung mga humiwalay kasi hindi nasunod ang gusto nila na independence. Then one category is Abu Sayyaf of politicians. Ito yong study ng Assisi Foundation way back in 2002. So may mga ganoong pagtingin. And, ito yung mga kabataan na napariwara.

Kaya nga when you look at the problem of violent extremism, also terrorism, hindi ito basta problema ng isang component lang ng government or societal problem. We should look it up on a holistic view. If you look at these young people pwede mong sabihing because they don’t have access to education at wala silang alam gawin kundi humawak ng baril, and you can also say it is a problem of poverty, dahil wala silang makain at andyang ang opportunity. Kaya sabi ko nga sa aking mga presentations, when you look at violent extremism, we should look at it on a holistic level, bakit mayroon? In fact hindi pare-parehas yung driving factors per area like for instance in the islands. In the island provinces, Basilan, Sulu, forget Tawi-tawi kasi wala silang violent groups. When you look at Basilan and Sulu ang lumalabas na mga pagtingin dyan kung bakit sumasama ang kabataan sa bayolenteng grupo, one is because of poverty. But when you look at the mainland Mindanao context, it's not poverty, eh. Take the example of the Maute group.

The Maute group are from a well-off family. The Maute are rich, in fact they are one of the government's project bidders. This means, they are earning. If you remember the Davao market bombing in 2016, who led the bombing? A son from a rich family and educated.

Hence, I always recommend that if you talk about violent extremism, do not mix the contexts of the mainland from the island provinces of Mindanao. The approach has to be contextualized if you are seeking a solution.)

And describing further the third group of young Abu Sayyaf, the respondent explained that:

"This ajang-ajang group, it is only their funny name because it literally means sweetheart, ayang-ayang, a Malay term for SWEETHEART. So during the height of their operations yun din yung kasikatan ng kanta na yon at in-adopt lang nila ang funny name. But if you look at their birth as young Abu Sayyaf, most of them are orphans of the commanders of Abu Sayyaf. So, it is a cycle. Namatay ang tatay, kasi ang sinasabi ng nanay, ang tatay mo, pinatay ng sundalo. So generic, lahat ng sundalo, sila ang pumatay sa tatay. So, this young group started their group with the name LUCKY 9, apat lang sila na magkakapatid at magkakaibigan na mga anak ng Abu Sayyaf commanders na namatay so they started and called their group the LUCKY 9. Extortion, highway robbery yung ginagawa nila. Siguro namataan sila ng iba pa na namatayan din ang mga tatay nila and they saw it as "oh okay pala ito ah" makakapag revenge na tayo magkakapera pa tayo before they formed the group. Dumami na ng dumami sila at pinangalanan nilang Anak Ilu which means orphan, so nagtipon tipon lahat ng orphans and bumuo ng kanilang grupo. So ito yong emerging group of young notorious Abu Sayyaf na walang ideology basta survival; More on survival, more on how they can find money. Sila yung nagpalaganap ng local extortion."

(This Ajang-ajang group, it is only their funny name because it literally means sweetheart. Ayang-ayang is a Malay term for SWEETHEART. So during the height of their operations, that was the time when this song was very popular, so they adopted it as their funny name. But, if you look at their birth as young Abu Sayyaf, most of them are orphans of the commanders of Abu Sayyaf. So, it is a cycle. The father died and the mother would tell them that their father was killed by the military. So it is generic, all soldiers were responsible for the killing of their fathers. So, this group of young people – four brothers and friends of children of other Abu Sayyaf commanders who were also killed, formed a group and called themselves Luck 9. They engaged in extortion and highway robbery. Maybe, other young people with similar circumstances noticed their group and saw their operations as an opportunity to avenge for the deaths of their fathers at the same time they will earn. So the group expanded and expanded, and eventually they called themselves Anak Ilu, which means orphans. So, all the orphans gathered together and this is the emerging group of young, notorious Abu Sayyaf with no ideology, their concern is only for survival. And they are doing extortion.)

Another respondent described a group of Abu Sayyaf whose only goal is to preserve Islam and follow its rules.

“Sila ang totoong Abu Sayyaf na gusto I preserve ang Islam; Pina-follow ang rules kaya hanggang ngayon buhay pa sila... Yong totoong Abu Sayyaf na gusto talaga nila is mag-adapt yung kabataan, sa totoong, totoong attitude, totoong character ng Islam. Hindi talaga sila Ma'am humalo sa mga nangingidnap. Yung mga nag-ano lang Ma'am, yung mga Abu Sayyaf na namatay, naubos sila yung mga Abu Sayyaf na masama yung mga gawain. Yung mga nagingidnap, gumagamit ng drugs...”

This is your way of addressing your problem in the LGU or in the Government or the National Government so yung nakikita naten na pero yun nga some of these are young, young people na anytime in the blink of an eye, they will return sa pinag mulan nila (Marawi P2)."

(We were neglected by government. They will say, we will return as ISIS if the promises of aid, rice, etc. in exchange for the arms, bullets that we surrendered will not be fulfilled. Here, you will notice that this is their way of addressing their needs, their problems with the LGU or the national government. So this is what we see why these young people, anytime at the blink of an eye could return to the fold of these violent groups.)

This view was also shared by a respondent from NCR:

"Pangarap na maiahon sa kahirapan na hindi nangyari. If ang information, analysis of the situation ay iniba at ang tinuturo ay ayon sa fundamentalist na pananaw, nag incite ang spoilers of peace, based sa failed promises para sa kanilang pangarap sa kinabukasan – na lupa, kaginhawaan mula sa kahirapan."

(Failed dreams of being lifted out from poverty. If the information and analysis of the situation is distorted based on a fundamentalist view, the spoilers of peace would utilize these failed promises of land and freedom from poverty to recruit young people.)

Narratives of hate against Christians is also used in recruitment. One respondent from Sulu mentioned the assassination of Bishop Ben de Jesus in 1994 as an example:

"I can tell how important ang narrative sa recruitment nila as you can remember as well yung killing ni Bishop Ben De Jesus, one of the prominent Christian leader in Sulu who has been loved by the Tausug, but I think that was in 1994-1996 that he was assassinated outside the church. Hindi kinailangan magpadala ng tao sa town ng Abu Sayyaf ang ginawa lang nila ay nagpalabas ng narrative at ang pinalabas nila ay ganito: Pag hindi nyo napatay si Bishop Ben wala ng lupang matitirahan ang mga Tausug, that's the narrative arranged by the Abu Sayyaf. Then they give an example. In Jolo proper, there are five biggest communities. It's almost considered as Baranggay, ang mga bahay at lupa diyan are administered by the church, yung Kasangyangan, Kabuyagan, Kasalamatan, Kasulutan, Kalimayahan. Ito yung mga community na ito, ay administered to by the church so yung mga lupa dyan, binili ng church, inarrange as subdivision, if you look at the inner interior, sino ba ang nakatira doon? 99.9% ay Muslim but hindi ganon ang kwento ng mga Abu Sayyaf. Sabi nila, saan ngayon kayo nakatira? If you are going to look at the context of Sulu, mostly of the populated nasa kapatagan so yun yung sabi nila, part of that is biktima sila kasi sila mismo ay nakatira sa dagat so wala ng lupa kasi kinuha na ng simbahan so the young people inisisted that he should be assassinated kaya di nila kinailangan ng magpadala ng assassination team, so ganito talaga kahalaga ang pag counter natin on how we do counter that ideology."

(I can tell how important their narrative of recruitment is, as you can remember as well, the killing of Bishop Ben de Jesus, of the prominent Christian leader in Sulu who was loved by the Tausug. But I think that was in 1994-1996 that he was assassinated outside the church. It was not necessary for the Abu Sayyaf to send a team to town.

They disseminated a narrative: If you will not kill Bishop Ben, the Tausug will be left without lands to build their houses on. They gave an example. In Jolo proper, there are five biggest communities almost considered as barangay. The land and houses are administered by the church – Kasanyangan, Kabuyagan, Kasalamatan, Kasulutan, and Kalimayahan and arranged as subdivisions. But if you look at the inner interior, 99.9% of the residents are Muslims. But this was not the narrative of the Abu Sayyaf. They disseminated the idea that the Catholic Church took all the lands especially the mainland, and the Tausug are living in the coastlines. Hence the bishop should be assassinated. So this is why they did not even have to send an assassination team. This is really why countering the ideology is important.)

Respondents from Davao City, Marawi, BARMM, and some from NCR also affirmed the distortion of concepts like Jihad in the recruitment.

“Jihad needs to be waged because the Moro in Mindanao should not be led and overwhelmed by Christians and their activities; or that killing non-Muslims is Jihad and their anger against other people who are non-Muslims are utilized. Prejudices also fan hate.”

The family is an avenue of recruitment, and the economic benefits is one of the driving factors. One respondent from Sulu shared an encounter with a young person who joined:

“So sabi ko, bakit ka sumali? Ang sagot niya ay yung tito nya ay mi-yembro na dati. So sabi sa kanya since wala ka namang ginagawa bakit hindi ka nalang sumama sa akin, makakakuha ka pa ng pera. Parang yung yung belief ng bata. Alam mong bata eh. But I told him na pwede ka pang mag aral ulit. Bata ka pa may program for that.

Well, ayaw nya don dahil baka daw ma-bully sya kasi nga daw miyembro daw sya ng Abu Sayyaf before. Ang sabi nya mag stay na lang daw sya doon sa kanila. Mostly yung mga bata na coming from rural areas wala lang sa kanila kasi tradition na yung patambay tambay lang, hahawak ng baril, may ganoong pagtingin ang ibang parents lalong lalo na kapag nakatutulong sa kanila, pag may pera pag uwi.”

(So I asked, why did you join? He said that he has an uncle who used to be a member. So, he was told to join since he was not working; and he could even earn money. That was the belief of the young person. You know how a young person thinks. But I told him he could still go back to school because there is a program for him. Well, he was not willing because he feared he will be bullied because he was once an Abu Sayyaf. So he said he will just stay with the group. Mostly, the children coming from rural areas, it is ordinary for them to carry guns, since they see it as a form of tradition. Other parents have that view, that by participating, their children could help them when they return home with the money.)

“Yun yung hindi mo maiwasan dito sa Sulu na may pamilya ka. Pero I'm not saying all ha? May pamilya ka na miyembro na hindi mo naman pwedeng i disown dahil hindi ka naman ginagalaw at wala namang ginagawa sa 'yo. Ganoon talaga, hindi maiiwasan dahil pamilya mo eh, pero di ka naman nakiki join. But there are some na sumasali dahil yung tito ko rin, yon, yong mga cousin ko na invite din nya. Pero kini-clear ko lang sa mga sundalo, na hindi na sya miyembro at gusto ng mag bagong buhay.”

(This is what you cannot avoid here in Sulu that you have family members who join the Abu Sayyaf. But I am not saying that all families are like this. There are families who have relatives who are part of the group and you cannot disown them because they did not do anything to you. That is the situation here, you cannot avoid it, but you are not part of them. But there are some, like my Tito who joined the group, and he was able to recruit some of my cousins. I made it clear to the military that he is no longer a member and that he wanted to start a new life.)

While the family is a channel for recruitment, it also offers support for those who leave the group or who want to escape from being recruited.

One respondent from Jolo shared that they have a relative who wanted to live a normal life after leaving the group. The whole clan helped in sending their relative to Sabah. In another situation, the family and even the whole clan raised money to send their woman relative to Manila who was pursued by an Abu Sayyaf commander.

Another respondent shared that the family culture of the Bangsamoro, is strong. If there is good relationship, there is no space for young people to be recruited. But if parents are mostly abroad, and if the father has a second family parenting, becomes very weak and the young people are vulnerable to recruitment. A respondent from Davao City emphasized the importance of the family as role models.

What are the pull factors?

Financial and material incentives, sense of belongingness to a group, there are members from the family, desire to practice the Islamic faith through studies and sharing activities and sense of security are some of the pull factors identified by the respondents.

For a respondent from Jolo, Sulu, material promises to young people are so attractive.

“We can take a look at the pull factors such as material promises. Alam mo ba yung Abu Sayyaf, mayroong silang isang grupo of young people commanded by young people followed by young people who are technologically savvy. Kung mayroong lumalabas na bagong I-phone halimbawa sa market, let’s say iPhone X X plus plus, pag yan naging available sa market, the following week mayroon din sila. Yong mga ganitong easy access, may pera sila because of the ransom, di gaya ng mga kabataan in the rural areas. Ang mga kabataan sa mga isolated areas, if you have an iPhone na pinaglumaan nila, it will be a big achievement for you kasi kung ikaw ay manggagaling lang sa anak ng farmer, how many harvests pa bago ka magkaraoon ng I-phone 6 na 2nd hand or 3rd hand pa kahit sa market ngayon nasa P6,000 to P8000 pa. While they are joining their team, naiisip nila na meron silang opportunity. Bibili yung commander mo ng bago at mabibili mo yung pinaglumaan nya; Nandoon yung possibility. Ito yung mga dapat na tinitignan lalo na sa mga isolated na barangays that you cannot even see the barangay tanod. Huwag mo na ring hanapin si barangay captain. Pero si barangay tanod wala din sa area, so how would you expect na dumadaan-daan diyan. And mind you, we have this violent extremist group na they are generous. Pag nagsabi sa’yo na bibigyan ka ng P10,000 kung may na ransom, di yan magiging nine thousand five hundred (P9,500). P10,000 talaga ang ibibigay niyan or more!

When you are trying to look at sa mga pinapakita nila yung mga dini-display nila that they are generous, that they are more than brothers, may ganoong mga treatment na ganyan sa loob.”

(You know, the Abu Sayyaf, they have a group of young people, commanded by young people and followed by young people who are technologically savvy. If there’s a new iPhone model in the market, let’s say iPhone, let’s say I phone XX plus, plus, if it is available in the market, the following week, they will have it. They have this easy access because they have ransom money, unlike the youth from the rural areas, from isolated areas, if you have a second hand iPhone from the commanders, it is a big achievement. If you are just a son of a farmer, how many harvest seasons would it take before you can have a second or third hand iPhone 6 which costs around P6,000 to P8,000 in the market. While they are joining the team, they would think that there is an opportunity that they could buy the used phone of the commander once he buys a new one. This is something that needs to be looked into especially in isolated barangays where you seldom see a village police (barangay tanod) or the barangay captain and they would not be able to notice this group coming in and out. And mind you, we have this violent extremist group who is generous. If they tell you that you will have P10,000 from the ransom, it will not be nine thousand five hundred (P9,500). They will really give P10,000 or even higher.

When you are trying to look at what they display - how they show they are generous that they are more than brothers - such treatments happen inside their group.)

The financial incentives vary between adults and young recruits.

“Mas malaki yung incentive for adults, for example bibigyan ka ng baril. Tapos yung entrance fee mo ay parang 50 thousand. Tapos pag may kidnap victim, may ganansya ka nasa: 20% or 10% depende sa level ng effort mo. Kung nag babantay ka lang meron 10% or 5% ganyan.”

“Sa mga kabataan, nasa 20 thousand, or 10 thousand, o 15 thousand. Tapos yung Abu Sayyaf, gumagamit ng drugs eh. Kaya bukod sa pera, drugs na yung pinang e-engganyo nila sa kabataan (Respondent from Jolo, Sulu).”

(The incentive for adult recruit is higher. For example, they will issue you a gun. Then the entrance fee is around P50,000. And if there is a kidnap victim, you will get a share of 20% or 10% depending on your level of effort. If you are just guarding the victim, you get 10% or 5%.

For young recruits, the range is P20,000 or P10,000 or P15,000. And the Abu Sayyaf is also using drugs. So, aside from money, drugs is being used to entice the young people.)

In Marawi, there was an incident where a father was offered scholarship for his son, so he allowed the group to take him; while in another case, a father was given money but he did not know that his son would be part of the group who staged the Marawi siege.

The sense of belongingness gained from friends, and drugs are also pull factors.

“Kumbaga, we’re friends. Tapos ako Abu Sayyaf, ako miyembro, so since barkada tayo, eni-engganyo kita pumasok dahil yung.... Yung sense of belongingness, na enjoy ka sa barkada mo. Nandyan din yung drugs. So those are factors na nakaka-engganyo sa mga kabataan kung bakit pumasok sa Abu Sayyaf (Respondent from Jolo, Sulu).”

(We’re friends, and I am an Abu Sayyaf member. I will encourage you to join because you feel you belong to the group. You enjoy the company of your friends, and there is also access to drugs. So these are the factors that encourage the young people to join the Abu Sayyaf.)

For highly urbanized cities like Davao and NCR, some respondents point to fraternity and sorority recruitment as more prevalent because of the sense of belongingness – brotherhood and sisterhood. There is also connection with influential people who could provide channels for work in the future, or even financial support. Another respondent from NCR believed that there is not much VE recruitment among young people because they have access to education. In universities, there are highly active young Moro. For example, they do solidarity actions.

A respondent from BARMM shared that a young person was forced to join the group to protect the family. A gun gives a feeling of security and status.

Based on the above narratives, it can be said that the family is double-edged. The family, especially dysfunctional families can create vulnerabilities among the youth. For others, families can be recruitment grounds for VE groups especially for those with family members and relatives engaged in VE. Families can also support and reinforce good values, discipline, and to serve as a place to monitoring any VE related behavioral changes.

Like families, schools can also serve as a recruitment ground e.g. Madrasahs, Toril, etc. On the other hand, schools can reinforce good values, provide accurate information and teachings about history, etc., provide spaces for the students to engage in extra-curricular activities, and address grievances of students. Teachers can also monitor any behavioral changes of their students.

Media

The availability and access of VE related content in the media can lead to vulnerabilities for recruitment e.g. proliferation of videos and CDs of ISIS, violence such as killings in soap operas. Lack of accurate and transparent reporting of the truth including reporting and coverage of conflict affects perceptions.

Social media, like other media, can provide access to VE-related content including fake news and VE recruitment. To counter VE, social media can be used to also promote peace.

“Pag sa social media kasi mas madali ang recruitment, nakikita nila. Before, YouTube, ngayon sa Facebook na lang.

So kung halimbawa nasa group chat, mas madali 'yong company and then 'yong power kasi medyo kumbaga makadagdag din ng kwan eh, ng strength, ng power, ng personal power, kung makikita mo 'yong mga nai-involve dito sila 'yong mga tao na parang hindi gano'n ka-confident o pero dahil sa group na na-belong niya mas napi-feel niya 'yong importance at napi-feel niya 'yong kumbaga 'yong self-satisfaction ba. Mas worthy, mas may silbi ako dito. Mas may magagawa ako dito."

(Through social media, recruitment is easier because they see it in YouTube, now through Facebook. For example, in a group chat, it is easier to feel their company, and then power, their strength and personal power. You can see that those involved are those not so confident about themselves but because of the group, they feel they belong. They feel they are important. There is self-satisfaction and they feel they are worthy and they can do something with the group.)

Based on the sharings of the respondents, social media is a critical element in recruitment and maintaining relationships between an individual, his/her peers and a VE group.

Research Objective 4:

To analyze the impact of violent extremism on youth’s economic opportunities, education, and community dynamics.

In this particular section, the study sought to review the impact of violent extremism to the youth based on three aspects – economic opportunities, education and community dynamics.

The following table summarizes the key themes that were noted during the interviews with additional information from other research materials studied.

Table 4.16.
Perspectives about violent extremism’s impact on the youth

Elements	Impact
Economic Opportunities	1. Reduced opportunities due to lack of access to education and learning opportunities 2. “Lack of future prospects” ²⁰
Education	1. Former combatants experience difficulties in returning to school due to stigma, prejudices, and generally lack of access to education itself. One respondent finished his degree abroad (Sabah) 2. Disruption of learning
Community Dynamics	1. Dynamics rely on the contextual factors within the communities (differences in the rural, urban, and indigenous peoples’ communities). 2. Challenges of community reintegration 3. Safety and security of former combatants after community reintegration i.e. one incident of former NPA rebel family unable to return to normal life because of security risks (Joined CAFGU) ²¹

²¹ PhilRights article
²² Phil Rights documented case

Elements	Impact
Community Dynamics	4. Organizing and mobilizing or orphan members to be part of VE groups or create new armed organizations 5. Displacement due to massive destruction of property and community.

Specifically, the study explored the participants’ views about the impact of violent extremism and how this manifested among the youth in the research location sites.

Table 4.17.
 Perceived impact of violent extremist movements among the life of the youth

Location	Perceived impact of violent extremism among the youth
Bangasamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	1. Experiencing challenges during the BARMM transition period i.e. high expectations, tendencies to feel frustrated with the government and might lead to another armed struggle 2. Created spaces for the youth to express their concerns – possible belief that they can do this by force
Davao	1. Presence of conflict with the family 2. Inability to continue students’ education because of strong emotions i.e. resentment, hate, etc. 3. Inability to accept the views of others and tendencies to be more close-minded 4. Vulnerability to being influenced easily
Marawi	1. Exclusion and tendencies to be more exclusive 2. Alienation from other 3. Personal reflections – reaffirmation that violent extremist groups are inhumane ²² after destroying Catholic statues and holy images

²² Based on the respondent’s reflections about the Marawi Siege.

Location	Perceived impact of violent extremism among the youth
Marawi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Reaffirmed Islamic teachings i.e. concept of Qadar described as divine destiny²³ 5. Reaffirmed the importance of Islam among the youth 6. Inability to continue the youth's education since there are no schools in evacuation centers 7. Loss of life – the youth engaged during the Marawi Siege died during the armed encounters
National Capital Region (NCR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Feelings of being afraid when confronted with violence from fraternity wars 2. Tendencies to believe that the companionship they experience can provide support and security 3. For the youth involved, they experienced trauma 4. Continuing threats ²⁴ 5. Migration
Sulu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Forced to seek refuge in other places i.e. case of an individual who moved to Sabah to study, returned to the Philippines and became a fireman 2. Insecurities and fears for the youth involved with violent extremist groups i.e. fear of being arrested, etc. 3. Observed views of friendship, belongingness, happiness and trust when they are with the violent extremist groups i.e. drug use, trust in ISIS groups, etc. 4. For some former combatants, they needed to relocate. Some moved to Manila and Zamboanga. 5. Six ideologues, which previously abandoned the violent extremist groups, returned to them after a certain period²⁵.

²³ The respondent described Qadar as a belief that when there is a problem or disaster, blessings will also follow. Prior to the Marawi Siege, the respondent recalled how the people were engaged in drugs, loaning schemes (5-6) and sexual intercourse outside marriage.

²⁴ Threats extend to the communities, which result to migration.

²⁵ The respondent mentioned that these friends possibly realized the lack of government intervention could be a factor in their decision to return back to the violent extremist group.

Location	Perceived impact of violent extremism among the youth
Zamboanga	1. Experienced strong emotions. Based on youth scholars' views they felt regretful while others felt hopeless. 2. Some former combatants are restarting their lives.

Based on the sharing of the respondents, violent extremism affected the youth in the following ways:

1. Access to education

Some of the youth were unable to participate and continue their studies because of internal displacement. The next logical option considered was to migrate or relocate to a new place – city or country to resume their education.

The youth who were engaged in violent extremist activities also faced similar challenges in continuing their education.

There were a few examples of cases wherein the membership in violent extremist groups actually supported continuity in education. One case was that of a youth member of an armed group. The individual spent 9 years completing undergraduate studies in the university. There was also a mentioned case of a violent extremist group who funded the education of a Nursing student. Meanwhile, one respondent who views fraternities as a violent extremist group confirmed that these groups only accept members who are currently studying in the universities.

2. Emotional experiences

The respondents noted the manifestations of emotions among the youth. For those who were part of violent extremist groups, they experienced strong emotions i.e. fear, worry, insecurity, frustration, resentment, hate, regret, hopelessness, etc. Others were observed to be more aggressive, close-minded, alienated and exclusive. For former combatants, the respondents shared possible fears of retaliation, while others feel regretful of their actions. In these situations, the respondents noted these experiences as traumatic for the youth.

Another observation by some of the respondents involves a more positive framing of the youth's experience with violent extremism. Some of those who became members of these groups were observed to have welcomed the ideas of camaraderie, friendship, trust and security with the armed groups. And feelings of happiness were noted especially in cases wherein the youth were using drugs as well.

3. Perceptions about religious teachings

One respondent shared how the experience in Marawi gave her new insights about Islam. She was reminded of the concept of Qadar - which she described as divine destiny. This idea allowed her to see the blessings even in situations of disaster.

Continuing education after joining violent extremist groups

Following the premise of violent extremist groups’ impact on the youth, the respondents shared their views about the status of education of the young people who experienced violent extremism.

Table 4.18.

Respondents’ view about the status of the youth’s education after joining a violent extremist group

Location	Perceived impact of violent extremism among the youth
BARMM	1. Some of the youth were able to resume their studies.
Davao	1. Inability to resume studies ²⁶ 2. Prolonged period of studies ²⁷
Marawi	1. Some experienced difficulties in returning back to their communities since they are considered as criminals. Others fear retaliation from the ISIS and this affects their return to their communities. 2. Some of the youth were able to resume their studies in Islamic institutions while in other cases, being forced to quit school was the reason they joined the war in Marawi
National Capital Region (NCR)	1. The youth involved stopped their schooling unless they migrate. 2. In one case, a violent extremist group – New People’s Army, funded the education of one Nursing student. 3. In other cases, one group only accepts members that are still enrolled and studying ²⁸ .

²⁶ One of the respondents shared that one recruiter of a violent extremist group was unable to graduate

²⁷ One respondent shared of how another person involved with a violent extremist group spent 9 years for undergraduate studies in the university

²⁸ A respondent classified fraternities and their actions as forms of violent extremism. In the case of fraternities in her university, the group only accepts individuals who are currently studying in the university

Location	Perceived impact of violent extremism among the youth
Sulu	1. Choice to migrate i.e. case of one student who migrated to Sabah to continue studying, etc.
Zamboanga	1. The government provided livelihood programs.

Similar to the previous observations, the interviewees noted how the youth experienced difficulties in resuming their studies after being disrupted by violent extremist activities. Migration and relocation offered an alternative for them to continue their education in other cities.

In some other cases, the community’s reception and acceptance of former combatants was a factor in the integration of former combatants back to their communities. It was implied that these difficulties could have influenced the youth’s ability to resume their studies. This was among the highlights shared by one of the Marawi respondents.

The respondents from the National Capital Region (NCR) shared a few instances wherein students involved in violent extremist activities were able to continue their studies even in difficult situations. As noted previously, one armed group provided funding for the studies of a Nursing student. Another youth member had a longer duration of undergraduate studies – 9 years compared to the standard 4-5 years of study for undergraduates. One respondent who classified fraternities as groups using violent extremist activities shared that these groups only accept individuals that are still studying at the time of their application for membership.

Aside from studying the effects of violent extremism on the youth’s education, the study also explored its effects on the youth’s families, peers and communities. The following summary notes the key observations of the respondents.

Table 4.19.

Views on effects of youth’s educational status in the context of violent extremism and their relationships with their family, peers and community

Location	Perceived effects in the relationship with family, peers and community
BARMM	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Families were observed to be supportive and welcoming to returnees.2. Difficulties at the community level in handling returning former members of violent extremist groups3. Risk of children of being tagged and labelled after returning to their communities.
Davao	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. For dysfunctional families – existing challenge of the youth to reintegrating back to their families. This can potentially affect their relationship with the community i.e. feeling anger, being close-minded, etc.
Marawi	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Existing challenges of internally displaced families and communities due to the Marawi Siege2. Some families accepted and supported the former youth combatants after their return.3. Other former youth combatants moved to other places and did not return to their families.4. Some families have no information from their members who joined violent extremist groups.5. One case involved a father who, upon learning that his son joined one armed group, conceded and allowed his son to go to school instead of helping him in his farm.

Location	Perceived effects in the relationship with family, peers and community
National Capital Region (NCR)	1. Experiencing feelings of fear and insecurity within the communities 2. Other cases, the communities worry since the recruitment targets individuals who are physically able 3. In other cases, the membership of a parent encouraged the children's membership in a group ²⁹
Sulu	No mention
Zamboanga	No mention

A few of the respondents noted the challenges that violent extremism created for the youth and the communities. Families of former youth combatants welcomed their return and accepted them back to the family. Meanwhile, those with dysfunctional families offer little support and acceptance on their possible return. In the recollection of one respondent from Marawi, some former combatants no longer returned to their families and decided to move to another place instead. Some families no longer have any information about their sons and daughters who joined violent extremists. While other parents' previous involvement encouraged the children to join the violent extremist groups³⁰.

Reintegration back to the community proves to be another challenging landscape for the former youth combatants. The respondent from the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Mindanao (BARMM) shared how communities experienced difficulties in handling the returnees. There is also a notable risk of labeling children previously involved in violent extremist activities.

²⁹ Case of membership in a fraternity

³⁰ One of the NCR respondents shared how the mother of one fraternity member was also part of a fraternity/sorority before. This in itself provided sufficient encouragement and motivation to join the same group her mother was previously part of.

Feelings of fear and insecurity of returning former combatants can possibly affect communities as well. Such is the case in Davao wherein a respondent noted how aggression and close-mindedness among the returning youth can be a challenge for the community.

In this particular section of the research, the respondents gave clarity on how violent extremism affects the youth's economic opportunities, education and community dynamics. For the youth affected – whether they were part of a violent extremist groups or not, the existence of an armed conflict itself disrupted their learning and education. This is primarily caused by the security issues during a conflict setting. Due to heightened safety issues, some communities were forced to move and are now internally displaced – leaving behind their homes and schools.

In the case of returning former combatants, reintegration is a challenge in itself because of the varying responses of communities. Some remain resentful and fearful of their presence and this can affect the sense of safety and security of the returning youth. Hence, in a situation of conflict wherein housing and education are not guaranteed and safeguarded, the youth's access to economic opportunities remain a challenge.

Research Objective 5:

To examine how gender affects the youth involvement and recruitment in violent extremism.

In this particular objective, the gender dynamics of conflicts and how it affects the youth are closely examined with the interviewees.

The following table summarizes the key insights from the respondents and information gathered from different research studies and articles.

Table 4.20.
Gender dynamics in recruitment and involvement of women with violent extremism

Gender	Recruitment	Involvement
Women	<div>1. Exploitation of emotional state of women – through romantic attractions and family ties</div> <div>2. Appeal for independence and freedom from restrictive families</div> <div>3. Appeal – adventure and thrill</div> <div>4. Sense of women empowerment and gender equality – taking on roles of men in violent extremist groups</div>	<div>1. Reproductive and domestic roles: Nurturing and loyal stereotype</div> <div>2. Perpetrator of violence</div> <div>Combatants – Marawi and Jolo bombings</div> <div>3. Taking power via use of guns and weapons</div> <div>4. Non-combatant: Auxiliary functions, recruiter (stereotype of beauty, etc.)</div>

Gender	Recruitment	Involvement
Men	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Gender stereotype – high status and regard of the father figures in families affect how children would be influenced or not by violent extremist groups2. Strong sense to protect and provide for the family	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Protection and caring for women through marriage2. Protection of youth by bringing them to the VE communities³¹

Nature of recruitment

While the interviewees were not able to recall specific numbers of female youth who joined violent extremist groups, the respondents were able to recall information about women joining violent extremist groups and the nature of their recruitment.

One respondent from the National Capital Region (NCR) shared information of how the person leading the recruitment of members in Marawi was actually a woman. These armed groups were also known to recruit the ones who are young and beautiful. Aside from these recruitment strategy, the interviewee reaffirmed that women also took active combatant roles – and shared how 3 of the snipers during the Marawi Siege were actually women.

In the context of Marawi, women who became part of these groups were wives of Maute leaders and they served as cooks and medics.

This is the same case in Zamboanga, wherein the respondent recounted that many women volunteered to be the wives of Abu Sayyaf members between 2003-2006.

³¹ Orphans PhilRights documented case

There were also situations wherein these women became widows, and in some cases were married to other members. There are some cases wherein the older wives no longer join and participate in their husbands' operations³².

Means of recruitment of women

Actual strategies for recruiting women differ from each armed group and the prevailing conditions where they operate.

In Marawi, the respondents reaffirmed their views of how the women recruited were family members – mostly as wives. There were also an instance wherein a woman recruited her best friend in the armed group³³.

The interviewees in Sulu, meanwhile, shared another form of strategy for recruitment. One respondent claimed that the Abu Sayyaf group recruit women by marrying them – some by force while others were offered finances. One example is how a member of the Abu Sayyaf chose a beautiful daughter from one family and offered Php 700,000 to her parents. The family and relatives were against the marriage and assisted the women in leaving for Manila.

The Zamboanga respondent also shared how, within 2003-2006, many women were called for voluntary marriage to Abu Sayyaf members. One leader named Radullan Sahiron had a young wife who is also a registered nurse and another wife who is actually a teacher³⁴. In the case of Jemaah Islamiyah group, the members had approximately 2-3 wives³⁵.

³² Another respondent from Sulu noted 3-5% of the female youth recruited were controlled by their parents. However, these figures remain unverified.

³³ Information shared by the respondent was from a UNDP documentary that covered the area of Lanao

³⁴ Shared by the respondent. Unverified information.

³⁵ Shared by the respondent. Unverified information.

In some research areas, other stereotyped skills of women were appealing to violent extremist groups. One interviewee from Davao believes that women have better communication skills and are more patient than men.

While some respondents were able to recall information, one respondent from BARMM shared that there was no exact information about the extent of recruitment of women.

Reasons for recruitment and participation in violent extremist movements

While the respondents provided information on recruitment, including views about participation of women in violent extremist operations, a number of them shared their insights on possible motivations and the nature of recruitment itself.

Aside from the prevailing idea of recruitment based on family ties, a respondent from Sulu shared that the recruitment strategies are also very convincing. In the case of the Abu Sayyaf group, some of these wives are educated. The respondent further shared a report in 2019 wherein the wife of a lieutenant of Abu Sayyaf leader³⁶ Puruji Indama was arrested. During this period, his wife was the Provincial Director of the Technical Education Skills and Development Authority (TESDA)³⁷.

³⁶ The husband is Radzmir Janatul was reported to be a pro-ISIS sub-leader. Source: Manila Times at <https://www.manilatimes.net/2019/06/25/news/latest-stories-tesda-provincial-chief-and-wife-of-abu-sayyaf-leader-arrested/574736/>

³⁷ The respondent did not associate the wife as a direct member of the Abu Sayyaf group but mentioned her association through her husband.

Another important point noted by the respondent from Zamboanga is the fact that some women who supported violent extremist members did so because of their relationships with them. The interviewee noted the reported incident wherein a female police officer in Bohol aided an Abu Sayyaf member because they fell in love³⁸.

One of the respondents from Marawi reaffirmed the stereotyped roles of recruitment by the Maute group i.e. by becoming wives of combatants, becoming cooks and serving as medics of the group.

The Zamboanga respondent also shared that these women fulfill other roles – most often logistical in nature due to their disarming nature as described in this quote:

“... their role is also as logistical support bibili ng pagkain and they are not much of combatant siguro nagiging combatant lang ang kababaihan kapag they were pushed through the wall kapag wala ng matakasan but the role of a young woman joining Abu Sayyaf is more of as logistical support kase andun din yung pagtingin na hindi sila hinuhuli sa checkpoints kahit magdala ng pera or bala yun yung pinanggagalingan ng mga kababaihan” (Zamboanga, R2).

(Their role is to provide logistical support to buy food. They are not much of combatant. Perhaps the women the women serve as combatants only when they are pushed through the wall when they can no longer escape. The role of a young woman joining Abu Sayyaf is more related to logistical support since there is a belief that they are not detected and arrested at checkpoints even if they are carrying funds or bullets.)

³⁸The case of Supt. Maria Christina Nobleza and Reneer Lou Dungon of the Abu Sayyaf Group. Source: Inquirer at <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/891339/female-cop-suspected-to-be-helping-abu-sayyaf-in-bohol-detained>

Research Objective 6:

To draw lessons from local activities and contexts on how to reach, engage and mobilize the youth for preventing violent extremism

Lessons from local activities and contexts on how to reach, engage and mobilize the youth for preventing violent extremism.

Reflecting on the existing framework in studying violent extremism, the study noted the following lessons shared by the respondents when asked to reflect on the lessons from their local experiences in engaging with the youth.

Table 4.21.
Summary of lessons from local activities and contexts

Spheres of Influence	Lessons from local activities and contexts on how to reach, engage and mobilize the youth for preventing violent extremism
Self	1. Nurture inner peace ³⁹ 2. Values formation ⁴⁰ and strong sense of identity 3. Safe spaces for young people to share their narratives of hurt, pains and frustrations and hopes and dreams 4. Psycho-social support for youth involved in VE (mental health programs, etc)
Family	1. Nurturing environment – family, peers within and outside schools 2. Reaffirmation of identity, and values

²¹ Through self-reflections: connection with one’s purpose and mission

²² Developing respect for others and elders and practicing humility

Spheres of Influence	Lessons from local activities and contexts on how to reach, engage and mobilize the youth for preventing violent extremism
Community	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Communication-related skills: Storytelling, listening, use of digital media to share stories and advocacies, etc. 2. Guidance: Identification of role models and consistent mentoring of the youth i.e. connection with Ulamas, senior peers, etc. 3. Establishing support networks through youth engagement and collaboration with their community i.e. active participation, strengthening youth leadership, collaborations among university and non-university based youth organizations, reinforcing good practices through issuing awards and provision of incentives to individuals and youth groups, etc. 4. Multigenerational relationship-building between the youth and elders with integrity and credibility 5. Availability of grievance mechanisms for dialogues and redress (conflict management and resolution mechanisms) 6. Inter-religious activities 7. Responding to specialized needs of survivors of armed conflict - community-based orphanages for widows and orphans of war
Market	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Educational sponsorships of former youth members of violent extremist groups 2. Access to livelihood (Seaweed farming, Carabao dispersals)
State	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Holistic state support for youth involved with violent extremist groups i.e. programs for orphans, educational and livelihood support, etc. 2. Multi-sectoral collaborations and partnerships 3. Addressing access and availability of comprehensive program and resources to meet socio-economic needs 4. Engagements with the local government units as well as the security forces

The research expounded on this topic by inquiring about the presence of initiatives that addresses violent extremism within their localities. The responses received are classified based on the following thematic areas of interest: 1) Education and Capacity Development; 2) Campaign and solidarity work; 3) Movement-building and Networking; and 4) Other projects i.e. livelihood, recreational and psychosocial activities.

Table 4.22.

Initiatives of organizations in addressing violent extremism based on research sites

Location	AREAS OF INTEREST			
	Education & capacity development	Campaign & solidarity work	Movement-building & networking	Other projects (livelihood, recreational, psychosocial)
BARMM	1. Equal Access International’s messaging hubs – use of media and technology for peacebuilding		1. Engagements with the Bangsamoro Youth Commission 2. Membership and participation in peacebuilding communities i.e. United Network of the Young Peacebuilders (UNOY) 3. Formation of a group that reach out to the youth for volunteering and organizing activities – experience of Positive Vibes, projects such as Peacesonality ⁴¹ , Tagampila ⁴² etc.	1. Livelihood (LGU): Program Against Violent Extremism (PAVE) for Peace Project launched by Governor Mujiv Hataman. This project provides housing and other livelihood support former combatants ⁴³ . 2. Projects in partnership with UNICEF and CFFI. This project addresses medical support and an integration program of young ex-combatants.

⁴¹ Focuses on personality development in the context of peacebuilding

⁴² Focuses on mental health in relation to the overall peace promotion in Mindanao

⁴³ Project areas in Basilan, etc. Source: PNA at <https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1032269>

Location	AREAS OF INTEREST		
	Education & capacity development	Campaign & solidarity work	Other projects (livelihood, recreational, psychosocial)
Davao	<p>University-led projects:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. University- based centers: Center for Psychological Extension and Research Services – COPERS. 2. Spaces for participation and representation of the students i.e. Town Hall, Christian ministry, etc. 3. University- based activities with participation of both the university and students i.e. SALAM TAMS' inter-faith dialogues⁴⁴, Viewfinder – dialogues with the President, Vice-President, Finance, etc., Town hall meetings with university, school officers and selected students. 4. Active roles of faculty members as advisers for students i.e. First Year Development Program (FYDP) ⁴⁵ 	1. Campaign against tuition fee hike	1. Livelihood: Farming projects

⁴⁴ SALAM Society is a socio-civic organization under the Ateneo Culture and Arts Cluster. The group organizes support for out-of-school youth during calamities i.e. floods, fire, etc. Throughout the interviews in Davao, there are several organizations that carry the term SALAM in their organizational name – Salam Society, Salam – The Ateneo Muslim Society (TAMS), Salam Corps and the Salaam movement.

⁴⁵ Scholarship programs for indigenous and Muslim students – emphasizes inclusion of minority groups who have long been deprived of quality education.

Location	AREAS OF INTEREST		
	Education & capacity development	Campaign & solidarity work	Other projects (livelihood, recreational, psychosocial)
Davao	<p>Activities with student participation and engagements:</p> <p>1. Presence of an active student government in organizing activities for the students and other faith-based organizations such as the Christian Ministry, etc.</p> <p>2. Open space for the youth to engage with decision makers in the university i.e. student representatives in faculty and academic meetings, tuition fee hike deliberations, etc.</p> <p>3. Youth-led: Gallery walk - commemoration of the Jabidah massacre Development Program (FYDP) ⁴⁵</p> <p>4. Lectures and events organized by different university-based organizations i.e. Youth camps to create and develop youth leaders in the communities, online lectures, etc.</p>		

Location	AREAS OF INTEREST		
	Education & capacity development	Movement-building & networking	Other projects (livelihood, recreational, psychosocial)
Marawi	<p>1. Inclusion of prevention of violent extremism in the peacebuilding work of the organization</p> <p>2. Representation of youth and women within planning and security assessments</p> <p>3. Capacity building with the youth i.e. Peacebuilding training in partnership with the Training Institute of Local Governance, University of Makati, and Mindanao State University</p> <p>4. Youth facilitators' training for psychosocial healing</p> <p>5. Training for women responders to conflict</p> <p>6. Involving the youth in Mashwara and in other dialogue processes</p>	<p>1. "Batang Transformers" youth organization</p> <p>2. Strengthening of networks of Moro youth</p> <p>3. Strengthening youth networks in Marawi, Cotabato - Mindanao wide group.</p> <p>4. Organizing coalitions and other youth-led organizations: Coalition of Moro Youth Movement</p> <p>5. BMW – Movement for Welfare (a loose group, had a coffee project/ business)</p> <p>6. Bangsamoro Youth Leadership Program</p>	<p>1. Social healing – includes psychosocial and ecological farming</p>

Location	AREAS OF INTEREST	
	Education & capacity development	Movement-building & networking
National Capital Region (NCR)	<p>1. Peace Hub (with Muslim and Christian denominations in partnership with UP Islamic Studies)</p> <p>2. Recognized schools as zones of peace i.e. case of the spiritual rector at the Claret School in Basilan. A mosque and chapels were built for Muslims and Christians.</p> <p>3. Conduct of Peace Hub in partnership with the UP Islamic Studies. Peace Hub is an expression of unity between Muslims and Christians through call for prayers, solidarity and ecumenism.</p> <p>4. University-wide organization organized sessions that discuss violence and conducts activities about relevant issues today.</p> <p>5. Inclusion of disarmament education in educational peace programs</p>	<p>1. University-wide organization organizes sessions that discuss violence and conducts activities about relevant issues today.</p> <p>2. Formation of youth ministry</p> <p>3. Conduct of various inter-religious dialogues</p> <p>4. Approach on prevention of violent extremism integrated in the over-all peace advocacy and campaign on disarmament.</p> <p>5. Existing network building among the youth</p> <p>6. For organizations - strengthening ties between members and the national secretariat to complement each other and avoid duplication of work</p> <p>7. Formation of youth ministry</p>

Location	AREAS OF INTEREST		
	Education & capacity development	Movement- building & networking	Other projects (livelihood, recreational, psychosocial)
Sulu	<p>1. Publication of materials i.e. booklets in the local language. (in partnership with the Ulamah from Sulu, Zamboanga, Basilan & Tawi-tawi; Sulu Ulamah Council for Peace and Development. This will also be distributed to the children of Abu Sayyaf members.)</p> <p>2. Some LGUs provided scholarship for children</p> <p>3. Engagements with the Ulamah for sharing of Islamic perspectives</p> <p>4. Engagements with the Madrasah</p> <p>5. Actual consultations with the students and the Ulamah to understand and clarify Islamic concepts.</p>	<p>1. Inclusion of the youth in designing programs within their baranggays and local government units.</p> <p>2. Presence of women-led organizations focusing on peace and security at the communities such as MutawKasi.</p>	<p>1. LGUs in certain areas provided livelihood support i.e, seaweed farming, carabao, seed-lings.</p> <p>2. Recreational activities: Sports i.e. Volleyball, Sepak Takraw, Baseball</p>

Location	AREAS OF INTEREST		
	Education & capacity development	Movement- building & networking	Other projects (livelihood, recreational, psychosocial)
Zamboanga	<p>1. Equal Access International - messaging hubs</p> <p>2. Organized activities such as Bangsamoro Short Film Festival</p> <p>3. Individual initiatives to support the education of children</p> <p>4. Resiliency program designed for graduates and out-of-school youths. The program includes seminars on violent extremism.</p> <p>5. Recognizing contribution to peace promotion through organizing of award-giving bodies i.e. Peace Weaver award by the Peace Advocates of Zamboanga (PAZ), supported by ZABIDA (Inter-religious Solidarity for Peace) ⁴⁶</p>	<p>1. Ulama Council for Zamboanga</p> <p>2. Formation of groups that are led by the youth i.e. IYOUDAHAN⁴⁷ for mental health, etc.</p>	<p>1. USAID project with the Mindanao Youth Development Program includes a livelihood training</p> <p>2. Organizing initiatives for psychosocial support to help the youth break free from the social stigma so they can have a renewed purpose in life.</p>

⁴⁶ ZABIDA is a learning space that conducts joint celebrations and activities during Iftar, etc. ZABIDA also conducts regional forum on peace and security for every quarter, releases analysis of recent situations, initiates discussion on violent extremism is included, ensures representation of different religions from the Christian Church and the Masjid. ZABIDA also engages with radical preachers to discuss differences.

⁴⁷ IYOUDAHAN is linked to Chavacano words for camaraderie and cooperation. The volunteer-based group organizes learning activities and documents stories from youth participants as well

Location	AREAS OF INTEREST
	Education & capacity development
Zamboanga	<p>6. Awardees are nominated by their schools⁴⁸</p> <p>7. Organizing of peace camps and other educational discussions i.e. multi-stakeholder event discussing the “Roadmap for the Inter-religious,” Kahawahan⁴⁹ – coffee type style of conversation where Ulamas are invited to share their insights.</p>

Reviewing the sharings of the respondents in the research sites, the interviewees were able to recount more experiences and insights about educational and capacity building activities. These projects were implemented within and outside of the school campus and were organized by school-based organizations, the educational institutions itself or a joint partnership with other non-government organizations and the local government units

⁴⁸ As part of the program, the peace initiatives of the awardees are monitored. The awardees also undergo youth and children’s camps to develop deeper understanding on the issues and values of interreligious dialogue.

⁴⁹ Kahawahan means coffee. The activities include inviting Ulamas and other religious leaders over a cup of coffee.

■ The responses during the interviews also reflect the following points:

- 1 There are organizations that were formed by the respondents themselves. These organizations are actively working in partnership with groups.
- 2 Some of these organizations are aware of the need to sustain the advocacy through developing young leaders working for peace. Hence, there are training conducted to transfer knowledge and skills to the youth.
- 3 Within the universities, student organizations engaged in peace advocacy work developed a positive reputation and provided a constant space for learning, reinforcing of values and camaraderie among its members.
- 4 The respondents were able to recount a consistent effort and presence of different religious leaders and groups particularly in activities that require awareness of one's faith and religious practices.
- 5 A respondent also highlighted the importance of the educational institution's recognition of different faiths and ensuring an enabling environment for peace within their university.
- 6 In some areas, the respondents mentioned the active involvement of the youth in implementing activities, and participation in critical discussions affecting the youth within the university and local government settings etc.

7 For organizations engaging with the youth, a number of creative projects were explored and implemented i.e. Kahawahan – conversations over coffee, peace awards, mental health related activities, and playing of sports.

8 From the respondents' recollection, there were very few recounts of experiences and knowledge of other projects such as psychosocial support, resiliency and livelihood programs. For participants who shared experiences in this aspect, they described involvement in psychosocial programs that are holistic and includes the environment. Another approach is to heal and address mental health issues through sharings among the youth. For livelihood programs, these initiatives are implemented by the local government as in the case of Governor Mujiv Hataman's program, and conducted as part of the broader effort of reintegration i.e. addressing the needs of former combatants, etc.

Based on the discussions of the interviewees, there are a number of activities wherein the youth has taken the initiative and organized specific projects. The table below contains the summary of these activities.

Table 4.23.

Summary of youth-led activities and engagements identified by the participants.

Location	Youth-led activities and engagements
BARMM	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Formation of youth-led organizations such as Positive Vibes that supports peacebuilding work through providing workshops and trainings for the youth as well as their parents and teachers. This builds a community within the classroom setting.2. Presence of other organizations such as Gen Peace and KAPWA3. Continuing engagements of the youth with other partner organizations such as The Golden Insitute in Chicago, USA.4. Engagements with the United Network of Young Peacebuilders5. Engagements with volunteers that can support their programs and at the same time show the value of their efforts to the communities6. Efforts to organize donation drives and other fund-raising projects i.e. cookies, bamboos for a cause, etc.
Davao	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Forum and gallery walk during the anniversary of the Jabidah massacre2. Community engagements of youth leaders in SALAM Society, SALAM TAMS, SALAM CORPS and SALAAM Movement. This includes distribution of school supplies to the youth, sharing of Iftar meals and providing support during disasters, etc.3. Conduct of Islamic lectures. In this activity, the Ustadz are invited to discuss current events.4. Annual peacebuilding camps organized by SALAM CORPS

Location	Youth-led activities and engagements
Marawi	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Peace camp for young people 2. Organizing of groups: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2.1 “Batang Transformers” who are engaged in peace building work 2.2 Organizing of Coalition of Moro Youth Movement 2.3 Bangsamoro Youth Commission (BYC) 2.4 Moro Youth Peace Camps – Teach Peace⁵⁰
National Capital Region (NCR)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Solidarity actions among Moro and Christian students during the campaign in support of Bangsamoro Basic Law, among others⁵¹
Sulu	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Developing of modules by the youth. These modules sought to correct narratives and emphasized the inter-religious movement to address issues on participation of Muslim and Christian Youth (Kaputot Bangsa Sug) 2. Sanggunian ng Kabataan engagements 3. Forming of organizations such as the Tausug League. Their programs consist of leadership, health, education, environment, culture and peace⁵². 4. Other groups such as the Sulu Network discussed the context of peace and order. This is lead by TSS Muslims Leaders Association. 5. Seminars and radio pluggings every Saturday.

⁵⁰ Teach Peace, a project that addresses violent extremism among school children – a project of Balay Rehabilitation Center and handled by one of the respondents

⁵¹ Engagement in national issues such as the anti-terror law, need for comprehensive response against COVID-19; human rights violations such as EJKs resulting from the war on drugs campaign

⁵² Initially formed within the university, students joined the organization. When the activities extended beyond the university, the activities focused on peace-related work. Youth volunteers served in the organization, joined conflict seminars on violent extremism, and emphasized the new image of Tausug youth that are not extreme. They also initiated peace education work among internally displaced peoples and they even volunteered as elementary teachers. Some of the activities they worked on included story telling and values formation i.e. how to build trust, how to forgive, etc.

Location	Youth-led activities and engagements
Zamboanga	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Peace initiatives of young peace weaver awardees within their schools. These initiatives also focus on the environment. 2. Involvement of youth in the barangay peace and order plans. 3. Organizing of educational activities for children. Activities highlight prophetic stories, among others. 4. Activities that encourage empathy i.e. spending money to cook meals and bring it to their communities, and other ways of serving them.

The research also explored the opinions of the interviewees in terms of the effectiveness of these activities. A number of the respondents shared the following perspectives as well as specific recommendations in addressing violent extremism in their localities.

Table 4.24.
Perceptions about effective practices and recommendations in addressing violent extremism.

Location	Views about effective practices in addressing violent extremism	Recommendations
BARMM	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Use of media and technology to share information about peacebuilding and strengthen capacities of interested people. 2. Emphasis on the youth with capacities and potential for nation and peacebuilding. 3. Continuous engagement and collaboration with the youth as well as other organizations. 4. Collaboration with different fields i.e. IT youth groups, etc. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Inclusion of the youth in policies and program designing. 2. Review strategies in responding to new contexts i.e. developing personal peace to address mental health issues, personal development 3. Preparation for gradual turn-over and transition of organizational leaders to the youth i.e. ensure efficient knowledge transfer, shift to an oversight role, etc.

Location	Views about effective practices in addressing violent extremism	Recommendations
BARMM	5. Opened spaces for volunteers to practice social responsibility 6. Continuous reflection of an individual and organization's values and purpose. 7. Considering positive narratives 8. Practicing values such as kindness.	4. Ensure sufficient knowledge of a community's context including dynamics in place for better understanding of appropriate strategies and actions needed. Reflect on the mission and purpose of the peace-building work.
Davao	1. Membership in an organization ⁵³ provided companionship, support, and encouragement for continuing faith-based practices. 2. Experience based on the activities of university-based organizations i.e. organizing of interfaith dialogues, and inviting Ustadz as resource speakers, organizing peace camps, etc. 3. Establishing organizations' good reputation among stakeholders ⁵⁴	1. Be open-minded and listen to all parties. 2. Appreciate the contributions and efforts of leaders 3. Reflecting on one's self and ability to discern right from wrong 4. Youth to serve as a role model for kids in coexisting with others and creating positive relationships with people of different faiths ⁵⁴ .

⁵³ One respondent mentioned about significant changes in her life after joining SALAM Society. Before college, she mentioned that she was very religious. Since joining SALAM Society, she felt encouraged to complete the five prayers every day because others are also religiously practicing it. After classes, she would look forward to being with her friends in the organization. She believes being part of such organizations help build the character of a person.

⁵⁴ Experience of SALAM organizations. Some students prefer studying in Ateneo because of SALAM's presence in the university.

⁵⁵ Muslim youth can serve as the role model for younger people. They can show that Islam is a religion of peace.

Location	Views about effective practices in addressing violent extremism	Recommendations
Davao	<p>4. Supportive and enabling environment within the university that nurtures spaces for understanding different faiths, i.e. experience with the Ateneo de Davao University system in initiating interfaith dialogues, etc.</p> <p>5. Use of live streaming for lectures and other online activities</p> <p>6. Use of sports to encourage camaraderie among the youth.</p> <p>7. Constant self-reflection and awareness of one's standpoint.</p> <p>8. Establishing good role models for the youth i.e. right Islamic way of life, peaceful coexistence with other faiths, etc.</p>	<p>5. Use of digital media in raising awareness on different topics about peacebuilding</p> <p>6. Conduct of sports fest for students to show the importance of sports to build camaraderie, establish sportsmanship. Similar activities can also be explored i.e. Zumba, luksong baka, luksong tinik, indigenous dances, etc.</p>
Marawi	<p>1. The Moro Youth Peace camps collected 500,000 signatures to support the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL).</p>	<p>1. Better understanding of the youth and how to guide them.</p> <p>2. Continuous learning and understanding of the context of Islam</p> <p>3. Explore mentoring the youth at the community level</p> <p>4. Modules for schools and baranggays. The youth can take lead in the implementation through the Student Councils.</p>

Location	Views about effective practices in addressing violent extremism	Recommendations
National Capital Region (NCR)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conduct of inter-religious dialogues as well as teaching ecumenism among the youth. 2. Active presence of the Youth Ministry⁵⁶. The Youth Ministry organized an international gathering of young people from different faiths. 3. Development of peace modules should include gender and cultural sensitivity, understanding of the Do No Harm principles. 4. Youth network must be hosted by a secretariat to be able to support funding for activities. 5. In decision making, ensure that the youth are involved. 6. Conduct of regular consultations for activities particularly in module designing and development 6. Importance of mentor, adviser, facilitator and mediator 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Continue organizing and developing the youth as leaders 2. Nurture humility among the youth 3. Remember the welfare of the people 4. Learn the principles of an effective advocate 5. Create structures for the youth 6. Create spaces, venues and financial support for the youth to motivate them 7. Strengthen and invest in organizations 8. Design campaigns to cater to real-time needs of the students so they would be engaged in the work 9. Organize campaigns and groups focusing on violent extremism 10. Use various digital platforms for campaign i.e. Twitter⁵⁷ and Facebook page⁵⁸. 11. Focus on unorganized students and others without any platform to discuss issues.

⁵⁶ This helped the formation of youth leaders at the diocese level.

⁵⁷ Considered by the respondent as more comfortable and private. The respondent believes the generation these days prefer Twitter.

⁵⁸ Preferred for organizational profiles

Location	Views about effective practices in addressing violent extremism	Recommendations
National Capital Region (NCR)		<p>12. Consider youth representations of organizations</p> <p>13. Continue engaging the local parishes to ensure their presence and to provide accompaniment in their work.</p>
Sulu	<p>1. Direct social interaction with the youth in learning about Islam and other issues</p> <p>2. Presence of youth leaders within the initiatives and teams</p> <p>3. Integrating values education in the school curriculum</p> <p>4. Distribution of pamphlets to children. The material includes topics on values formation, respecting adults. Importance of one's character.</p> <p>5. Experience of the Sulu CSO network in maintaining relationships with the local government units, the police, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines to ensure they will not cause harm or threaten civil society organizations and other communities.</p> <p>6. Collaboration with different groups</p>	<p>1. Develop a national policy and program for surrenderees.</p> <p>2. Provide educational support such as reading materials to the youth. Contents can include values education – focusing on Islamic values.</p> <p>3. Organize learning activities such as seminars, discussions, etc.</p> <p>4. Conduct educational activities that highlight cultural and religious sensitivity.</p> <p>5. Conduct learning activities that can teach them entrepreneurship and other vocational skills.</p> <p>6. Institutionalize Islamic values education i.e. through the curriculum of Department of Education.</p> <p>7. Increase efforts to raise awareness of existing government programs offering livelihood support and assistance to former combatants.</p>

Location	Views about effective practices in addressing violent extremism	Recommendations
Sulu		<p>8. Continue strengthening existing youth organizations and build partnerships with other organizations</p> <p>9. Explore research projects about the widows and orphans of the war and design policy initiatives that can provide government support to them.</p> <p>10. Introduce interventions on the needs of widows and orphans of the war</p> <p>11. Recognize that militarization is not the solution to the conflict situation</p> <p>12. Ensure the support of the local government units in this work</p> <p>13. Consider the different and relative perceptions of peace between different individuals.</p> <p>14. Nurture inner peace.</p>
Zamboanga	<p>1. Psychosocial support programs that addresses mental health of the youth through education.</p> <p>2. Providing narratives that are positive i.e. encouraging a renewed purpose in life, etc.</p>	<p>1. Encourage the youth to participate in leadership programs.</p> <p>2. Explore partnerships with other organizations and networks to share experiences on violent extremism.</p>

Location	Views about effective practices in addressing violent extremism	Recommendations
Zamboanga	3. Documenting untold stories of survivors and sharing these stories to other individuals and communities. 4. Inclusion of organizations such as ZABIDA as part of the finance committee and annual operations plan of the city. 5. Involvement of students that are part of a specific field of work to be part of the activities. 6. Importance of sincerity in helping people in the communities 7. Addressing needs of out-of-school youths especially on education.	3. Continue youth organizing and reach out to out-of-school youth to encourage them to return to school. Recognize that these youth are vulnerable to recruitment. 4. Continuous collaboration with other networks to share experiences on violent extremism. 5. Strengthen youth networks and engage more young leaders in various platforms. 6. Use of creative digital strategies for peace and counter narratives i.e. social media posts, how to be creative in postings as a blogger/vlogger, etc.

Aside from the previous interviewees, the Country Director of Equal Access International – Exan Sharief, also shared several recommendations in addressing violent extremism. According to Sharief, a holistic peacebuilding approach is necessary to address peace and conflict issues. This approach should include children. Support should be available for youth-led activities to ensure sustainability. Sharief also believes in the value of social entrepreneurship and how it can be further explored with the youth.

Based on the shared experiences, the effective practices as well as the recommendations by the respondents remain consistent with the analytical framework of the research.

There are a few recommendations that need to be noted for its relevance, among these points include the following:

- 1 Recognition that militarism is not the only solution to a conflict;
- 2 The use of digital media in peacebuilding work, including sharing positive narratives to address violent extremism;
- 3 The emphasis of an individual's self-transformation i.e. reflection, nurturing inner peace, reinforcing values, teaching religious education and its subsequent integration within the educational curriculum;
- 4 The strong presence of role models to serve as mentors as well as religious leaders to reinforce values and the correct religious concepts;
- 5 Organizing of sports events to bring together the youth and develop sportsmanship and positive values; and
- 6 Holistic approach in peacebuilding through government programs addressing the needs of widows and orphans, psychosocial and livelihood needs of communities.

Chapter 5: Analysis

The data gathered from both the survey and key informant interviews reflect the key sentiments and views about violent extremism in the five key areas of the research.

Defining violent extremism

Definitions of violent extremism differed among the respondents of the survey and the interviews.

Respondents find violent extremism difficult to define with the definitions not unanimously accepted. The common description they shared is the use of extreme violence. Some respondents think this is a new concept introduced from abroad and is perceived as the new flavor of the month for funding opportunities.

While there was no definitive standard for describing the term itself, the respondents recalled its expressions based on motivation and intention, belief systems, method used, costs, and impact as well as the general nature of the VE groups’ organizational operations.

Table 5.1.
Respondents’ perspectives on violent extremism

Elements	Violent Extremism	Description
Motivation	Various factors: Psychological, Economic, Socio-political	Emotional state (Passionate belief in the cause - establishing a Caliphate, establishing a Communist government, feelings of vengeance, strong protective tendencies to defend family and community, etc)

Elements	Violent Extremism	Description
Belief system	Extreme ideology, belief	Legitimate cause: Insurgent groups Some violent extremist groups initially had a strong ideology but was later on influenced by power, influence, drugs and money (ASG)
Method	Use of violent methods Destructive nature of methods used	Extreme acts - beyond the norm Criminal acts Nothing wrong with extreme beliefs, use of violence defines violent extremism
Intention	Intention: Compel, intimidate actors (state, population) to act or abstain from actions	Insurgent groups: Unintended collateral damage
Costs	High costs in terms of loss lives, property social and economic costs (loss of lives, property, environment)	Use of specific violent acts - some are criminal in nature: Killings, burning and bombings of private and public places (houses, community areas), religious areas, kidnapping and ransom
Impact	Long term impact: psycho-social, economic, political	Can serve as potential drivers of succeeding insurgencies and other violent extremist acts
Nature	Organized (Leadership, structure, resources and finances)	Violent extremist groups are organized movement

Impressions of violent extremism lean toward terrorism and other violent extremism. This is consistent with the range of definitions referred to within the domestic and international landscape.


Understanding these differences in definitions require an understanding of the local contexts wherein violent extremist organizations exist. Groups labeled as violent extremists have historical contexts that need to be fully recognized. In the island provinces of Mindanao, especially in Sulu, the centuries of historical injustices dating back to the Spanish colonization inspired the people to wage an armed struggle to defend their homeland, fight for their identity and rights, such as in the case of the MNLF and MILF. The failed peace agreement between the MNLF and the government resulted to the breakaway formation of the MILF. Prior to their successfully negotiated agreement with the government, they were also labeled as terrorists. Some respondents held the view that, had the term violent extremism existed before the MILF's successful peace negotiation, they would also be called violent extremists. Some think that the appropriate term could be non-state actors, since some of them fought for their rights to self-determination and the use of arms and violence were their remaining defense against the attacks on their homeland and their identity as a people.

Hence, in many households in the BARMM, having a gun is an important necessity. This also explains the recurrence of rido or clan conflicts in these areas. Poor governance, inability to enforce laws, the proliferation of guns, and now drugs – the shadow economy in the region needs to be seen as complicating factors related to the problem of violent extremism. There are high hopes that the formation of the BARMM government will address these problems.


It is also important to see the evolution of VE groups and how this contributes to the changing perceptions about VE. Abu Sayyaf had its roots initially to the political and ideological goals of the MNLF and the MILF.

Frustrated by the failed promises of the government, some of its leaders who were schooled abroad were inspired to form their own group with the goal of creating an Islamic movement. Later generations of commanders lost this ideology and succumb to survival needs, hence, they started the business of kidnapping for ransom. There are remnants of this purist group of Abu Sayyaf, whose only goal is to ensure that they live up to Islamic teachings especially the succeeding younger generations. There are other breakaway factions of the Abu Sayyaf who work in partnership with politicians. This was expressed by respondents from Jolo and Marawi. Drugs are reported to be of mutual interest aside from money from kidnapping. And politicians use them as private armies, too.


In further unpacking the term violent extremism, there is a noted resistance over the use of the terminology itself from within a section of the peacebuilding community in Mindanao. This was explicitly discussed in formal gatherings such as workshops and fora such as the activities organized by Equal Access International. The resistance to the concept itself is caused by the historical reclaiming of narratives within the historical political struggle for self-determination in Mindanao. Based on the documentation of the proceedings and follow-up interview with its Country Director, there is a risk of the political narratives being dismissed as acts of violence in the absence of a critical understanding of dynamics of the conflict and the historical marginalization that caused the formation of the armed movement. The use of the term as well was observed to be solely applied to Islamic violent extremist group without referring to the existence of other violent extremist groups such as the Communist Party of the Philippines - New People's Army.



The label itself of violent extremism is questionable to some respondents. Some of them believe the use of the term discriminates against Muslims, e.g. Muslims as violent extremists, as terrorists and that Christians are not labeled as such. Some also think that the violent attacks of the military, such as the burning of communities are acts similarly committed by violent extremist groups.



A contextual understanding of the history and community is a critical step prior to actual engagements with the community. While the term violent extremism itself has been widely used globally to refer to violent and armed organizations with goals and radical beliefs, the community perspective and ideals about such references should continue to be heard and better understood. This is particularly essential for interventions in conflict and post-conflict settings that have varying degrees of vulnerability. A holistic understanding of the local context and conflict dynamics can aid in preventing further marginalization of groups that can drive individuals to use violence in pursuit of their agenda.



Violent extremism as a foreign concept is another insight discussed in the interviews and shared by the survey respondents. In one of the gatherings hosted by Equal Access International - one of their participant expressed that with the branding of violent extremist actors, they are being deprived of “the potential for social good.”

Views of the youth on violent extremism

Similar to the previous analysis, the youth recalls violent extremism in reference to the use of violent methods to achieve the organization’s intentions and goals.

In some situations, violent extremism is recognized by the use of violence. In this case, other legal organizations such as fraternities were perceived by one respondent to exhibit violent extremist tendencies. This similarly caused fear among those who experience such violence. One of the respondents from the National Capital Region (NCR) also shared this perspective. Based on her experiences within NCR, she noted how violent state response to legitimate protests could also be a form of a violent extremism. Another respondent provided examples of violent extremism based on the experience of other countries - such as the Tiananmen Massacre.

Another insight shared during the data collection is the view that radical ideas in itself pose no risk and are generally accepted. For instance, radical ideas about the practice of one’s faith, among others. The use of violence delineates individuals and organizations espousing radical ideas from violent extremist groups.

Table 5.2.
Summary of youth and civil society perspectives on violent extremism

Methods	Youth perspectives
Literature review	Marawi: Awareness of violent extremism in relation to the Maute - ISIS group; understands objectives but disagrees on methods due to incompatibility with Islam as a religion of peace

Methods	Youth perspectives
Qualitative results	1. Violent extremism targets Muslims 2. Affirmed by a respondent from NCR: The Communist Party of the Philippines' operations began in 1969 and there are legitimate reasons for waging the armed struggle but the group used violent methods. 3. Acceptable term: Non-state actors; Violent excessive acts. 4. Recognition of armed groups waging legitimate causes 5. Extreme beliefs, wrong interpretation of Islamic teachings
Quantitative results	Extreme ideology that uses excessive force and violence similar to terrorism. The intent is to dominate and subjugate for political and religious purposes.

Violent extremism’s push and pull factors

The respondents shared their views about the push and pull factors that influence one’s participation in violent extremism. The following table provides a summary of their responses based on the research framework of the study.

Table 4.16.
 Respondents views on the push and pull factors of violent extremism

Methods	Push factors	Pull factors	Space for interventions
Self	1. Appeals to independence and freedom 2. Sense of belongingness and status 3. Emotional state following the death of a family member	1. Provokes anger and desire for vengeance 2. Evokes a violent sense of empowerment (in relation to gender dynamics) 3. Appeal to the sense of belonging and security	1. Healthy self-esteem Deeper understanding of one’s purpose and goal Personal stance against violence

Methods	Push factors	Pull factors	Space for interventions
Self	4. Strong desire to practice Islam 5. Lack of understanding of the Islam		
Family	1. Dysfunctional families 2. Participation of family members in violent extremism 3. Attacks against family	1. Restrictive families: Appeal to sense of independence and freedom 2. Family loyalties i.e. desire for providing and protecting family members	1. Strong presence and guidance of authority figures in the family
Community	1. Low identification with groups and communities 2. Impoverished communities 3. Violent extremist groups' influence over communities	1. Violent extremist groups' influence over communities 2. Accessibility of spaces for learning, gathering and recruitment 3. Wrong views of Islam in impoverished communities 4. Provokes anger especially in marginalized communities with traumatic experiences 5. Violent extremist groups' exploiting unprocessed historical injustice felt by communities	1. Socially cohesive communities

Methods	Push factors	Pull factors	Space for interventions
Market	1. Poverty 2. Lack of education 3. Lack of access to technology 4. Lack of employment and livelihood opportunities	1. Monetary and non-monetary incentives (i.e. gadgets, etc.) 2. Scholarship offers 3. Guns and other weapons 4. Drugs	1. Addressing issues through policy making and good governance
State	1. Perceived failure of national government 2. Committed acts of injustices against the individual, family and community 3. Lack of acceptable resolution for historical injustices	1. Provocation of desire to seek vengeance and reclaim power 2. Fear and anger as a driving force for committing violent extremist acts 3. Emphasizing notions of purity in the new Caliphate, capacity for better governance and addressing needs of muslims	1. Access to education of youth Holistic approach to resolving root causes Local governance' approach to resolve root causes and long-term impact

The appeal to join violent extremist groups differ based on the respondents' experiences. The points that are essential in the local narratives are the factors that set the conditions for violent extremist groups to even exist and thrive. Respondents, as well as other studies, cited the shortcomings and failure of national government in addressing historical injustices that gave rise to armed groups. Such situations provided the environment that enabled violent extremism in the Philippines.

While there is little evidence within this study to ascertain whether, indeed, poverty served as the primary driver for recruitment of violent extremist groups, several respondents noted how appealing recruitment strategies can be. Some of these strategies include financial offers paid at times in installments i.e. offers of gadgets, monthly payments and other financial incentives based on their roles & tasks.

Among the outreach and recruitment by these groups, there are efforts to immerse within the communities and other learning spaces to create constant interaction, create influence and build relationships. In these interactions, discussions occur and narratives are used to ensure successful recruitment. In the case of Islamic violent extremist groups, learning spaces are used to provide alternate and/or false information that can distort views about Islamic teachings. With some vulnerable individuals and groups, their emotional state can be further provoked by these groups and provide options wherein their frustrations can be addressed.

Within the context of the family, a certain vulnerability is created when this unit expresses a level of dysfunction. This is the case of restrictive families that triggers frustrations and longing for freedom by their family members. If any of the family members are also part of violent extremist groups, there is an even more vulnerability for the rest of them to be recruited.

Violent extremist groups also exploit an individual through his or her emotional state. A VE member can highlight the sense of belongingness the group can offer to a potential recruit. This can be appealing to others, especially those who experienced various frustrations in life and have been discriminated. While for some who experienced forms of restrictions within their families, joining violent extremist groups can fulfill the need for independence and empowerment.

Impact of violent extremism on the youth

The experience on violent extremism among the youth provided impressions among the respondents. The disruption in the youth's education itself poses a heavy burden and lasting impact in the youth's future. Unable to return to school and complete their education, these factors gradually reduce their access to economic opportunities for them. For the ones with sufficient resources to relocate, the choice to leave and move to other places and universities was reported as viable options.

The community's support is integral in enabling an environment that supports continuous education and learning, among others. Hence, the acceptance of community members in relation to former youth members of violent extremism is a factor that can provide a safe and supportive environment where their lives can start anew – including resuming their education.

Gender dynamics in violent extremism

The literature studied with the interview results showed a number of patterns in the way gender relations and power influenced the recruitment of the women in violent extremist groups.

In summary, the study noted that the participation of women in violent extremist groups is limited to their roles as wives, and to perform errands for the group. There is limited information where women directly participate as fighters. Hence, their participation is still seen within the realm of women's roles in the household, now extended within the setting of a violent extremist group. Within the ranks of the NPAs, there were reports of women performing beyond their domestic roles. They serve as fighters and medics. The MNLF and MILF also have their own women auxiliary brigades as well. However, this research did not delve into this matter in detail.

The following points expound on the dynamics of gender within a VE group:

1 Women are influenced by different gender stereotypes, which can be observed in the following situations:

a. The stereotype of the dutiful wife and mother who nurtures and protects the husband and children. This leads to vulnerabilities in recruitment to follow the husband in extremist activities out of love and duty. Vulnerable mothers were also expected to support and protect her children from poverty and other risks, which can lead to engaging with violent extremist groups.

b. The concept of women having a soft spot, heart for their lovers, husband and children were noted. This vulnerability was observed as an opportunity that can be exploited by violent extremist groups in recruiting women.

c. In other cases, respondents suggested sexual exploitation in the relationships of female recruits and their connections to the extremist groups.

d. The stereotype of women was used to disarm and allay suspicions of involvement in violent extremist groups. Stories of how women serves as spies, couriers and fund raisers were shared by different respondents in various studies.

e. The image of a strong and empowered women were also noted to lead to radicalization and recruitment of women. Women fighters were reported to have a concept of gender equality that refers to the women being able to take on roles and tasks done conventionally by men. In the context of violent extremist operations, these roles range from taking up arms (female snipers were the best snipers in the Marawi seige), suicide bombing, or taking up leadership positions. Radicalized women in these groups were emboldened to also recruit other women to their operations.

f. Violent extremist groups have used the idea of gender complementarity to encourage recruitment. This notion supports fixed roles of men and women within the family setting and lays down norms that can be appealing to potential recruits.

2 Male stereotypes are further exploited by violent extremist groups

a. The masculine concept of the father as the provider of the protector of the family creates vulnerability for recruitment.

b. In addition to this, the pressure to provide financially to the family lures men into VE groups and their appealing offer for financial incentives.


c. In contrast to the female roles in violent extremist groups, taking up arms is perceived as a masculine behavior, which can serve to support and validate men's masculinity.

3 Gender roles in preventing violent extremism


- a.** Mothers were perceived to have a bigger role in educating children and looking after their moral upbringing. Observing behavior and listening to views of their children were seen as the mother's role in the bigger strategy to prevent extremist and violent tendencies within the family. Hence, their influence is more rooted within their domestic obligations to the family.
- b.** The stereotype of the father being the authoritative person in the family wherein family members would usually obey. This emphasizes the role of men in preventing violent and extremist ideas within the family. A strong father figure that denounces violent extremist ideologies can influence the whole family.

Engagements and initiatives in addressing violent extremism

The current militaristic approach to address the problem of violent extremism will not resolve the roots of the rise of VE groups. For example, current programs for surrenderees are very temporary – financial incentives for the surrender of arms, but there are no sustained livelihood programs. The approach needs to be holistic and needs to be context-based. For instance, the island provinces of Basilan and Sulu have different historical circumstances. They have been battle scarred. Their social, economic, ecological and political environments reflect the compounded effects of the war. There are limited economic opportunities even for those who finished college. The very few government offices in the area are the employment options, and political patronage matters for someone to land a job. There are no companies that could employ them, except for some retail stores. The wage is low. Those engaged in farming are faced with very low prices for their produce. Hence, poverty is high in the area. Only very few individuals can go to school.



The military operations targeting violent extremist groups result to many human rights violations. The cry for justice for those who are victims of human rights violations committed by the military against civilians remain unanswered. This is clearly expressed by respondents from Jolo, Sulu, Marawi, and BARMM. For those in Marawi, victims of the siege are still waiting for the promised rehabilitation and the return to their lands. This feeling of government neglect can serve as an entry point for VE recruitment.



In Marawi, corruption and the unmet promises of government especially after the Marawi siege are vulnerabilities that could entice young people to join violent extremist groups. The Maute group responsible for the Marawi siege came from a family who are financially capable. In this case, poverty was not the reason for their actions.

In the cities of Davao and NCR, issues related to human rights violations, national policies to address the pandemic, insurgency, and the drug war are the priorities compared to violent extremism. In these areas, the young people have more access to education and there are mechanisms to address their grievances.

Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations

1 Self/ Individual


The self and/or individual element in the prevention and countering of violent extremism should be of similar importance with other elements such as the community, market and the state. Considering the vulnerabilities of the youth in the recruitment, it is necessary to create and support the strengthening of one's identity, character and resiliency in relation to one's core values.

Similarly, programs that will strengthen the mental health of young people are important. It could be a partnership with government and CSOs, especially those initiated by young people. Funding for this program is essential.


Developing programs that include a sustainable mentoring system within organizations and communities can provide long term guidance for the youth as they go about their own personal transformations.

2 Family and Community

The family and community's support remain an essential factor in preventing youth recruitment. The important role of the family is emphasized by the results of this study. It has a dual face – it can be a channel of violent extremist recruitment and also a nurturing space to protect the young people from participation. However, economic pressures left families – either the wife or husband, with the option to find work and leave their children behind.



In Sulu, many women were reported to have left for work as domestics in the main cities, or abroad, in Sabah, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, among other countries. Having second families for Muslim husbands also add pressures to these families. Extended families, or clans play an important role in nurturing the children. Elders in these families are role models for young people. They are respected and listened to. If elders are members of VE groups, or are promoting distorted concepts of Islam in the case of Muslim families, then young people could also be easily recruited or they would develop hatred and prejudices against non-Muslims.



Thus, in interventions to address violent extremism, it is not just the young people but their own families and the community elders who need to be attended to. Families need to be capacitated to be able to listen and communicate better with their children; to provide healthy avenues for sharing of differing opinions; to foster respect and love, and to encourage their sons and daughters to express their emotions openly, to counter hypermasculine notions such as “men should not cry” or should not show their emotions, and train them to manage their anger.

Capacitating religious leaders is also important. Linkages with CSOs/ youth groups to foster healthy exchange of ideas to address the problem of VE in a language that is relatable and easy to understand is highly encouraged.

Strengthening the inner capacity of young people is also essential, for them to be able to deeply discern facts from fake news; to rise above their difficult circumstances and find other means to respond to their needs and dreams other than joining VE groups. Hence, counselling, at the very least, is also important⁵⁹. In the case of Jolo, Sulu, one respondent shared that public schools in the area have no guidance counselors. Hence, initiatives to address the mental health of young people especially those who are internally displaced or in armed conflict areas need to be supported and strengthened.

Diaspora communities in highly urbanized areas like NCR bring with them unresolved issues of historical injustices and prejudices. They are also targeted by military operations once there are reported VE activities in Mindanao. They also have to confront prejudices against them. Inter-religious dialogues undertaken by various faiths in NCR are important and need to be sustained since this will foster greater understanding and acceptance among them. Activities to foster solidarity among the young people initiated by some youth groups, both Muslims and Christians are notable initiatives.

Similarly there should be space to build good relationships and community cohesion through activities that enhance interaction and create more trust. Activities that can provide spaces to deal with prejudices and grievances can be implemented, such as interfaith dialogues, among others.

Other peacebuilding community systems can be considered and adapted based on the situation and needs of the communities itself.

⁵⁹ This research did not include an inquiry into the situation of schools and boarding schools like Madrasha and Toril if counseling and related inner peace attitude and skills building are available.

Specific partnerships with existing civil society organizations such as Equal Access International is highly recommended to ensure complementary projects that will amplify each organizations' strengths and maximize resources for better social impact.

3 Market


Among the factors that established a stronger pull in recruitment of the youth is the economic standing of the individual and the family.

Hence, adequate economic opportunities should be explored with different multisectoral partners. Addressing this element also involves finding strategies that can support the continuing education of the youth affected by armed conflicts, etc.


4 State

The accountability of the state in respecting, promoting and fulfilling human rights of its people remain a necessity in preventing VE even in the most remote communities. While it is important to address means and strategies of recruitment - this remains a short-lived approach to building sustainable peace. Holistically addressing grievances, structural injustices and effects of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency can provide long-term approach to peacebuilding.

The state needs to provide a comprehensive program where the roots of historical injustices and current issues of human rights violations are addressed. Sustainable economic programs, including the distribution and ownership of agricultural lands, agricultural support programs, support for small and medium industries especially in the island regions, and skills training for surrenderees are important.



The market could not thrive when the security of the area is unstable. The security forces need to be re-oriented in their approach and perspective and be guided by international human rights laws in their operations.



Creating a culture of peace through peace promotion and education i.e. peace messages of respect for diversity, respect for various faiths, among others, can only be successful with a holistic design and funding. Such efforts can ultimately be sustained through policy reforms, institutionalizing changes, and nurturing the youth. Only through this approach can violent extremism be effectively curbed and prevented⁶⁰.

⁶⁰ This research did not include an inquiry into the situation of schools and boarding schools like Madrasha and Toril if counseling and related inner peace attitude and skills building are available.

ANNEX A

Survey Questions

Demographic profile of interviewees	Name/Gender/Age/ Civil Status/ Educational background/Position or title in the organization
Profile of the city	<p>How long have you been living in the area?</p> <p>What is the religion of people living in your area?</p> <p>Which Muslim sects live in your area?</p> <p>Which ethnic groups live in your area?</p> <p>What are the major occupations in the area?</p> <p>What is the average monthly income of people?</p>
Forms of violent extremism	<p>How do you define violent extremism?</p> <p>What forms of violent extremism exist in the area?</p> <p>How often do they occur?</p> <p>Who are the main actors of violent extremism in the area/city?</p> <p>Who would you differentiate radicalism from violent extremism?</p>
Drivers of violent extremism among youth	<p>Do you have an idea what is the percentage of young people involved in violent extremism in the area?</p> <p>How young are the people recruited?</p> <p>How are they recruited? What sort of “promises” are made to them?</p> <p>What do you think are the push and pull factors why these young people are easily recruited to violent extremist movements or groups?</p> <p>What are the roles of the family, peers, schools, media and social media in the recruitment of young people?</p>
Impact of violent extremism on young people	<p>How has VE movement affect the life of young people?</p> <p>Do they continue to go to school even after joining the VE movement?</p> <p>How has this affected their relation with the family, peers and the community?</p>

ANNEX A

Survey Questions

Gender perspective	<p>Do you have any idea on the percentage of female youth and young girls who have joined the VE movement/group?</p> <p>How are women recruited?</p> <p>What are the usual reasons why female youth and young girls join VE movements?</p>
Best practices	<p>Are there initiatives in the community geared towards the prevention of violent extremism? Which of these initiatives are undertaken by young people? (Note on networks of young people)</p> <p>How effective are these moves?</p> <p>What lessons can be learned from these initiatives?</p>

ANNEX B

Key Informant Interview

- 1 What is your definition of violent extremism?
- 2 What forms of violent extremism exist in the area?
- 3 Who are the main actors of violent extremism in the area/city?
- 4 How would you differentiate radicalism from violent extremism?
- 5 Drivers of violent extremism among the youth
 - 5.1. Do you have an idea what is the percentage of young people involved in violent extremism in the area?
 - 5.2. How young are the people recruited?
 - 5.3. How are they recruited?
 - 5.4. What sort of “promises” are made to them?
 - 5.5. What do you think are the push and pull factors why these young people are easily recruited to violent extremist movements or groups?
 - 5.6. What are the roles of the family, peers, schools, media and social media in the recruitment of young people?
- 6 How has VE movement affect the life of young people?
- 7 Do they continue to go to school even after joining the VE movement?
- 8 How has this affected their relation with the family, peers and the community?

ANNEX B

Key Informant Interview

10 Gender perspective

10.1. Do you have any idea on the percentage of female youth and young girls who have joined the VE movement/group?

10.2. How are women recruited?

11 What are roles and tasks?

11.1. What are the usual reasons why female youth and young girls join VE movements?

12 Best practices

12.1. Are there initiatives in the community geared towards the prevention of violent extremism?

12.2. Which of these initiatives are undertaken by young people?
(Note on networks of young people)

12.3. How effective are these moves?

12.4. What lessons can be learned from these initiatives?

References

- 2nd Infantry Division PAO. (2020, June 26). Child-warrior, three other NPAs yield rifle in Quezon. Philippine Information Agency. Retrieved 17 September 2020 at <https://pia.gov.ph/news/articles/1045919>
- ABS-CBN. (2017, September 5). Abdullah Maute is dead, says military. Retrieved 21 January 2021 at <https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/09/05/17/abdu-lah-maute-is-dead-says-military>
- Alonsagay, R. (n.d.). Moro youth perception on violent extremism vis-à-vis drivers of radicalization and the influence of socializing agents
- Aspinwall, N. (2020, December 08). Duterte and Philippine Mayors Trade Loyalty for Drug Killings, Study Shows. Retrieved from <https://thediplo-mat.com/2020/12/duterte-and-philippine-may-ors-trade-loyalty-for-drug-killings-study-shows/>
- Banlaoi, R. (2009). Globalization and nation-building in the Philippines: State pre-dicaments in managing society in the midst of diversity. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at https://apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/GrowthGovernance_files/Pub_Growth%20Governance/Pub_GrowthGovernancech16.pdf
- Barrios-Fabian, M. (2004). Case study of Zambonga city. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://dirp3.pids.gov.ph/ris/dps/pidsdps0450.pdf>
- BBC News. (2019, January 27). Jolo church attack: Many killed in Philippines. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47018747>
- BIMP-EAGA. (n.d.). What is BIMP-EAGA? Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://bimp-ea-ga.asia/>
- Borum, R. (2011). Radicalization into violent extremism I: A review of social science theories. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 4(4), 7-36. Retrieved 21 January 2021 at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26463910>
- Buan, L. (2020, November 25). In alarming rise of PH lawyer killings, what is being done? Retrieved from <https://www.rappler.com/nation/what-is-being-done-rise-of-lawyer-killings-philippines>

References

- Buan, L. (2020, October 26). It may mean life or death: Activists beg Supreme Court to stop anti-terror law now. Retrieved from <https://www.rappler.com/nation/activists-plea-tro-injunction-supreme-court-stop-anti-terrorism-law-implementation>
- Bueza, M. (2016, September 6). Fast facts: What's the alsa masa?. Rappler. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.rappler.com/news-break/iq/145270-fast-facts-alsa-masa-davao>
- Cabico, G. K. (2020, December 08). Democratic freedoms in Philippines now 'severely restricted' - global rights monitor. Retrieved from <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2020/12/08/2062339/democratic-freedoms-philippines-now-severely-restricted-global-rights-monitor>
- Carey, B. (2016). Agnew's general strain theory: Context, synopsis, and application. Retrieved 28 July 2020 at <https://www.uis.edu/caphonors/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/2016/08/Blake-Carey-Agnew.pdf>
- Center for Humanitarian Dialogue. (2010). Sulu armed violence and reduction initiative 2010. Retrieved 17 September 2020 at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A285F9B73938F23F8525783400794A8A-Full_Report.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1RQ7EimrvTsmJgJVtv1BHF9ad4cjJtKWr2GNgHYZ6z77ESQBYTnahGcCk
- Cimatu, F. (2020, August 10). 7 killed in army - NPA encounter in Ilocos Sur. Rappler. Retrieved 4 October 2020 at <https://www.rappler.com/nation/killed-army-npa-encounter-ilocos-sur>
- Colina IV, A. (2018, October 30). Davao 'pilot city' for China-BIMP-EAGA cooperation. Minda News. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2018/10/davao-pilot-city-for-china-bimp-eaga-cooperation/>
- CNN Philippines. (2019, December 8). CHR to probe NPA's alleged use of child soldier. CNN Philippines. Retrieved 16 September 2020 at <https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2019/12/8/CHR-NPA-child-soldier.html>

References

- Conde, C. (2016). Dispatches: Fighting over child soldiers in the Philippines. Retrieved 16 September 2020 at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/16/dispatches-fighting-over-child-soldiers-philippines>
- Congress of the Philippines (2020). Republic Act 11479. An act to prevent, prohibit and penalize terrorism, thereby repealing Republic Act no. 9372, otherwise known as the human security act of 2007. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2020/07/03/republic-act-no-11479/>
- Counter-extremism project. (n.d.). The Philippines: Extremism & counter-extremism. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country_pdf/PH-12102020.pdf
- Custodio, A. (2019, March 25). Marawi city as an exponent of Maranao culture. The Manila Times. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.manila-times.net/2019/03/25/supplements/marawi-city-as-an-exponent-of-maranao-culture/530567/>
- De Vera, M., Indoyon, K., and Barbin, B. (2016). Collective action for political stability and business confidence: The case of Marawi city, Philippines. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at https://www.collective-action.com/sites/collective.localhost/files/conference/icca-2016/collective-action-conference-2016-de_vera-et-al.pdf
- Dejeto, M. (2018, August 18). In photos: Davao city's rich culture, as told through the Kadayawan village. Rappler. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.rappler.com/life-and-style/travel/ph-travel/209798-photos-davao-city-culture-kadayawan-village>
- Elemia, C. (2018, February 9). Zamboanga City wants guarantees it won't be included in the Bangsamoro. Rappler. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.rappler.com/nation/zamboanga-city-wants-guarantees-bangsamoro-region>

References

- Ellis-Petersen, H. (2018, February 8). ICC launches crimes against humanity inquiry into Duterte's war on drugs. The Guardian. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/08/icc-claims-crimes-against-humanity-duterte-philippines>
- Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2013). Davao, Philippines. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Davao-City>
- Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2013). Marawi, Philippines. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Marawi>
- Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2017). Sulu archipelago. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sulu-Archipelago>
- Encyclopaedia Britannica. (n.d.). Tausug. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Tausug>
- Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2018). Zamboanga city, Philippines. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Zamboanga-City>
- Esmaguell II, P. (2020, April 25). Wrath of God vs infidels: Terrorists exploiting COVID-19. Rappler. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.rappler.com/world/global-affairs/terrorist-groups-exploiting-covid-19>
- Equal Access International. (2020). Turning the loop: Bridging generations of peace influencers. OURmindaNOW Summit 2020. Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines.
- Fonbuena, C. (2017, June 14). I met a former Maute soldier. He's a child. Rappler. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://rappler.com/news-break/in-depth/maute-child-soldiers-marawi>
- Gavilan, J. (2017, May 28). Fast facts: Poverty in Mindanao. Rappler. Retrieved 11 July 2020 from <https://www.rappler.com/news-break/iq/171135-fast-facts-poverty-mindanao>

References

- Glazzard, A. & Zeuthen, M. (2016). Professional development reading pack: Violent extremism. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at http://www.gsdr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Violent-extremism_RP.pdf
- Global indexes. (2020, November 05). Retrieved from <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps>
- Global Terrorism Index 2020: The ten countries most impacted by terrorism. (2020, December 04). Retrieved from <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/global-terrorism-index-2020-the-ten-countries-most-impacted-by-terrorism/>
- Gloria, G. (2013, September 14). Misuari, myths and the MNLF. Rappler. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/misuari-myths-mnlf>
- GMA News. (2008, December 6). MILF slams anti-MOA 'victory celebration' in Zambo. GMA News Online. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/regions/137836/milf-slams-anti-moa-victory-celebration-in-zambo/story/>
- Gotinga, J. (2019, July 24). AFP confirms report: Indonesian couple behind Jolo cathedral bombing. Rappler. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.rappler.com/nation/afp-confirms-report-indonesian-couple-behind-jolo-cathedral-bombing>
- Harper, E. (2018). Reconceptualizing the drivers of violent extremism: An agenda for child and youth resilience. Retrieved 21 January 2021 at https://www.tdh.ch/sites/default/files/tdh_wana_pve_en_light.pdf
- Holmer, G., & Bauman, P. (2018). Taking stock: Analytical tools for understanding and designing P/CVE programs. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/preventing-counteracting-violent-extremism-takingstock.pdf>

References

- Human Rights Watch. (2020). UN rights body should reject misuse of “deradicalization” agenda as pretext for violations. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/05/un-rights-body-should-reject-misuse-deradicalization-agenda-pretext-violations>
- Hwang, J. (2019). Relatives, redemption, and rice: Motivations for joining the Maute group. Retrieved 4 October 2020 at <https://ctc.usma.edu/relatives-redemption-rice-motivations-joining-maute-group/>
- Institute for Autonomy and Governance. (2017). Research on youth vulnerability to violent extremism in Muslim Mindanao. Retrieved 16 September 2020 at http://iag.org.ph/images/pdf/Research_on_Youth_Vulnerability_to_VE_in_the_ARMM.pdf
- International Alert. (2015). Island trading in the Philippines. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.international-alert.org/news/island-trading-philippines>
- International Crisis Group. (2011). The communist insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and talks. Retrieved 16 September 2020 at <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/202-the-communist-insurgency-in-the-philippines-tactics-and-talks.pdf>
- Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC). (2017). Marawi, the “East Asia Wilayah” and Indonesia. Retrieved 21 January 2021 at http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/07/IPAC_Report_38.pdf
- International Republican Institute. (2019). Violent extremism in the Philippines: Endemic conflict, volatile politics and the struggle for identity. Retrieved 16 September 2020 at https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/philippines_ve_report_-_winter_2018.pdf
- Job Manahan, A. N. (2020, December 09). 'Inulila ang buong bayan': Nephew of slain Los Baños mayor rails against gov't narco list. Retrieved from <https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/12/09/20/inulila-ang-buong-bayan-nephew-of-slain-los-baos-mayor-rails-against-govt-narco-list>

References

- Latip-Yusoph, S. N.D. (n.d.). A gender snapshot of the Marawi conflict. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/oxfam-marawi-conflict-gender-snapshot_final_0_1.pdf
- Libretext. (2020). Theories of socialization. Retrieved 21 January 2021 at [https://socialsci.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Sociology/-Book%3A_Sociology_\(Boundless\)/04%3A_The_Role_of_Socialization/4.03%3A_Theories_of_Socialization/4.3A%3A_Theories_of_Socialization](https://socialsci.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Sociology/-Book%3A_Sociology_(Boundless)/04%3A_The_Role_of_Socialization/4.03%3A_Theories_of_Socialization/4.3A%3A_Theories_of_Socialization)
- Levine, J., Moreland, R.L. & Ryan, C. (1998). Group socialization and intergroup relations. *Intergroup cognition and intergroup behavior*. 283-308. Retrieved 21 January 2021 at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312607553_Group_socialization_and_intergroup_relations
- Luczon, N. (2019). NPA couple who started as child soldiers yields in Bukidnon. Retrieved 17 September 2020 at <https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1074534>
- Nanes, M. & Lau, B. (2018). Surveys and countering violent extremism: A practitioner guide. Accessed 11 July 2020 from <https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Surveys-and-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf>
- Nario-Galace, J. (2019). UN women: Guidance on implementing gender provisions in the Philippine national action plan on P/CVE. Retrieved 11 July 2020 from https://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/field%20office%20eseasia/docs/publications/2019/07/ap-bls19221_action-plan_004_web.pdf?la=en&vs=1534
- Nemr, C. & Savage, S. (2019). Integrative complexity interventions to prevent and counter violent extremism. Retrieved 25 July 2020 at <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep20332>
- Nivette, A., et. al., (2017). Developmental predictors of violent extremism attitudes. A test of general strain theory. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022427817699035>

References

- Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP). (2020). OPAPP to CPP-NPA: Stop using 'child-warriors' to fight your war. Retrieved 16 September 2020 at <https://peace.gov.ph/2020/02/opapp-to-cpp-npa-stop-using-child-warriors-to-fight-your-war/?fbclid=IwAR0WRunGCsITTKonXVdujh5wwqd6edYHpHFHNSVS RA8KdWEv2KWJ7YgXSM0>
- Palicte, C. (2020). Mayor Sara condemns NPA attack in Paquibato village. Retrieved 4 October 2020 at <https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1100768>
- PhilAtlas. (n.d.) Marawi: Province of Lanao del Sur. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.philatlas.com/mindanao/armm/lanao-del-sur/marawi.html>
- Philippine Statistics Authority. (2017). Demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Davao city. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/11_Davao%20City.pdf
- Philippine Statistics Authority. (2019). Age and sex structure of Marawi city. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <http://rssoarmm.psa.gov.ph/release/content/special/55328>
- Philippine Statistics Authority. (2016). Population of the National Capital Region. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://psa.gov.ph/content/population-national-capital-region-based-2015-census-population-0>
- Philippine Statistics Authority. (2016). Population of region IX - Zamboanga Peninsula. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://psa.gov.ph/content/population-region-ix-zamboanga-peninsula-based-2015-census-population-and-housing>
- Philippine Statistics Authority. (2016). Population of region IX - Zamboanga Peninsula. Retrieved 2 February 2020 at <http://rsso11.psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/Factsheet%20Religions%20in%20Mindanao%2C%202015.pdf>
- Philippine Statistics Authority. (2002). Population growth rate at 3.56 percent in Zamboanga city. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://psa.gov.ph/content/population-growth-rate-356-percent-zamboanga-city>

References

- Philrights. (n.d.). Deadly playgrounds: The phenomenon of child soldiers in the Philippines. Retrieved 17 September 2020 at https://www.slide-serve.com/sandra_john/deadly-play-grounds-the-phenomenon-of-child-soldiers-in-the-philippines
- Peel, M. (2017, February 1). Drugs and death in Davao: The making of Rodrigo Duterte. The Financial Times. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.ft.com/content/9d6225dc-e805-11e6-967b-c88452263daf>
- Regencia, T. (2019, October 23). Delay in return 'boosts ISIL recruitment' in Philippines' Marawi. Aljazeera. Retrieved 11 July 2020 from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/delay-return-boosting-isil-recruitment-philippines-marawi-191022063320387.html>.
- Ressa, M. (2016, September 5). Who's behind the Davao bombing?. Rappler. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/who-is-behind-davao-bombing>
- Reuters in Manila. (2004, October 12). Six accused of ferry bombing. The Guardian. Retrieved 21 January 2021 at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/12/alqaida.terrorism>
- Rood, S. (2013). Zamboanga tragedy: A pivot point in the Mindanao peace process. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://asiafoundation.org/2013/10/09/zamboanga-tragedy-a-pivot-point-in-the-mindanao-peace-process/>
- Saada, N. (2017, February 8). Kissa and dawat: The 1974 battle of Jolo, narratives and quest for social conscience. Minda News. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2017/02/kissa-and-dawat-the-1974-battle-of-jolo-narratives-and-quest-for-social-conscience/>
- Saguisag, R. (2019, February 1). Historical injustices; the 1974 'Jolo-caust'. The Manila Times. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.manila-times.net/2019/02/01/opinion/columnists/topanalysis/historical-injustices-the-1974-jolo-caust/504850/>

References

- Salvador, J. (2014, October 25). 6 Zamboanga city facts you may not know about. SunStar Philippines. Retrieved 21 January 2021 at <https://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/374221/Local-News/6-Zamboanga-City-facts-you-may-not-know-about>
- Santos, Jr. S., & Santos, P. (2010). Primed and purposeful: Armed groups and human security efforts in the Philippines. Retrieved 16 September 2020 at <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/-book-12-Philippines/SAS-Armed-Groups-Human-Security-Efforts-Philippines.pdf>
- Silverio, R. (n.d.). Engaging non-state armed groups through human rights education: Experience with youth from southern Philippines. Retrieved 17 September 2020 at <https://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/asia-pacific/section1/10Silverio.pdf>
- Stanford University. (2018). Mapping militant organizations: Communist party of the Philippines - new people's army. Retrieved 4 October 2020 at <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/communist-party-philippines-new-peoples-army>
- Stanford University. (2019). Mapping militant organizations: Moro National Liberation Front. Retrieved 4 October 2020 at <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/moro-national-liberation-front>
- Strachan, A. (2015). Conflict analysis of Muslim Mindanao. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/307107685_Conflict_analysis_of_Muslim_Mindanao
- Stephens, W. et. al., (2019). Preventing violent extremism: A review of the literature. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1543144?needAccess=true>
- United Nations Development Programme. (2016). Survey of the drivers of youth radicalism and violent extremism in Serbia. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at http://www.cesid.rs/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/UNDP_SRB_drivers-of-youth-radicalism-and-violent-extremism.pdf

References

- United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). (2017). Philippines: Marawi city armed conflict displacement snapshot. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ocha_phl_marawi_city_armed_conflict_displacement_snapshot_9_june_2017.pdf
- The Asia Foundation. (2013). Preventing rido: A practical guide for the police and other community peacekeepers. Retrieved 9 October 2020 at <https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/PreventingRido.pdf>
- The Asia Foundation. (2019). Trade in the Sulu archipelago: Informal economies amidst maritime security challenges. Retrieved 15 September 2020 at <https://asiafoundation.org/publication/trade-in-the-sulu-archipelago-informal-economies-amidst-maritime-security-challenges/>
- The Asia Foundation. (2020). Children of war: A rapid needs assessment of orphans in Muslim Mindanao. Retrieved 15 September 2020 at <https://asiafoundation.org/publication/children-of-war-a-rapid-needs-assessment-of-orphans-in-muslim-mindanao/>
- The Asia Foundation & Rappler, Inc. (2018). Understanding violent extremism: Messaging and recruitment strategies on social media in the Philippines. Retrieved 15 September 2020 at <https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Understanding-Violent-Extremism-Messaging-and-Recruitment-on-Social-Media-in-the-Philippines.pdf>
- The Associated Press. (2005, February 14). Terror group claims 3 blasts in Philippines. NBC News. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6967810/ns/world_news/t/terror-group-claims-blasts-philippines/#.XqkXM54zbIU
- The Stabilisation Network. (2019). Violent extremism in the Philippines: A country needs assessment.
- Torres, W. (2014). Rido: Clan feuding and conflict management in Mindanao. Retrieved 9 October 2020 at <https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Rido-TOC.pdf>

References

- Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission. (2017). Listening process report. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <http://cdn.viiworksdemo.com/pdf/b-jov-TJRC%20Listening%20Process%20Report.pdf>
- United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (n.d.). Abu sayyaf group. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/abu-sayyaf-group
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (2017). Preventing violent extremism through education. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/policymakr.pdf>
- Villamor, F. (2017, January 13). Philippine police arrest 2 more in September bombing of night market. New York Times. Retrieved 11 July 2020 at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/world/asia/philippines-davao-attack-maute.html>
- Villero, J. (2010). Deadly playgrounds: Child soldiering in the Philippines. Accessed 17 September 2020 at <https://www.philrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Deadly-playgrounds.pdf>
- World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Philippines. (2020, January 16). Retrieved January 26, 2021, from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/philippines>



Extremely
TOGETHER

PHILLIPPINES - PANAGHIUSA

www.kofiannanfoundation.org/extremely-together